Ja, zu Jahresbeginn in Rekordtempo, dann bewusst nicht mehr. Vorl\u00e4ufige Handelsdaten zeigen, dass China seine Roh\u00f6lbest\u00e4nde Anfang 2026 um etwa 1,24 Millionen Barrel pro Tag aufstockte, \u00fcber dem Durchschnitt von rund 1,1 Millionen Barrel pro Tag im Jahr 2025. Dadurch beliefen sich die Gesamtbest\u00e4nde auf fast 1,4 Milliarden Barrel. Die Unterbrechung der Stra\u00dfe von Hormus Ende Februar ver\u00e4nderte die Lieferketten: Als der Brent-Preis auf \u00fcber 100 US-Dollar pro Barrel stieg, reduzierte China die Importe bis Mai auf etwa 7,8 Millionen Barrel pro Tag \u2013 den niedrigsten Stand seit fast zehn Jahren \u2013 und griff auf seine Lagerbest\u00e4nde zur\u00fcck, anstatt die gestiegenen Preise zu nutzen. Die Prognosen der EIA (ca. 1,0 Millionen Barrel pro Tag) und der FGE (ca. 730.000 Barrel pro Tag) vor der Krise pr\u00e4gen weiterhin das Bild f\u00fcr das Gesamtjahr: Der Ausbau der Lagerbest\u00e4nde setzt sich fort, und es wird erwartet, dass die Akkumulation mit der Normalisierung der Preise wieder ansteigt.<\/p>\n
Bis 2025 stockte China seine strategischen und kommerziellen Roh\u00f6lreserven um durchschnittlich rund 1,1 Millionen Barrel pro Tag auf \u2013 die schnellste kontinuierliche Aufstockung, die je ein Land verzeichnet hat. Bis Dezember 2025 beliefen sich die Gesamtbest\u00e4nde auf fast 1,4 Milliarden Barrel: etwa 360 Millionen Barrel in der direkt staatlich kontrollierten strategischen Reserve und rund 1 Milliarde Barrel in kommerziellen Tanks, die Peking zunehmend als strategisch einstuft, nachdem die staatlichen \u00d6lgesellschaften angewiesen wurden, Notfallreserven zu halten.<\/p>\n
Das neue Jahr begann noch rasanter. Vorl\u00e4ufige Handels- und Regierungsdaten f\u00fcr Anfang 2026 deuten auf einen Zuwachs von rund 1,24 Millionen Barrel pro Tag hin. Dies liegt zwar unter dem Rekordmonatswert vom Dezember, aber \u00fcber dem Durchschnitt f\u00fcr das Gesamtjahr 2025. Die Erkl\u00e4rung daf\u00fcr war einfach: Die Preise zu Beginn des Jahres 2026 bewegten sich weiterhin in einem f\u00fcr Peking attraktiven Bereich, neue Tankkapazit\u00e4ten wurden im Rahmen des staatlichen Programms in Betrieb genommen, und die politische Anweisung zur Bevorratung blieb unver\u00e4ndert.<\/p>\n
None of this is officially published. Beijing releases no reserve statistics, so every figure here is an estimate assembled from customs data, satellite tank-gauging and refinery runs, the same triangulation that produces the range of numbers explored across our companion dossiers on the stockpile’s size and days of cover.<\/p>\n
From late February 2026 the conflict in the Middle East largely closed the Strait of Hormuz, the chokepoint that normally carries around 20 percent of the world’s oil and roughly 45 percent of China’s crude imports. Brent moved above 100 dollars a barrel for the first time in roughly four years, and on 11 March the International Energy Agency authorised its largest ever coordinated release, 400 million barrels from member reserves.<\/p>\n
China, das nicht der IEA angeh\u00f6rt, reagierte auf die Krise mit einer eigenen Strategie. Anstatt zu Krisenpreisen auf knappe Rohstoffe zu bieten, stellte das Land die Bef\u00fcllung seiner Tanks ein und begann, diese zu leeren. Zolldaten zeigen, dass die Importe bis Mai auf etwa 7,8 Millionen Barrel pro Tag sanken, verglichen mit einem F\u00fcnfjahresdurchschnitt von rund 11 Millionen \u2013 der niedrigste Stand seit fast zehn Jahren. Dieser einzelne R\u00fcckgang trug zu etwa 74 Prozent des R\u00fcckgangs im globalen Roh\u00f6lhandel w\u00e4hrend der Krise bei.<\/p>\n
The effect surprised forecasters who had priced a far worse spike. By absorbing its own demand shock from storage, China removed the world’s largest buyer from a panicked market at exactly the moment supply was shortest. The stockpile did precisely what it was built to do, and its scale, near 1.4 billion barrels against the government’s own three-month import-cover target, is why Beijing could afford to do it for months rather than weeks.<\/p>\n
Die vor der Krise erstellten Prognosen beschreiben weiterhin den von beiden Institutionen erwarteten Kurs. Die US-Energieinformationsbeh\u00f6rde (EIA) ging davon aus, dass China seine strategischen Reserven bis 2026 mit knapp 1 Million Barrel pro Tag weiter ausbauen und das Wachstum ab 2027 verlangsamen w\u00fcrde. Das Beratungsunternehmen FGE prognostizierte einen Anstieg der Lagerbest\u00e4nde um etwa 266 Millionen Barrel im Laufe des Jahres, was einem Durchschnitt von rund 730.000 Barrel pro Tag entspricht. Beide Prognosen deuten darauf hin, dass der krisenbedingte R\u00fcckgang eine Pause innerhalb eines l\u00e4ngerfristigen Akkumulationsprozesses darstellt, nicht dessen Ende.<\/p>\n
Das konkrete Programm deutet in dieselbe Richtung. Staatliche Unternehmen wie Sinopec und CNOOC bauen ihre Speicherkapazit\u00e4t bis 2025 und 2026 an elf Standorten um mindestens 169 Millionen Barrel aus. Der chinesische Erd\u00f6l- und Petrochemieverband hat sich zum Ziel gesetzt, die staatlichen Reserven auf \u00fcber eine Milliarde Barrel zu erh\u00f6hen, was explizit einer Nettoimportdeckung von drei Monaten entspricht. Leere Tanks werden daher regelm\u00e4\u00dfig zum Kauf angeboten.<\/p>\n
Timing is the only real question, and China’s own behaviour supplies the rule: it accelerates purchases when prices are soft and steps back when they spike. A durable reopening of Hormuz and a Brent price returning toward pre-crisis levels would recreate exactly the conditions under which China stockpiled hardest, this time with more tankage to fill and a fresh demonstration of why the buffer is worth holding.<\/p>\n
Da Peking nichts ver\u00f6ffentlicht, muss die Entwicklung bis 2026 anhand der Kapitalfl\u00fcsse und nicht anhand von Aussagen interpretiert werden. Betrachtet man die einzelnen Perioden, ergibt sich ein schl\u00fcssiges Muster: ein Rekordaufbau, solange die Preise dies zulie\u00dfen, ein gezielter R\u00fcckgang, als dies nicht mehr m\u00f6glich war, und Prognosen, die davon ausgehen, dass der Aufbau nach einer Normalisierung der Lage wieder aufgenommen wird.<\/p>\n
Jede Zahl birgt den Vorbehalt, der f\u00fcr dieses gesamte Feld gilt: Es handelt sich um Sch\u00e4tzungen, die auf Zolldaten, Tankerverfolgung und Satellitenmessungen basieren, und unterschiedliche Methoden f\u00fchren zu unterschiedlichen Ergebnissen. Die Richtung der einzelnen Phasen ist jedoch unstrittig.<\/p>\n
| Zeitraum<\/th>\n | Gesch\u00e4tzter Durchfluss<\/th>\n | Was es signalisiert<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n |
|---|---|---|
| 2025 volles Jahr<\/td>\n | Die Geb\u00e4ude werden im Durchschnitt mit etwa 1,1 Millionen Barrel pro Tag bef\u00fcllt.<\/td>\n | Rekordverd\u00e4chtiger Ausgangswert; die Gesamtbest\u00e4nde erreichen fast 1,4 Milliarden Barrel.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n |
| Januar bis Februar 2026<\/td>\n | Die Produktionskapazit\u00e4t betr\u00e4gt rund 1,24 Millionen Barrel pro Tag.<\/td>\n | Beschleunigung \u00fcber dem Durchschnitt von 2025 bei gleichzeitig attraktiven Preisen.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n |
| M\u00e4rz bis Mai 2026<\/td>\n | Die Importe sanken auf etwa 7,8 Millionen Barrel pro Tag; Nettoabfluss<\/td>\n | Krisenreaktion: Vorr\u00e4te verbrauchen, anstatt auf einem stark steigenden Markt einzukaufen.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n |
| Zweites Halbjahr 2026 (Prognose)<\/td>\n | Es werden Produktionsmengen von etwa 0,7 bis 1,0 Millionen Barrel pro Tag erwartet.<\/td>\n | Sowohl EIA als auch FGE gehen davon aus, dass die Akkumulation wieder einsetzt, sobald sich die Preise normalisieren.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n |
| Kapazit\u00e4tsprogramm<\/td>\n | 169 Millionen Barrel neuer Tankkapazit\u00e4t an 11 Standorten<\/td>\n | Das staatliche Ziel von \u00fcber einer Milliarde Barrel Reservekapazit\u00e4t h\u00e4lt den Ausbau am Laufen.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\nDas kommerzielle Signal innerhalb der Pause<\/h2>\nDer wichtigste wirtschaftliche Unterschied in diesem Zusammenhang liegt im Unterschied zwischen der Auslastung und dem Kapazit\u00e4tsprogramm. Die Auslastung korreliert mit dem \u00d6lpreis und stagnierte im M\u00e4rz. Das Kapazit\u00e4tsprogramm hingegen \u2013 die Tiefbauarbeiten, Stahltanks, Pipelineanschl\u00fcsse, Messtechnik, Instrumentierung, Brandschutzma\u00dfnahmen, Inspektion und Zertifizierung an elf Standorten \u2013 folgt den staatlichen Planungszyklen und wurde nicht unterbrochen. Die Lieferanten, die in den Ausbau investieren, investieren in das Programm, nicht in den Preis.<\/p>\n The cycle also moves adjacent markets in both directions. China’s stockpiling swings are now large enough to reshape seaborne crude flows, tanker demand and port throughput on their own: the 2025 build pulled shipping demand forward, and the 2026 drawdown removed it just as sharply. Any supplier whose revenue tracks Chinese import volumes, from marine logistics to inspection services, is exposed to a reserve policy that is decided without publication and read only through flows.<\/p>\n F\u00fcr Marketing- und Strategieteams im Energiesektor ist diese Episode auch eine wichtige Lektion in Sachen Nachfrageanalyse. Die Fragen, die K\u00e4ufer und Analysten stellen \u2013 wie viel produziert China zus\u00e4tzlich, ist das Wachstum zum Erliegen gekommen, wann wird es wieder anziehen \u2013 erreichen ihren H\u00f6hepunkt genau dann, wenn der Markt am unsichersten ist. Unternehmen, die diese Fragen glaubw\u00fcrdig beantworten, gewinnen die Aufmerksamkeit, die ihnen zuteilwird. Aus diesem Grund gibt es diese Seite, und die gleiche Logik der Antwortfindung gilt f\u00fcr jede B2B-Marke im Energiesektor, deren Expertise sich mit den Fragen deckt, die der Markt aktiv stellt.<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" China entered 2026 adding an estimated 1.24 million barrels a day to its oil reserves, then the Hormuz crisis flipped it from builder to buffer: imports fell to 7.8 million barrels a day and China drew on its 1.4 billion barrel stockpile instead of buying the spike. What the flows show, and when building resumes.<\/p>","protected":false},"author":12,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"iawp_total_views":2,"p54_article_data":"{\"meta\":{\"kicker\":\"Insight \u00b7 Energy\",\"topics\":[\"Energy\",\"Strategy\",\"Capital\"],\"title\":\"Is China Still Adding to Its Oil Reserves in 2026? The Record Build, the Hormuz Shock, and What Comes Next\",\"dek\":\"China entered 2026 stockpiling crude faster than ever, adding an estimated 1.24 million barrels a day to inventories in the opening weeks of the year, above even 2025's record average of 1.1 million barrels a day. Then the Strait of Hormuz disruption turned the world's biggest oil buyer into its biggest shock absorber: imports fell to roughly 7.8 million barrels a day by May, the lowest in nearly a decade, and China drew on its estimated 1.4 billion barrel stockpile rather than chase a spiking market. Here is what the trade data show, why the pause is not the end of the buildout, and what the stockpiling cycle signals for suppliers watching the world's largest storage programme.\",\"date\":\"3 July 2026\",\"readTime\":\"9 min read\",\"author\":\"Project 54\",\"listenTime\":\"21 min listen\"},\"quickAnswer\":{\"q\":\"Is China still adding to its oil reserves in 2026?\",\"a\":\"Yes at the start of the year, at record pace, then deliberately not. Preliminary trade data show China adding about 1.24 million barrels a day to crude inventories in early 2026, above the roughly 1.1 million barrels a day averaged across 2025, which left total stocks near 1.4 billion barrels. The Strait of Hormuz disruption from late February changed the flow: with Brent spiking above 100 dollars a barrel, China cut imports to about 7.8 million barrels a day by May, its lowest in nearly a decade, and drew on stockpiles instead of buying the spike. Pre-crisis forecasts from the EIA, about 1.0 million barrels a day of builds, and FGE, about 730,000 barrels a day, still frame the full-year picture: the storage buildout continues, and accumulation is expected to resume as prices normalise.\"},\"takeaways\":[\"China opened 2026 stockpiling faster than ever: preliminary data show additions of about 1.24 million barrels a day in the opening weeks, above 2025's record average of about 1.1 million barrels a day, which had already lifted total crude inventories to nearly 1.4 billion barrels.\",\"The Strait of Hormuz disruption flipped China from builder to buffer. Imports fell to about 7.8 million barrels a day by May 2026, the lowest in nearly a decade, and China's cut accounted for roughly 74 percent of the decrease in global crude trade.\",\"The drawdown is the reserve working as designed. By consuming from storage instead of bidding for scarce cargoes at over 100 dollars a barrel, China absorbed the shock and helped keep the global price spike contained.\",\"The buildout logic survives the pause. Pre-crisis forecasts saw 2026 builds of 0.7 to 1.0 million barrels a day, and the capacity programme, at least 169 million barrels of new tankage across 11 sites and a state target above 1 billion barrels, remains in place.\",\"For suppliers, the fill rate and the capacity programme are different markets. Tankage, instrumentation, inspection and marine logistics contracts run on the storage buildout, not the oil price, and the buildout has not stopped.\"],\"sections\":[{\"id\":\"record-build\",\"q\":\"How fast was China adding oil to its reserves before the crisis?\",\"h\":\"Record accumulation into early 2026\",\"p\":[\"Through 2025 China added crude oil to its combined strategic and commercial inventories at an average of about 1.1 million barrels a day, the fastest sustained accumulation any country has ever run. By December 2025 total stocks stood near 1.4 billion barrels: roughly 360 million barrels in the directly government-controlled strategic reserve and around 1 billion barrels in commercial tanks that Beijing increasingly treats as strategic, having directed its national oil companies to hold emergency barrels.\",\"The new year began faster still. Preliminary trade and government data for early 2026 indicate additions of about 1.24 million barrels a day, below the record monthly pace set in December but above the full-year 2025 average. The logic was straightforward: prices entering 2026 remained in a range Beijing considered attractive, new tankage was coming online across the state programme, and the political instruction to stockpile had not changed.\",\"None of this is officially published. Beijing releases no reserve statistics, so every figure here is an estimate assembled from customs data, satellite tank-gauging and refinery runs, the same triangulation that produces the range of numbers explored across our companion dossiers on the stockpile's size and days of cover.\"]},{\"id\":\"hormuz-flip\",\"q\":\"What did the Strait of Hormuz disruption change?\",\"h\":\"From builder to buffer: the flip in the second quarter\",\"p\":[\"From late February 2026 the conflict in the Middle East largely closed the Strait of Hormuz, the chokepoint that normally carries around 20 percent of the world's oil and roughly 45 percent of China's crude imports. Brent moved above 100 dollars a barrel for the first time in roughly four years, and on 11 March the International Energy Agency authorised its largest ever coordinated release, 400 million barrels from member reserves.\",\"China, which sits outside the IEA system, ran its own response. Rather than bid for scarce cargoes at crisis prices, it stopped filling tanks and started emptying them. Customs data show imports falling to about 7.8 million barrels a day by May, against a five-year average around 11 million, the lowest level in nearly a decade. That single cut accounted for roughly 74 percent of the decrease in global crude trade during the crisis.\",\"The effect surprised forecasters who had priced a far worse spike. By absorbing its own demand shock from storage, China removed the world's largest buyer from a panicked market at exactly the moment supply was shortest. The stockpile did precisely what it was built to do, and its scale, near 1.4 billion barrels against the government's own three-month import-cover target, is why Beijing could afford to do it for months rather than weeks.\"]},{\"id\":\"resumption\",\"q\":\"Will China resume stockpiling in the second half of 2026?\",\"h\":\"The forecasts, and the logic that survives the shock\",\"p\":[\"The forecasts made before the crisis still describe the trajectory both agencies expect to reassert itself. The US Energy Information Administration assumed China would keep building strategic stockpiles at close to 1.0 million barrels a day through 2026 before slowing in 2027. Consultancy FGE projected inventories rising by about 266 million barrels across the year, roughly 730,000 barrels a day on average. Both imply that the crisis drawdown is a pause inside a longer accumulation, not the end of it.\",\"The physical programme points the same way. State companies including Sinopec and CNOOC are adding at least 169 million barrels of storage capacity across 11 sites through 2025 and 2026, and the China Petroleum and Petrochemical Industry Federation has set an intention to lift state reserve capacity above 1 billion barrels, explicitly framed as three months of net import cover. Empty tanks are a standing instruction to buy.\",\"Timing is the only real question, and China's own behaviour supplies the rule: it accelerates purchases when prices are soft and steps back when they spike. A durable reopening of Hormuz and a Brent price returning toward pre-crisis levels would recreate exactly the conditions under which China stockpiled hardest, this time with more tankage to fill and a fresh demonstration of why the buffer is worth holding.\"]},{\"id\":\"ledger\",\"q\":\"How do the 2026 numbers fit together?\",\"h\":\"The stockpiling ledger, period by period\",\"p\":[\"Because Beijing publishes nothing, the 2026 story has to be read from flows rather than statements. Laid out period by period, the pattern is coherent: a record build while prices allowed it, a deliberate drawdown when they did not, and forecasts that expect the build to resume once conditions normalise.\",\"Every figure carries the caveat that runs through this whole cluster: these are estimates built from customs data, tanker tracking and satellite gauging, and different methodologies produce different numbers. The direction of each phase, however, is not in dispute.\"],\"table\":{\"cols\":[\"Period\",\"Estimated flow\",\"What it signals\"],\"rows\":[[\"2025 full year\",\"Builds averaging about 1.1 million b\/d\",\"The record baseline; total stocks reach nearly 1.4 billion barrels\"],[\"January to February 2026\",\"Builds around 1.24 million b\/d\",\"Acceleration above the 2025 average while prices stayed attractive\"],[\"March to May 2026\",\"Imports cut to about 7.8 million b\/d; net drawdown\",\"Crisis response: consume from storage rather than buy a spiking market\"],[\"Second half 2026 (forecast)\",\"Builds of roughly 0.7 to 1.0 million b\/d expected\",\"EIA and FGE both expect accumulation to resume as prices normalise\"],[\"Capacity programme\",\"169 million barrels of new tankage across 11 sites\",\"State target above 1 billion barrels of reserve capacity keeps the buildout running\"]]}},{\"id\":\"commercial-signal\",\"q\":\"What does the stockpiling cycle mean for suppliers and marketers?\",\"h\":\"The commercial signal inside the pause\",\"p\":[\"The most important commercial distinction in this story is between the fill rate and the capacity programme. The fill rate moves with the oil price and stopped moving in March. The capacity programme, the civil works, steel tankage, pipeline tie-ins, metering, instrumentation, fire suppression, inspection and certification across 11 sites, runs on state planning cycles and did not stop. Suppliers selling into the buildout are selling into the programme, not the price.\",\"The cycle also moves adjacent markets in both directions. China's stockpiling swings are now large enough to reshape seaborne crude flows, tanker demand and port throughput on their own: the 2025 build pulled shipping demand forward, and the 2026 drawdown removed it just as sharply. Any supplier whose revenue tracks Chinese import volumes, from marine logistics to inspection services, is exposed to a reserve policy that is decided without publication and read only through flows.\",\"For marketing and strategy teams in the energy sector, the episode is also a demand-intelligence lesson. The questions buyers and analysts ask, how much is China adding, has it stopped, when will it resume, spike exactly when the market is most uncertain, and the organisations that answer them credibly capture that attention. That is the reason this page exists, and the same answer-engine logic applies to any energy B2B brand whose expertise maps to questions the market is actively asking.\"]}],\"media\":{\"image\":{\"src\":\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/lighthouse-coastal-energy.jpg\",\"label\":\"China's storage buildout kept running through the 2026 price shock: the fill rate paused, the capacity programme did not.\",\"credit\":\"Project 54\"},\"infographicLabel\":\"China's 2026 stockpiling cycle: record builds in January and February, crisis drawdown from March, forecast resumption in the second half\",\"pdf\":{\"href\":\"\/wp-content\/themes\/p54-blueprint\/assets\/pdf\/is-china-still-stockpiling-oil-2026.pdf\",\"title\":\"China's 2026 Oil Stockpiling Cycle: Briefing Deck\",\"meta\":\"9-slide briefing \u00b7 Project 54\"},\"podcast\":{\"src\":\"\/wp-content\/themes\/p54-blueprint\/assets\/media\/is-china-still-stockpiling-oil-2026-podcast.m4a\",\"title\":\"China's Invisible Oil Buffer Dictates Global Flows\",\"ep\":\"P54 Energy Growth Brief\",\"duration\":\"20:54\"}},\"poll\":{\"q\":\"China stockpiled at record pace, then drew down through the Hormuz crisis. What does the cycle tell you?\",\"note\":\"Your selection maps how you interpret China's reserve behaviour. No vote tallies, this is a reflection tool.\",\"options\":[{\"id\":\"a\",\"label\":\"A buffer working exactly as designed\",\"insight\":\"This reading treats the 2026 cycle as vindication: the point of holding 1.4 billion barrels is to consume them in a crisis instead of bidding against the world for scarce cargoes. Build cheap, draw dear, repeat.\"},{\"id\":\"b\",\"label\":\"A price actor now too big to ignore\",\"insight\":\"On this view the lesson is market power. When one buyer's stockpiling decisions account for three quarters of the swing in global crude trade, China's reserve policy has become a supply-side force comparable to an OPEC decision, set without publication or warning.\"},{\"id\":\"c\",\"label\":\"A cycle you can position for\",\"insight\":\"This reading is commercial. The drawdown is temporary, the tankage keeps growing, and the resumption of buying is forecastable within a range. Suppliers and traders who track the flows rather than the headlines get to the demand first.\"}]},\"faq\":[{\"q\":\"How much oil was China adding per day in early 2026?\",\"a\":\"Preliminary data indicate about 1.24 million barrels a day of additions in January and February 2026, above the roughly 1.1 million barrels a day averaged across 2025. The full context of the reserve programme is set out in our dossier on China's strategic petroleum reserve in 2026<\/a>.\"},{\"q\":\"Did China stop stockpiling during the Hormuz crisis?\",\"a\":\"Effectively yes. Customs data show imports falling to about 7.8 million barrels a day by May 2026, the lowest in nearly a decade, implying China was consuming from storage rather than adding to it. Beijing publishes no reserve data, so the switch is read from trade flows rather than official statements.\"},{\"q\":\"How big is China's total oil stockpile?\",\"a\":\"Best estimates put total crude inventories near 1.4 billion barrels entering 2026, roughly 360 million barrels in the government strategic reserve and around 1 billion barrels in commercial tanks. How that count is built is covered in our dossier on the barrel count<\/a>.\"},{\"q\":\"How many days of supply does the stockpile cover?\",\"a\":\"Around 120 to 130 days of import cover on most estimates, though the figure moves with the import denominator used. The methodology and the ranges are unpacked in our days-of-supply dossier<\/a>.\"},{\"q\":\"Does China's stockpiling follow IEA rules?\",\"a\":\"No. China is not an IEA member and carries no 90-day stockholding obligation, and it did not release stocks through the IEA's coordinated March 2026 action. How China compares to the benchmark anyway is examined in our dossier on the 90-day comparison<\/a>.\"}],\"newsletter\":{\"kicker\":\"The Energy Growth Brief\",\"title\":[\"Get the next\",\"intelligence drop\"],\"body\":\"Join energy and industrial leaders getting our marketing, AI-growth and revenue-architecture intelligence, direct, no filler.\",\"cadence\":\"Twice monthly\",\"reach\":\"Gulf \u00b7 MENA \u00b7 Asia \u00b7 Europe\",\"cta\":\"Subscribe\",\"note\":\"No spam. Unsubscribe anytime. We read every reply.\",\"success\":\"You're on the list\",\"successBody\":\"Welcome to The Energy Growth Brief, watch your inbox for the next dispatch.\"},\"related\":[{\"title\":\"China's Strategic Petroleum Reserve in 2026: Levels, Capacity, Days of Supply, and the Commercial Signal\",\"topic\":\"Energy\",\"href\":\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/china-strategic-petroleum-reserve-2026\/\"},{\"title\":\"How Many Barrels Are in China's Strategic Petroleum Reserve? Sizing the World's Largest Oil Stockpile\",\"topic\":\"Energy\",\"href\":\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/china-strategic-petroleum-reserve-barrels\/\"},{\"title\":\"How Does China Compare to the IEA 90-Day Benchmark? Why the Comparison Is Harder Than It Looks\",\"topic\":\"Energy\",\"href\":\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/china-iea-90-day-oil-stockholding-benchmark\/\"}]}","p54_faq":"","p54_media":"","p54_comments_enabled":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[92,125],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3560","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-analysis","category-strategy"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3560","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/12"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3560"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3560\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3562,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3560\/revisions\/3562"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3560"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3560"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3560"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}} |