China ver\u00f6ffentlicht so gut wie keine Angaben zu seinen \u00d6lreserven, daher beruhen alle Ihnen bekannten Zahlen auf Rekonstruktionen. Dieses Dossier erl\u00e4utert die drei von Analysten verwendeten Methoden, zeigt die tats\u00e4chliche Streuung zwischen ihnen auf und bietet Ihnen eine nachvollziehbare M\u00f6glichkeit, die Zahlen zu zitieren, ohne sie als Fakt darzustellen.<\/p>\n
Peking ver\u00f6ffentlicht keine regelm\u00e4\u00dfigen Daten zu den \u00d6lbest\u00e4nden, daher kennt keine Quelle die tats\u00e4chliche Zahl. Analysten rekonstruieren sie auf zwei Arten: Satellitenmessungen von Schwimmdachtanks (Kpler, Vortexa, Ursa Space Systems) und eine Angebotsbilanzberechnung, die Roh\u00f6limporte plus Inlandsproduktion abz\u00fcglich des Raffineriedurchsatzes ber\u00fccksichtigt und den Rest als Lageraufbau behandelt. Die beiden Methoden weichen voneinander ab, da Satelliten unterirdische Felskavernen oder Festdachtanks nicht erfassen k\u00f6nnen und die Angebotsbilanz auf Sch\u00e4tzungen der Raffinerieauslastung in volatilen, unabh\u00e4ngigen Raffinerien beruht. Die angegebene Tagesreichweite weicht dann erneut im Bezugsma\u00dfstab ab: Derselbe Lagerbestand von etwa 1,2 bis 1,4 Milliarden Barrel entspricht etwa 110 bis 130 Tagen im Verh\u00e4ltnis zu den Nettoimporten und deutlich weniger im Verh\u00e4ltnis zum Gesamtverbrauch. Jede einzelne Zahl, die ohne Angabe der Methode und des Bezugsma\u00dfstabs genannt wird, ist nicht pr\u00e4zise, sondern selektiv.<\/p>\n
China does not release routine crude inventory data. There is no weekly stocks report, no equivalent of the EIA’s Wednesday release, no audited annual filing. Inventory levels are treated as strategically sensitive, which is a rational position for a country whose principal energy vulnerability is a maritime chokepoint.<\/p>\n
Die Ausnahme best\u00e4tigt die Regel. Im Jahr 2018 gab das Nationale Statistikamt nationale Reserven in H\u00f6he von insgesamt 37,73 Millionen Tonnen, etwa 280,7 Millionen Barrel, zum Zeitpunkt Mitte 2017 bekannt.South China Morning Post<\/a>Es war das erste Mal, dass jemals eine offizielle Gesamtzahl ver\u00f6ffentlicht wurde; sie kam Monate nach dem beschriebenen Zeitraum an, und seitdem hat sich nichts in diesem Ausma\u00df regelm\u00e4\u00dfig wiederholt.<\/p>\n Alle im Umlauf befindlichen Zahlen, einschlie\u00dflich unserer, sind also Rekonstruktionen. Das ist keine Kritik an den Analysten, die diese Rekonstruktionen vornehmen. Es ist eine Tatsache der Daten, und sie sollte Ihre Art, die Zahl zu zitieren, beeinflussen.<\/p>\n Um zu verstehen, warum die Zahlen voneinander abweichen, muss man begreifen, dass sie nicht alle versuchen, dasselbe Objekt zu messen.<\/p>\n The divergence is not academic. The EIA put China’s strategic inventories at nearly 1.4 billion barrels as of December 2025, after average additions of 1.1 million barrels a day through 2025 (Umweltvertr\u00e4glichkeitspr\u00fcfung<\/a>). Kpler’s satellite and flow based tracking had onshore inventories at about 1,232 million barrels in late May 2026, down from a peak of 1,251 million in early May (Kpler, 25. Mai 2026<\/a>Der Reuters-Kolumnist Clyde Russell sch\u00e4tzte die kombinierten kommerziellen und strategischen Lagerbest\u00e4nde auf mindestens 1,2 Milliarden Barrel, wobei gleichzeitig Daten von Vortexa einen Rekordwert von 1,24 Milliarden Barrel im April 2026 angaben.<\/p>\n Die Akkumulationsrate weicht noch st\u00e4rker voneinander ab als das Niveau. Das Oxford Institute for Energy Studies fand ver\u00f6ffentlichte implizite Lagerbestandssch\u00e4tzungen f\u00fcr 2025, die von 0,43 bis 0,9 Millionen Barrel pro Tag reichen, gegen\u00fcber seinem eigenen zentralen Szenario von 0,75, und stellte fest, dass die Spanne zwischen den Analysten durchschnittlich etwa 0,5 Millionen Barrel pro Tag betr\u00e4gt und bis zu 1,1 Millionen erreichen kann.OIES, Mai 2026<\/a>Eine Differenz von 1,1 Millionen Barrel pro Tag ist gr\u00f6\u00dfer als die gesamte Tagesproduktion mehrerer OPEC-Mitglieder.<\/p>\n The most instructive case is historical. Analysts at Rice University’s Baker Institute, working with Orbital Insight satellite data, wrote that “at times in mid to late 2017, Orbital Insight’s data suggested total crude oil stockpiles in China were more than three times as large as the figures reported by Xinhua, a potential discrepancy of more than 500 million barrels” (Collins und Hung, Baker Institute, 2018<\/a>Eine halbe Milliarde Barrel betr\u00e4gt die Differenz zwischen einer teilweisen offiziellen Angabe und einer unabh\u00e4ngigen Messung im selben Land.<\/p>\n Invisible storage. A growing share of China’s strategic capacity is built in mined underground rock caverns rather than above ground steel. Shadow based satellite analysis cannot read it at all. The Baker Institute notes that underground caverns can cost more than 60 percent less per barrel of capacity than above ground tanks, so China has both a security incentive and a cost incentive to keep building storage that satellites cannot see.<\/p>\n Kommerzielle und strategische \u00d6lreserven lassen sich nicht von externen Faktoren trennen. Der Puffer besteht aus zwei miteinander verbundenen Schichten: einer staatlichen Reserve und einem wesentlich gr\u00f6\u00dferen Pool an kommerziellen \u00d6lreserven, die von CNPC, Sinopec und CNOOC gehalten werden und auf den Peking im Krisenfall zur\u00fcckgreifen kann. Ein externer Analyst kann ein bestimmtes \u00d6lfass nicht einer dieser Schichten zuordnen, daher weichen die Sch\u00e4tzungen allein schon davon ab, wo der Autor die Grenze zieht.<\/p>\n Die Auslastung der Raffinerien stellt einen schwachen Input dar. Unabh\u00e4ngige Raffinerien in Shandong erreichen etwa ein Viertel der nationalen Kapazit\u00e4t und weisen eine hohe Auslastung auf: Der nationale Durchschnitt fiel im Mai 2026 auf 66,3 Prozent, w\u00e4hrend die Anlagen in Shandong innerhalb einer Woche eine Auslastung von 50,5 Prozent erreichten. Da der Durchsatz einer der beiden wichtigsten Inputfaktoren f\u00fcr die Angebotsbilanz ist, wirkt sich ein Fehler in diesem Bereich direkt auf den impliziten Lageraufbau aus.<\/p>\n Apparent demand is a proxy, not a measurement. China’s apparent demand is refinery processing plus net product imports. There is a persistent gap of roughly 1.1 to 1.4 million barrels a day between crude supply and what refineries actually process. Some of that gap is statistical noise across customs, NBS and shipping data. The rest becomes the stock build. Small measurement errors therefore become large disagreements about storage.<\/p>\n Diesen Punkt \u00fcbersehen die meisten Leser. Die Anzahl der Tage, die der Vorrat reicht, ist ein Bruch, und der Z\u00e4hler ist nur die halbe Wahrheit.<\/p>\n The IEA measures its members’ 90 day obligation against net imports of the prior calendar year, a stable and audited figure. China’s headline day counts are frequently quoted instead against gross imports, or against total consumption, which runs well above net imports. Both are larger denominators, so both mechanically produce a smaller day count for exactly the same barrels.<\/p>\n So kommt es, dass eine glaubw\u00fcrdige Quelle von 90 Tagen und eine andere von 130 Tagen spricht, obwohl beide denselben Lagerbestand beschreiben. Keine der beiden Quellen l\u00fcgt. Sie rechnen lediglich mit unterschiedlichen Faktoren, und fast niemand gibt an, mit welchen. Die zugrundeliegenden Berechnungsmethoden haben wir in [Referenz einf\u00fcgen] dargelegt. das 90-Tage-Bestandsdossier der IEA<\/a>, und die Anzahl der Arbeitstage in Tage der Versorgung<\/a>.<\/p>\n Alle Angaben zu den chinesischen Lagerbest\u00e4nden sind als Spanne zu verstehen. Die Berechnungsmethode und der Nenner sind stets anzugeben. Mitte 2026 d\u00fcrften die gesamten chinesischen Roh\u00f6lbest\u00e4nde (staatliche Reserven und kommerzielle Best\u00e4nde) voraussichtlich zwischen 1,2 und 1,4 Milliarden Barrel liegen und sich nach den Reduzierungen w\u00e4hrend des Iran-Konflikts eher dem unteren Ende ann\u00e4hern. Auf Basis der Nettoimporte entspricht dies einer Deckung von etwa 110 bis 130 Tagen. Auf Basis der Bruttoimporte bzw. des Gesamtverbrauchs ergibt dieselbe Menge an Barrel eine k\u00fcrzere Deckungsdauer.<\/p>\n The practical rule for anyone writing, briefing or selling on this: cite the range with attribution, say plainly that Beijing publishes no confirming figure, and note that the number moves in near real time with China’s buying and refining behaviour, unlike the IEA’s fixed annual benchmark. A single number with no method attached is not more precise. It is just less honest.<\/p>\n Das ist auch der Grund daf\u00fcr. Die Undurchsichtigkeit selbst ist die Strategie.<\/a>, und warum die Sch\u00e4tzungen wirtschaftlich von Bedeutung sind: Dieselbe Unklarheit, die Analysten frustriert, gibt Peking in einer Krise Handlungsspielraum.<\/p>\n Da Peking keine regelm\u00e4\u00dfigen Daten zu den \u00d6lbest\u00e4nden ver\u00f6ffentlicht, rekonstruieren Analysten die Gesamtmenge anhand von Satellitenmessungen sichtbarer Tanks und der Differenz zwischen den vom Zoll gemeldeten Importen, der Inlandsproduktion und dem Raffineriedurchsatz. Diese Methode ist zwar zuverl\u00e4ssig, aber indirekt, weshalb jede ver\u00f6ffentlichte Zahl mit einer Fehlermarge behaftet und eine Sch\u00e4tzung, keine offizielle Statistik darstellt.<\/p>\n Da verschiedene Quellen unterschiedliche Methoden und Bezugsgr\u00f6\u00dfen f\u00fcr denselben Lagerbestand verwenden, kann ein Gesamtbestand von etwa 1,2 bis 1,4 Milliarden Barrel je nach Berechnungsmethode (Nettoimporte, Bruttoimporte oder Gesamtverbrauch) als Deckung f\u00fcr 110 bis 180 Tage angegeben werden. Laut OIES unterscheiden sich die Sch\u00e4tzungen der Analysten hinsichtlich der Lageraufbaurate um bis zu 1,1 Millionen Barrel pro Tag.<\/p>\n No. Satellites read the shadow cast by a floating roof on an above ground tank, which captures a large share of visible tank farms, more than 4,000 tanks in Ursa Space Systems’ coverage alone. They cannot see oil in mined underground rock caverns or fixed roof tanks, and China has both a cost incentive and a security incentive to keep building exactly that kind of storage.<\/p>\n Es handelt sich um eine Restberechnung: Inl\u00e4ndische Produktion plus Importe plus Pipeline-Lieferungen, abz\u00fcglich Raffinerieauslastung und Exporte, basierend auf Daten des chinesischen Zolls und des Nationalen Statistikamtes. Nicht raffiniertes oder nicht exportiertes Roh\u00f6l wird als eingelagert angenommen. Da die Berechnung auf Sch\u00e4tzungen der Raffinerieauslastung beruht, insbesondere bei volatilen, unabh\u00e4ngigen Raffinerien, f\u00fchren bereits kleine Fehler zu erheblichen Schwankungen der impliziten Produktionsmenge.<\/p>\n Selten und nur teilweise. Der eindeutigste Fall ist die Zahl des Nationalen Statistikamtes von 37,73 Millionen Tonnen (ca. 280,7 Millionen Barrel), die 2018 f\u00fcr Mitte 2017 ver\u00f6ffentlicht wurde. Xinhua ver\u00f6ffentlicht gelegentlich Daten zu kommerziellen Tankern, die jedoch nur einen Teil des Systems abdecken. Daher bleiben Satellitenmessungen und Sch\u00e4tzungen der Angebotsbilanz die wichtigsten Instrumente. Warum dieses Schweigen beabsichtigt ist, erfahren Sie in unserem Dossier. Warum China seine \u00d6lreserven nicht ver\u00f6ffentlicht<\/a>.<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" China ver\u00f6ffentlicht so gut wie keine Angaben zu seinen \u00d6lreserven, daher beruhen alle Ihnen bekannten Zahlen auf Rekonstruktionen. Dieses Dossier erl\u00e4utert die drei von Analysten verwendeten Methoden, zeigt die tats\u00e4chliche Streuung zwischen ihnen auf und bietet Ihnen eine nachvollziehbare M\u00f6glichkeit, die Zahlen zu zitieren, ohne sie als Fakt darzustellen.<\/p>","protected":false},"author":12,"featured_media":1861,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"p54_article_data":"{\"meta\":{\"kicker\":\"Insight \u00b7 Method\",\"topics\":[\"Energy\",\"Policy\"],\"title\":\"Why Every Estimate of China's Oil Stockpile Disagrees, and Which Numbers to Trust\",\"dek\":\"China publishes almost nothing about its oil reserves, so every figure you have ever read is a reconstruction. This dossier explains the three methods analysts use, shows the real spread between them, and gives you a defensible way to cite the number without pretending it is a fact.\",\"date\":\"12 July 2026\",\"readTime\":\"10 min read\",\"author\":\"Project 54, Research & Strategy\",\"listenTime\":\"22 min listen\"},\"quickAnswer\":{\"q\":\"Why is China's days of supply figure only an estimate, and why does it vary between sources?\",\"a\":\"Beijing does not publish routine oil inventory data, so no source has the actual number. Analysts reconstruct it two ways: satellite gauging of floating roof tanks (Kpler, Vortexa, Ursa Space Systems), and a supply balance calculation that takes crude imports plus domestic output minus refinery throughput and treats the residual as a stock build. The two methods disagree because satellites cannot see underground rock cavern storage or fixed roof tanks, and because the supply balance depends on estimating refinery runs at volatile independent teapot refiners. The headline day count then diverges again on the denominator: the same stockpile of roughly 1.2 to 1.4 billion barrels reads as about 110 to 130 days against net imports, and far fewer against total consumption. Any single number quoted without its method and its denominator is not precision, it is selection.\"},\"takeaways\":[\"No source has the real number. China treats stock levels as strategically sensitive, and the last meaningful official disclosure covered mid 2017: 37.73 million tonnes, roughly 280.7 million barrels, released by the National Bureau of Statistics.\",\"There are two independent methods, and they measure different things. Satellite gauging reads visible above ground tanks. The supply balance method infers a residual from customs and refining data. They are not interchangeable.\",\"Satellites are structurally blind to part of the system. Underground rock caverns cost far less per barrel than steel tanks, which gives China an incentive to keep building storage that cannot be photographed.\",\"The denominator decides the headline. Net imports, gross imports and total consumption give three different day counts for one identical stockpile.\",\"Cite a range with attribution, never a point estimate. As of mid 2026 the defensible position is roughly 1.2 to 1.4 billion barrels, converging on the lower end, at about 110 to 130 days of net import cover.\"],\"sections\":[{\"id\":\"sec1\",\"q\":\"Why is there no official number?\",\"h\":\"Beijing does not publish it, and that is the whole problem\",\"p\":[\"China does not release routine crude inventory data. There is no weekly stocks report, no equivalent of the EIA's Wednesday release, no audited annual filing. Inventory levels are treated as strategically sensitive, which is a rational position for a country whose principal energy vulnerability is a maritime chokepoint.\",\"The exception proves the rule. In 2018 the National Bureau of Statistics disclosed a national reserve total of 37.73 million tonnes, about 280.7 million barrels, as of mid 2017 (South China Morning Post<\/a>). It was the first time an official total had ever been published, it arrived months after the period it described, and nothing on that scale has been repeated on a regular schedule since.\",\"So every figure in circulation, including ours, is a reconstruction. That is not a criticism of the analysts doing the reconstructing. It is a fact about the data, and it should change how you cite the number.\"]},{\"id\":\"sec2\",\"q\":\"How do analysts actually build the estimate?\",\"h\":\"Three methods, measuring three different things\",\"p\":[\"Understanding why the numbers disagree requires understanding that they are not all trying to measure the same object.\"],\"pillars\":[{\"n\":\"01\",\"t\":\"Satellite gauging\",\"d\":\"Providers such as Ursa Space Systems, Kpler and Vortexa photograph tank farms and read the shadow inside a floating roof tank. The roof floats on the liquid and falls as oil is drawn down, so the shadow is a gauge. Ursa tracks more than 4,000 floating roof tanks across roughly 130 Chinese locations. It measures visible above ground tanks only.\"},{\"n\":\"02\",\"t\":\"Supply balance\",\"d\":\"The dominant method for Reuters, the EIA and OIES. Domestic production plus imports plus pipeline receipts, minus refinery throughput and exports. Whatever is unaccounted for is assumed to have gone into storage. It measures a residual, not a tank.\"},{\"n\":\"03\",\"t\":\"Official disclosure\",\"d\":\"Rare, partial and late. The 2018 release covering mid 2017 remains the clearest data point. Xinhua publishes occasional commercial tank figures that cover only part of the system and exclude the strategic layer.\"}]},{\"id\":\"sec3\",\"q\":\"How far apart do the estimates actually get?\",\"h\":\"The spread, in real numbers\",\"p\":[\"The divergence is not academic. The EIA put China's strategic inventories at nearly 1.4 billion barrels as of December 2025, after average additions of 1.1 million barrels a day through 2025 (EIA<\/a>). Kpler's satellite and flow based tracking had onshore inventories at about 1,232 million barrels in late May 2026, down from a peak of 1,251 million in early May (Kpler, 25 May 2026<\/a>). Reuters columnist Clyde Russell, working from the supply balance, put combined commercial and strategic stocks at at least 1.2 billion barrels, with Vortexa data cited alongside at a record 1.24 billion in April 2026.\",\"The rate of accumulation splits even wider than the level. The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies found published implied stock build estimates for 2025 ranging from 0.43 to 0.9 million barrels a day, against its own central case of 0.75, and noted the spread between analysts averages about 0.5 million barrels a day and can reach 1.1 million (OIES, May 2026<\/a>). A disagreement of 1.1 million barrels a day is larger than the entire daily output of several OPEC members.\",\"The most instructive case is historical. Analysts at Rice University's Baker Institute, working with Orbital Insight satellite data, wrote that \\\"at times in mid to late 2017, Orbital Insight's data suggested total crude oil stockpiles in China were more than three times as large as the figures reported by Xinhua, a potential discrepancy of more than 500 million barrels\\\" (Collins and Hung, Baker Institute, 2018<\/a>). Half a billion barrels is the gap between a partial official figure and an independent measurement of the same country.\"],\"table\":{\"cols\":[\"Source\",\"Estimate\",\"What it measures\",\"Date\",\"Why it differs\"],\"rows\":[[\"China NBS (official)\",\"37.73 million tonnes, approx. 280.7 million barrels\",\"Disclosed national reserve total\",\"Released 2018, covering mid 2017\",\"Only official figure; excludes most commercial stock; not repeated\"],[\"EIA\",\"Nearly 1.4 billion barrels\",\"Combined strategic and commercial inventories\",\"December 2025\",\"Broadest definition, includes commercial NOC stocks\"],[\"Kpler\",\"Approx. 1,232 million barrels\",\"Onshore visible crude inventories\",\"25 May 2026\",\"Satellite and flow based; misses underground storage\"],[\"Reuters \/ Clyde Russell\",\"At least 1.2 billion barrels\",\"Implied total from customs and refining data\",\"March to April 2026\",\"Residual method; sensitive to teapot run rates\"],[\"Vortexa (cited by Reuters)\",\"Approx. 1.24 billion barrels, a record\",\"Tracked commercial plus strategic stocks\",\"April 2026\",\"Different tracking universe and definitions\"],[\"OIES\",\"Stock build 0.43 to 0.9 million b\/d (central 0.75)\",\"Rate of accumulation, not level\",\"2025 data, published 2026\",\"Different refinery run and output assumptions\"]]}},{\"id\":\"sec4\",\"q\":\"Why can the methods not just be reconciled?\",\"h\":\"Four technical reasons the gap does not close\",\"p\":[\"Invisible storage. A growing share of China's strategic capacity is built in mined underground rock caverns rather than above ground steel. Shadow based satellite analysis cannot read it at all. The Baker Institute notes that underground caverns can cost more than 60 percent less per barrel of capacity than above ground tanks, so China has both a security incentive and a cost incentive to keep building storage that satellites cannot see.\",\"Commercial and strategic barrels are not separable from outside. The buffer is two blended layers: a state reserve and a much larger pool of commercial stock held by CNPC, Sinopec and CNOOC that Beijing can lean on in a crisis. An outside analyst cannot attribute a given barrel to one layer, so estimates diverge simply on where the author draws the line.\",\"Refinery runs are the weak input. Independent teapot refiners in Shandong are roughly a quarter of national capacity and move run rates fast: the national average fell to 66.3 percent in May 2026, with Shandong plants at 50.5 percent in one week. Because throughput is one of two big inputs to the supply balance, an error there lands directly in the implied stock build.\",\"Apparent demand is a proxy, not a measurement. China's apparent demand is refinery processing plus net product imports. There is a persistent gap of roughly 1.1 to 1.4 million barrels a day between crude supply and what refineries actually process. Some of that gap is statistical noise across customs, NBS and shipping data. The rest becomes the stock build. Small measurement errors therefore become large disagreements about storage.\"]},{\"id\":\"sec5\",\"q\":\"What makes one day count different from another?\",\"h\":\"The denominator is doing more work than the barrels\",\"p\":[\"This is the part most readers miss. Days of supply is a fraction, and the numerator is only half the argument.\",\"The IEA measures its members' 90 day obligation against net imports of the prior calendar year, a stable and audited figure. China's headline day counts are frequently quoted instead against gross imports, or against total consumption, which runs well above net imports. Both are larger denominators, so both mechanically produce a smaller day count for exactly the same barrels.\",\"That is how one credible source says 90 days and another says 130 while describing an identical stockpile. Neither is lying. They are dividing by different things, and almost nobody says which. We set out the benchmark mechanics in the IEA 90 day stockholding dossier<\/a>, and the working day count in the days of supply dossier<\/a>.\"]},{\"id\":\"sec6\",\"q\":\"So how should you cite it?\",\"h\":\"A defensible position, as of mid 2026\",\"p\":[\"Treat every China stockpile figure as a range and always name the method and the denominator. As of mid 2026, total Chinese crude inventories, state reserve plus commercial, most likely sit between about 1.2 and 1.4 billion barrels, converging toward the lower end after the drawdowns through the Iran conflict period. On a net import basis that is roughly 110 to 130 days of cover. On a gross import or total consumption basis the same barrels look like fewer days.\",\"The practical rule for anyone writing, briefing or selling on this: cite the range with attribution, say plainly that Beijing publishes no confirming figure, and note that the number moves in near real time with China's buying and refining behaviour, unlike the IEA's fixed annual benchmark. A single number with no method attached is not more precise. It is just less honest.\",\"This is also why the opacity itself is the strategy<\/a>, and why the estimates matter commercially: the same ambiguity that frustrates analysts is what gives Beijing optionality in a crisis.\"]}],\"media\":{\"image\":{\"src\":\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/earth-night-lights-energy.jpg\",\"label\":\"Measured from orbit, inferred from customs data, confirmed by almost nobody: how China's reserve numbers are actually built.\",\"credit\":\"Project 54\"},\"infographicLabel\":\"The estimate spread: what each source measures, what it misses, and why the day counts diverge.\",\"pdf\":{\"href\":\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/07\/china-oil-reserve-estimates-vary-sources.pdf\",\"title\":\"Why China's Oil Reserve Estimates Disagree, Slide Deck\",\"meta\":\"Briefing deck \u00b7 Project 54\"},\"video\":{\"src\":\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/07\/china-oil-reserve-estimates-vary-sources-video.mp4\",\"label\":\"Explainer briefing: how China reserve estimates are built, and why they clash\",\"duration\":\"8:11\",\"poster\":\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/07\/china-oil-reserve-estimates-vary-sources-poster.jpg\",\"captions\":\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/07\/china-oil-reserve-estimates-vary-sources-captions.vtt\",\"transcript\":\"Beijing does not publish routine oil inventory data, so every figure in circulation is a reconstruction rather than an audited fact. The last meaningful official disclosure came from the National Bureau of Statistics in 2018, covering mid 2017. Analysts use two very different tools. Satellite gauging, from providers such as Kpler and Ursa Space Systems, measures the shadow cast inside a floating roof tank from orbit. The supply balance method looks at no tanks at all: it takes domestic production plus imports, subtracts refinery throughput and exports, and assumes the residual went into storage. The results diverge sharply. The EIA put stocks at nearly 1.4 billion barrels by December 2025, Kpler at roughly 1,232 million barrels in May 2026, with Vortexa data cited around 1.24 billion. The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies found analyst estimates of the 2025 stock build varying by as much as 1.1 million barrels a day, which is larger than the daily output of several OPEC members. Four blind spots keep the gap open: invisible underground rock cavern storage, which costs roughly 60 percent less per barrel than above ground steel and cannot be photographed; the blending of commercial and strategic barrels; highly volatile teapot refinery run rates in Shandong, which fell to 50.5 percent in a single week in May 2026; and apparent demand, which is a proxy rather than a measurement. Then the denominator changes everything. The same stockpile divided by net imports gives roughly 110 to 130 days of cover, and divided by gross imports or total consumption gives a far smaller number. That is how one credible source says 90 days and another says 130 while describing identical barrels. The defensible position in mid 2026 is a range: about 1.2 to 1.4 billion barrels, roughly 110 to 130 days on a net import basis, always naming the method and the denominator. The opacity is not an accident. It is the strategy, and it is what gives Beijing optionality in a crisis.\"},\"podcast\":{\"src\":\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/07\/china-oil-reserve-estimates-vary-sources-podcast.m4a\",\"title\":\"Why Every Estimate of China's Oil Stockpile Disagrees\",\"ep\":\"P54 Energy Growth Brief\",\"duration\":\"22:10\"}},\"poll\":{\"q\":\"When you see a figure for China's oil reserves, what do you check first?\",\"options\":[{\"id\":\"a\",\"label\":\"The method behind it\",\"insight\":\"The right instinct. Satellite gauging and supply balance measure different objects, and one of them is structurally blind to underground caverns. The method tells you what the number can and cannot include.\"},{\"id\":\"b\",\"label\":\"The denominator on the day count\",\"insight\":\"Equally decisive, and more often missed. Net imports, gross imports and total consumption produce three different day counts for one identical stockpile.\"},{\"id\":\"c\",\"label\":\"The date\",\"insight\":\"Necessary but not sufficient. These stocks move fast, so a stale figure is misleading, but a fresh figure with an unnamed method is still unusable.\"},{\"id\":\"d\",\"label\":\"Whether it is official\",\"insight\":\"Reasonable, but it will fail you here. There is essentially no current official figure. The last meaningful disclosure covered mid 2017.\"}]},\"faq\":[{\"q\":\"Why is China's days of supply figure only an estimate?\",\"a\":\"Because Beijing does not publish routine oil inventory data. Analysts reconstruct the total from satellite readings of visible tanks and from the gap between customs reported imports, domestic output and refinery throughput. The method is credible but indirect, so every published figure carries a margin of error and is an estimate, not an official statistic.\"},{\"q\":\"Why does the days of supply number vary between sources?\",\"a\":\"Because sources use different methods and different denominators for the same stockpile. A total of roughly 1.2 to 1.4 billion barrels can be quoted as anywhere from about 110 to 180 days of cover depending on whether it is divided by net imports, gross imports or total consumption, and estimates of the rate of stock build differ by as much as 1.1 million barrels a day between analysts, according to OIES.\"},{\"q\":\"Can satellites see all of China's oil storage?\",\"a\":\"No. Satellites read the shadow cast by a floating roof on an above ground tank, which captures a large share of visible tank farms, more than 4,000 tanks in Ursa Space Systems' coverage alone. They cannot see oil in mined underground rock caverns or fixed roof tanks, and China has both a cost incentive and a security incentive to keep building exactly that kind of storage.\"},{\"q\":\"What is the supply balance or implied stock build method?\",\"a\":\"It is a residual calculation: domestic production plus imports plus pipeline receipts, minus refinery throughput and exports, using China customs and National Bureau of Statistics data. Whatever crude is not refined or exported is assumed to have gone into storage. Because it depends on estimating refinery runs, especially at volatile independent teapot refiners, small errors there produce large swings in the implied build.\"},{\"q\":\"Has China ever published an official reserve figure?\",\"a\":\"Rarely and partially. The clearest case is the National Bureau of Statistics figure of 37.73 million tonnes, about 280.7 million barrels, disclosed in 2018 for mid 2017. Xinhua publishes occasional commercial tank data that covers only part of the system, which leaves satellite and supply balance estimates as the primary tools. For why the silence is deliberate, see our dossier on why China does not publish its oil reserves<\/a>.\"}],\"newsletter\":{\"kicker\":\"The Energy Growth Brief\",\"title\":[\"Intelligence,\",\"to your inbox\"],\"body\":\"Join energy and industrial leaders getting our marketing, AI-growth and revenue-architecture intelligence, direct, no filler.\",\"placeholder\":\"you@company.com\",\"cta\":\"Subscribe\",\"note\":\"No spam. Unsubscribe anytime. We read every reply.\"},\"related\":[{\"title\":\"How Many Days of Oil Supply Does China Hold?\",\"topic\":\"Energy\",\"href\":\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/china-oil-reserve-days-of-supply\/\"},{\"title\":\"China and the IEA 90 Day Oil Stockholding Benchmark\",\"topic\":\"Policy\",\"href\":\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/china-iea-90-day-oil-stockholding-benchmark\/\"},{\"title\":\"Why China Does Not Publish Its Oil Reserves\",\"topic\":\"Policy\",\"href\":\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/why-china-doesnt-publish-oil-reserves\/\"},{\"title\":\"Is China Still Stockpiling Oil in 2026?\",\"topic\":\"Energy\",\"href\":\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/is-china-still-stockpiling-oil-2026\/\"}],\"listenTime\":\"22 min listen\",\"__slug\":\"china-oil-reserve-estimates-vary-sources\"}","p54_faq":"","p54_media":"","p54_comments_enabled":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[92,125],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3628","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analysis","category-strategy"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3628","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/12"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3628"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3628\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3629,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3628\/revisions\/3629"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1861"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3628"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3628"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3628"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}Drei Methoden, die drei verschiedene Dinge messen<\/h2>\n
\n
Die Spanne, in realen Zahlen<\/h2>\n
Vier technische Gr\u00fcnde, warum sich die L\u00fccke nicht schlie\u00dft<\/h2>\n
Der Nenner leistet mehr Arbeit als die F\u00e4sser.<\/h2>\n
Eine verteidigungsf\u00e4hige Position, Stand Mitte 2026<\/h2>\n
FAQ<\/h2>\n
Why is China’s days of supply figure only an estimate?<\/h3>\n
Warum variiert die Angabe der Liefertage je nach Quelle?<\/h3>\n
Can satellites see all of China’s oil storage?<\/h3>\n
Was ist die Methode der Angebotsbilanz bzw. des impliziten Lageraufbaus?<\/h3>\n
Hat China jemals eine offizielle Reservezahl ver\u00f6ffentlicht?<\/h3>\n