Im Februar 2025 revidierte BP seine 2020 eingeleitete Strategie der Klimaneutralit\u00e4t und investierte sein Kapital wieder in \u00d6l und Gas. Dies ist die kurze, belegte Antwort auf die Frage, warum das Unternehmen, das sich selbst als umweltfreundlichstes gro\u00dfes \u00d6lunternehmen bezeichnete, seinen Kurs \u00e4nderte, welche Zahlen diese Entscheidung beeinflussten und welche Auswirkungen diese Kehrtwende auf Lieferanten und Abnehmer des Konzerns hat.<\/p>\n
Warum hat BP seine Netto-Null-Strategie aufgegeben?<\/strong> BP gab seine 2020 geplante Klimaneutralit\u00e4tsstrategie auf, weil diese nur schwache Renditen abwarf und die Bewertungsl\u00fccke zu Wettbewerbern immer gr\u00f6\u00dfer wurde \u2013 nicht etwa, weil das Klimaziel selbst gescheitert w\u00e4re. Am 26. Februar 2025 k\u00fcndigte Vorstandsvorsitzender Murray Auchincloss eine grundlegende Neuausrichtung an, bei der Kapital von erneuerbaren Energien zur\u00fcck in \u00d6l und Gas gelenkt wurde: Die Investitionen in \u00d6l und Gas sollten bis 2027 auf rund 10 Milliarden US-Dollar j\u00e4hrlich erh\u00f6ht, die Ausgaben f\u00fcr den \u00dcbergang zu erneuerbaren Energien um mehr als 5 Milliarden US-Dollar j\u00e4hrlich auf 1,5 bis 2 Milliarden US-Dollar gek\u00fcrzt und eine Produktion von 2,3 bis 2,5 Millionen Barrel \u00d6l\u00e4quivalent pro Tag bis 2030 angestrebt werden. Diese Neuausrichtung folgte einem Einbruch des Gewinns auf 381 Millionen US-Dollar im Jahr 2024 und dem \u00f6ffentlichen Druck des aktivistischen Investors Elliott Management, der eine Beteiligung von rund 5 Prozent aufgebaut hatte. Kurz gesagt: BP ruderte zur\u00fcck, weil der Markt die Investition in erneuerbare Energien abgestraft hatte und die Kapitaldisziplin eine R\u00fcckkehr zu den renditest\u00e4rksten \u00d6l- und Gasf\u00f6rderanlagen erforderte.<\/p>\n Im Jahr 2020 verpflichtete sich BP unter dem damaligen Vorstandsvorsitzenden Bernard Looney zu Klimaneutralit\u00e4t bis 2050 und strebte die Umwandlung in ein integriertes Energieunternehmen an, indem die \u00d6l- und Gasf\u00f6rderung reduziert und gleichzeitig erneuerbare Energien, Bioenergie und Wasserstoff ausgebaut wurden. Am 26. Februar 2025 revidierte das Unternehmen diese Strategie. Strategie-Reset<\/a>, Auchincloss erkl\u00e4rte, BP habe seine Strategie grundlegend neu ausgerichtet, indem das Unternehmen Kapital reduzierte und in seine renditest\u00e4rksten Gesch\u00e4ftsbereiche umschichtete. Konkret bedeutete dies mehr \u00d6l und Gas, deutlich weniger CO\u2082-arme Technologien und eine strikte Abkehr vom Wachstum hin zu Rendite und Bilanzsanierung.<\/p>\n Dies war die tiefgreifendste Kehrtwende eines gro\u00dfen \u00d6lkonzerns in diesem Jahrzehnt und beseitigte die meisten Unklarheiten dar\u00fcber, wo BP nun im Wettbewerb steht. Das Unternehmen wird in zwei Segmente, Upstream und Downstream, umstrukturiert, und die eigenst\u00e4ndige Einheit f\u00fcr kohlenstoffarme Technologien wird \u00fcbernommen und abgebaut. Eine detaillierte Beschreibung der Neuausrichtung und der damit verbundenen Risiken finden Sie in unserem Dossier. BP’s strategic reset<\/a>.<\/p>\n The 2020 strategy was a bet that the energy transition would accelerate, that investor and societal sentiment demanded it, and that BP could build higher growth low carbon franchises while legacy hydrocarbons funded the dividend. The bet did not pay off in the market. Renewable returns proved lower and slower than oil and gas, BP’s shares lagged peers who stayed disciplined on hydrocarbons, and a valuation gap opened that made the company a target.<\/p>\n The financial trigger was stark. BP’s 2024 profit collapsed to 381 million US dollars, and activist investor Elliott Management built a stake of about 5 percent and pressed for a sharper focus on returns. Faced with a punished share price and an activist on the register, BP chose the path that the market was rewarding elsewhere: concentrate capital where the cash is, exactly the discipline we see in ExxonMobil’s value over volume strategy<\/a> und in Equinor’s tuned transition pace<\/a>.<\/p>\n The headline figures come from BP’s own February 2025 release. They show a company reallocating capital toward hydrocarbons and away from the transition, while repairing its balance sheet through divestment.<\/p>\n Die Umkehrung liefert wertvolle Erkenntnisse f\u00fcr konkrete Ma\u00dfnahmen. Budgets flie\u00dfen in die vorgelagerte \u00d6l- und Gasf\u00f6rderung, die Zuverl\u00e4ssigkeit von Raffinerien, LNG, den Handel und die dazugeh\u00f6rigen digitalen Tools, w\u00e4hrend Projekte, die ausschlie\u00dflich auf erneuerbare Energien setzen, mit einem schrumpfenden und kapitalarmen BP-Partner konfrontiert sind. Der erste praktische Schritt besteht darin, das BP-Konto den beiden neuen Segmenten Upstream und Downstream zuzuordnen, da die eigenst\u00e4ndige Einheit f\u00fcr CO\u2082-arme Technologien, an die viele Anbieter verkauft haben, aufgel\u00f6st wird.<\/p>\n The wider lesson is that a major’s public sustainability narrative is a weaker predictor of where it spends than its capital allocation slide. Sellers who track capital discipline, returns targets and divestment programmes will read these shifts before the press release, exactly the posture we argue for in Marketingstrategie f\u00fcr Energieunternehmen<\/a>. Der erfolgversprechendste Schachzug ist, dorthin zu verkaufen, wo das Geld hinflie\u00dft, mit einem \u00fcberzeugenden Renditeargument statt mit einem wertorientierten Argument \u2013 entwickelt, nicht vorausgesetzt.<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" BP abandoned net zero because the 2020 transition bet delivered weak returns and a valuation gap, not because decarbonisation failed. The sourced answer, the numbers, and what it signals for suppliers.<\/p>","protected":false},"author":12,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"p54_article_data":"{\"meta\": {\"kicker\": \"Answer \u00b7 Energy Transition\", \"topics\": [\"Analysis\", \"Strategy\"], \"title\": \"Why Did BP Abandon Its Net Zero Strategy?\", \"dek\": \"In February 2025 BP tore up the net zero pivot it had made in 2020 and put its capital back into oil and gas. This is the short, sourced answer to why the company that branded itself the greenest major reversed course, the numbers that drove the decision, and what the reversal signals for suppliers and marketers selling into the group.\", \"date\": \"21 July 2026\", \"readTime\": \"9 min read\", \"author\": \"Project 54, Research & Strategy\", \"dateModified\": \"2026-07-21\"}, \"quickAnswer\": {\"q\": \"Why did BP abandon its net zero strategy?\", \"a\": \"BP abandoned its 2020 net zero pivot because the strategy delivered weak returns and a widening valuation gap with rivals, not because the climate goal itself failed. On 26 February 2025 chief executive Murray Auchincloss announced what he called a fundamental reset, reallocating capital from renewables back to oil and gas: raising oil and gas investment to around 10 billion US dollars a year through 2027, cutting transition business spending by more than 5 billion US dollars a year to between 1.5 and 2 billion, and targeting production of 2.3 to 2.5 million barrels of oil equivalent per day by 2030. The reset followed a collapse in 2024 profit to 381 million US dollars and public pressure from activist investor Elliott Management, which built a stake of about 5 percent. In short, BP reversed because the market punished the transition bet, and capital discipline demanded a return to the highest returning barrels.\"}, \"takeaways\": [\"BP did not abandon net zero because decarbonisation failed, it abandoned it because the strategy produced weak returns and a valuation discount to peers who stayed with oil and gas.\", \"The 26 February 2025 reset raised oil and gas investment to around 10 billion US dollars a year and cut transition spending by more than 5 billion a year, to between 1.5 and 2 billion.\", \"The trigger was financial: 2024 profit collapsed to 381 million US dollars, and activist investor Elliott Management built a roughly 5 percent stake and pushed for change.\", \"The reversal is the clearest case of a wider pattern: capital is chasing returns, not slogans, and every major is now judged on cash generation per barrel rather than transition ambition.\", \"For suppliers, budget is flowing to upstream oil and gas, refining reliability, LNG and trading, while renewables only vendors face a shrinking, de-capitalised BP counterparty.\"], \"sections\": [{\"id\": \"what\", \"q\": \"What exactly did BP change?\", \"h\": \"From an integrated energy company back to an oil major\", \"p\": [\"In 2020, under then chief executive Bernard Looney, BP committed to net zero by 2050 and set out to become an integrated energy company, cutting oil and gas output while scaling renewables, bioenergy and hydrogen. On 26 February 2025 the company reversed that direction. In its own strategy reset<\/a>, Auchincloss said BP had fundamentally reset its strategy, reducing and reallocating capital to its highest returning businesses. In practice that meant more oil and gas, far less low carbon, and a hard pivot from growth back to returns and balance sheet repair.\", \"This was the deepest reversal by any oil major this decade, and it removed most of the ambiguity about where BP now competes. The company is being reorganised around two segments, Upstream and Downstream, and the standalone low carbon unit is being absorbed and run down. For a full account of the reset and its execution risk, see our dossier on BP's strategic reset<\/a>.\"]}, {\"id\": \"why\", \"q\": \"Why did the net zero bet fail commercially?\", \"h\": \"The market did not reward the transition\", \"p\": [\"The 2020 strategy was a bet that the energy transition would accelerate, that investor and societal sentiment demanded it, and that BP could build higher growth low carbon franchises while legacy hydrocarbons funded the dividend. The bet did not pay off in the market. Renewable returns proved lower and slower than oil and gas, BP's shares lagged peers who stayed disciplined on hydrocarbons, and a valuation gap opened that made the company a target.\", \"The financial trigger was stark. BP's 2024 profit collapsed to 381 million US dollars, and activist investor Elliott Management built a stake of about 5 percent and pressed for a sharper focus on returns. Faced with a punished share price and an activist on the register, BP chose the path that the market was rewarding elsewhere: concentrate capital where the cash is, exactly the discipline we see in ExxonMobil's value over volume strategy<\/a> and in Equinor's tuned transition pace<\/a>.\"]}, {\"id\": \"numbers\", \"q\": \"What are the numbers behind the reset?\", \"h\": \"The capital slide tells the story\", \"p\": [\"The headline figures come from BP's own February 2025 release. They show a company reallocating capital toward hydrocarbons and away from the transition, while repairing its balance sheet through divestment.\"], \"table\": {\"cols\": [\"Lever\", \"Before (2020 strategy)\", \"After (2025 reset)\", \"What it signals\"], \"rows\": [[\"Oil and gas investment\", \"Declining under the transition plan\", \"Around 10 billion USD a year through 2027\", \"Hydrocarbons are the growth lane again\"], [\"Transition investment\", \"Scaling up\", \"1.5 to 2 billion USD a year, cut by more than 5 billion\", \"Low carbon is de-prioritised, not eliminated\"], [\"Group capital\", \"Higher\", \"13 to 15 billion USD a year\", \"Overall discipline and lower spend\"], [\"Divestment\", \"Not a focus\", \"20 billion USD target by end 2027\", \"Balance sheet repair over growth\"], [\"Production by 2030\", \"Falling under net zero plan\", \"2.3 to 2.5 million barrels of oil equivalent per day\", \"Output rises again, reversing the 2020 pledge\"]]}}, {\"id\": \"suppliers\", \"q\": \"What does BP's reversal signal for suppliers and marketers?\", \"h\": \"Read the capital slide, not the sustainability report\", \"p\": [\"The reversal is actionable intelligence. Budget is flowing to upstream oil and gas, refining reliability, LNG, trading and the digital tools that support them, while renewables only propositions face a shrinking, de-capitalised BP counterparty. The first practical step is to re-map the BP account to the two new segments, Upstream and Downstream, because the standalone low carbon unit that many vendors sold into is being absorbed.\", \"The wider lesson is that a major's public sustainability narrative is a weaker predictor of where it spends than its capital allocation slide. Sellers who track capital discipline, returns targets and divestment programmes will read these shifts before the press release, exactly the posture we argue for in marketing strategy for energy companies<\/a>. The winning move is to sell to where the cash is going, with a payback case rather than a values pitch, engineered, not assumed.\"]}], \"media\": {\"image\": {\"src\": \"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/07\/oil-refinery-flare-stack-dusk.jpg\", \"label\": \"BP's reset put capital back into oil and gas, refining and trading, reversing the 2020 pledge to shrink hydrocarbons.\", \"credit\": \"Project 54\"}, \"infographicLabel\": \"Why BP reversed: weak returns and a valuation gap, not a failed climate goal.\"}, \"poll\": {\"q\": \"BP abandoned net zero after weak returns and activist pressure. What is the sharpest read of the reversal?\", \"note\": \"No tallies. Each option maps to a real interpretation.\", \"options\": [{\"id\": \"a\", \"label\": \"The climate goal was always unrealistic\", \"insight\": \"This overstates the case. BP hit real operational milestones under the 2020 plan. What failed was the market return, not the technical feasibility, which is why the reversal was about capital allocation rather than climate science.\"}, {\"id\": \"b\", \"label\": \"The market punished the transition bet\", \"insight\": \"This is the most accurate read. A collapsed 2024 profit and a valuation gap to disciplined peers, plus an activist stake, made the return story untenable. BP followed the capital, not the slogan.\"}, {\"id\": \"c\", \"label\": \"Activist pressure forced it\", \"insight\": \"Partly true. Elliott's roughly 5 percent stake sharpened the focus on returns, but the underlying driver was weak performance. The activist accelerated a decision the numbers already pointed to.\"}, {\"id\": \"d\", \"label\": \"It is temporary and BP will pivot back\", \"insight\": \"Unlikely on current evidence. The reset is being accelerated, not softened, and the low carbon unit is being absorbed. A reversal would need both far stronger renewable returns and a very different investor base.\"}]}, \"faq\": [{\"q\": \"When did BP abandon its net zero strategy?\", \"a\": \"BP announced its strategic reset on 26 February 2025, reversing the net zero pivot it had made in 2020. Chief executive Murray Auchincloss described it as a fundamental reset that reallocates capital from renewables back to oil and gas.\"}, {\"q\": \"Did BP drop its net zero target entirely?\", \"a\": \"BP did not eliminate low carbon activity, but it sharply de-prioritised it, cutting transition investment to between 1.5 and 2 billion US dollars a year, more than 5 billion below prior guidance, and dropping targets to reduce oil and gas output. The practical effect is a return to being an oil and gas led major.\"}, {\"q\": \"What drove BP's reversal?\", \"a\": \"The main drivers were financial: BP's 2024 profit collapsed to 381 million US dollars, its shares lagged peers who stayed focused on hydrocarbons, and activist investor Elliott Management built a stake of about 5 percent and pushed for higher returns. Capital discipline, not climate policy, drove the decision.\"}, {\"q\": \"How much is BP now investing in oil and gas?\", \"a\": \"BP is raising oil and gas investment to around 10 billion US dollars a year through 2027, within a group capital budget of 13 to 15 billion a year, and targeting production of 2.3 to 2.5 million barrels of oil equivalent per day by 2030, alongside a 20 billion US dollar divestment programme by end 2027.\"}, {\"q\": \"What does BP's reversal mean for suppliers?\", \"a\": \"Budget is flowing to upstream oil and gas, refining reliability, LNG, trading and their digital tools, while renewables only suppliers face a shrinking, de-capitalised BP counterparty. Vendors should re-map the account to BP's two new segments, Upstream and Downstream, and lead with a returns and payback case.\"}], \"newsletter\": {\"kicker\": \"The Energy Growth Brief\", \"title\": [\"Intelligence,\", \"to your inbox\"], \"body\": \"Join energy and industrial leaders getting our marketing, AI-growth and revenue-architecture intelligence, direct, no filler.\", \"placeholder\": \"you@company.com\", \"cta\": \"Subscribe\", \"note\": \"No spam. Unsubscribe anytime. We read every reply.\"}, \"related\": [{\"title\": \"BP's Strategic Reset in 2026\", \"topic\": \"Analysis\", \"href\": \"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/bp-strategic-reset-2026\/\"}, {\"title\": \"ExxonMobil's Advantaged Assets Strategy\", \"topic\": \"Strategy\", \"href\": \"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/exxonmobil-advantaged-assets-strategy\/\"}, {\"title\": \"Equinor's 2026 Capital Markets Day Strategy\", \"topic\": \"Analysis\", \"href\": \"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/equinor-capital-markets-day-2026-strategy\/\"}, {\"title\": \"Chevron Starts Selling Power, Not Barrels\", \"topic\": \"Analysis\", \"href\": \"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/chevron-microsoft-project-kilby\/\"}]}","p54_faq":"","p54_media":"","p54_comments_enabled":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[92,125],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3857","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-analysis","category-strategy"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3857","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/12"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3857"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3857\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3859,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3857\/revisions\/3859"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3857"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3857"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3857"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}Vom integrierten Energiekonzern zur\u00fcck zum \u00d6lkonzern<\/h2>\n
Der Markt hat den \u00dcbergang nicht belohnt.<\/h2>\n
Der Kapitalabsturz erz\u00e4hlt die Geschichte<\/h2>\n
Lesen Sie die Kapitalfolie, nicht den Nachhaltigkeitsbericht.<\/h2>\n