En marzo de 2026, la Agencia Internacional de Energ\u00eda autoriz\u00f3 la mayor liberaci\u00f3n de petr\u00f3leo de emergencia de su historia, 400 millones de barriles, para estabilizar un mercado afectado por la interrupci\u00f3n del estrecho de Ormuz. Este informe analiza la causa principal de la crisis, explica c\u00f3mo funciona la acci\u00f3n coordinada de las reservas, eval\u00faa si fue suficiente y se pregunta qu\u00e9 significa para el futuro de la seguridad energ\u00e9tica y para todos aquellos que compran, venden o planifican en torno al petr\u00f3leo un trimestre que transform\u00f3 las reservas estrat\u00e9gicas de una medida de precauci\u00f3n en una pol\u00edtica de primera l\u00ednea.<\/p>\n
The defining feature of the 2026 oil shock is that it was a transit crisis, not a demand or production collapse. Conflict in the Middle East escalated sharply in early 2026, and in the aftermath, according to widespread reporting, shipping through the Strait of Hormuz was severely restricted as Iran threatened vessels transiting the waterway. The strait is the single most important oil artery on earth: roughly 20 percent of the world’s oil and a large volume of liquefied natural gas normally pass through it. When a chokepoint of that scale is constrained, the problem is not that the oil has stopped being produced, it is that it cannot reach the market by its usual route.<\/p>\n
Esa distinci\u00f3n es la ra\u00edz de todo lo que sucedi\u00f3 despu\u00e9s. Una crisis de demanda puede resolverse reduciendo el consumo, y una crisis de producci\u00f3n a veces puede compensarse con el aumento del bombeo por parte de otros productores; sin embargo, un bloqueo en un punto cr\u00edtico deja los barriles atrapados tras la obstrucci\u00f3n, independientemente de la cantidad producida aguas arriba. Los informes indicaron que el flujo a trav\u00e9s del estrecho cay\u00f3 m\u00e1s del 90 % en su punto m\u00e1ximo, lo que supuso la p\u00e9rdida de millones de barriles diarios del transporte mar\u00edtimo habitual. La AIE calific\u00f3 la situaci\u00f3n como la mayor interrupci\u00f3n del suministro en la historia del mercado petrolero mundial. Entender la crisis como una falla en el tr\u00e1nsito f\u00edsico, en lugar de un desequilibrio del mercado, explica por qu\u00e9 la respuesta pol\u00edtica se centr\u00f3 tanto en liberar los barriles que ya se encontraban en el lado correcto del bloqueo.<\/p>\n
On 11 March 2026 the IEA’s 32 member countries agreed unanimously to make 400 million barrels of oil from their emergency reserves available to the market, the largest emergency stock release the agency has ever coordinated. Fatih Birol, the IEA’s executive director, said, “The oil market challenges we are facing are unprecedented in scale, therefore I am very glad that IEA Member countries have responded with an emergency collective action of unprecedented size.” He also stressed that the deeper fix lay in restoring transit: tanker traffic, he noted, had to resume through the Strait of Hormuz to bring stable oil and gas flows back to the global market. The release was a circuit-breaker for prices and confidence, not a substitute for reopening the route.<\/p>\n
The mechanics are worth understanding because they explain both the power and the limits of the tool. Every IEA member is obliged to hold emergency oil stocks equal to at least 90 days of its net oil imports, and to stand ready to act collectively in a severe disruption. Those stocks can be government-held, agency-held or held by industry under government obligation, and collectively IEA members hold more than 1.2 billion barrels of public emergency stocks plus several hundred million more in obligated industry stocks. When the agency acts, releases are phased to each member’s national circumstances rather than dumped simultaneously: in March, Asia-Oceania members made stocks available immediately while members in the Americas and Europe began from the end of the month. This is coordinated supply management, calibrated to calm a market in the weeks it takes for the underlying disruption to resolve.<\/p>\n
The honest answer is that a 400 million barrel release is large enough to steady a market and small enough to expose the system’s limits at the same time. Against a chokepoint that can remove millions of barrels a day, a release of that size buys weeks of cushion, not months of replacement. The price action told the story: Brent crude moved above 100 dollars a barrel in early March for the first time in around four years and rose considerably higher at its peak, with the monthly increase ranking among the largest ever recorded, before the release and other factors took some heat out of the market. Those price figures are best treated as reported estimates from a volatile period rather than precise marks, but the direction was unmistakable, and analysts warned that output for the quarter could fall by the most since the pandemic.<\/p>\n
What the episode revealed is more durable than any single price print. First, that strategic reserves are a mitigation, not a cure: they bridge a gap while the real problem, in this case a blocked strait, is resolved by other means. Second, that the adequacy of reserves, measured in days of import cover, is now a live policy question rather than a technical footnote, and the same logic is driving large stock builds elsewhere, which Project 54 examined in its analysis of China’s strategic petroleum reserve. Third, that energy security has a geography: the value of a barrel depends on which side of a chokepoint it sits. A market that had treated the Strait of Hormuz as a tail risk spent the first half of 2026 learning to price it as a present one, which is precisely why questions of spare capacity and producer baselines, examined in the analysis of the UAE’s OPEC and OPEC-plus position, became so consequential.<\/p>\n
La consecuencia m\u00e1s importante es que las reservas estrat\u00e9gicas pasaron, en un solo trimestre, de ser un seguro de respaldo a una pol\u00edtica de primera l\u00ednea. Se prev\u00e9 que, una vez superada la crisis, se acelere el aumento de las reservas, se reabra el debate sobre la cantidad de d\u00edas de cobertura necesarios y que m\u00e1s pa\u00edses acumulen o ampl\u00eden sus reservas estrat\u00e9gicas, una tendencia que ya se observa en Asia y el Golfo. Es probable que la obligaci\u00f3n de 90 d\u00edas que sustenta el sistema de la AIE, ahora reflejada en las normas de almacenamiento de emergencia de unos 60 pa\u00edses que cubren aproximadamente el 95 % de las importaciones mundiales de petr\u00f3leo, se refuerce en lugar de flexibilizarse. En otras palabras, la pol\u00edtica de seguridad energ\u00e9tica se est\u00e1 reescribiendo en tiempo real a partir de la lecci\u00f3n de que la resiliencia f\u00edsica es m\u00e1s importante de lo que supon\u00edan los mercados.<\/p>\n
For energy-sector B2B, the read is direct and commercial. When supply security becomes a front-page risk, it stops being someone else’s problem and becomes a procurement criterion: buyers start scoring suppliers on supply-chain resilience, logistics redundancy and the ability to keep delivering through disruption, and price-risk management and inventory strategy climb the agenda. Suppliers who can demonstrate that resilience, and who bring credible data rather than assurances, gain an edge precisely when buyers are most anxious. Project 54’s view is that this is the structural takeaway from 2026, not the price spike itself: in an era where a single chokepoint can become the largest supply disruption in market history, the advantage goes to the organisations that have engineered resilience in advance rather than the ones improvising once the strait is already closed.<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
En marzo de 2026, la Agencia Internacional de Energ\u00eda autoriz\u00f3 la mayor liberaci\u00f3n de petr\u00f3leo de emergencia de su historia, 400 millones de barriles, para estabilizar un mercado afectado por la interrupci\u00f3n del estrecho de Ormuz. Este informe analiza la causa principal de la crisis, explica c\u00f3mo funciona la acci\u00f3n coordinada de las reservas, eval\u00faa si fue suficiente y se pregunta qu\u00e9 significa para el futuro de la seguridad energ\u00e9tica y para todos aquellos que compran, venden o planifican en torno al petr\u00f3leo un trimestre que transform\u00f3 las reservas estrat\u00e9gicas de una medida de precauci\u00f3n en una pol\u00edtica de primera l\u00ednea.<\/p>","protected":false},"author":12,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"iawp_total_views":0,"p54_article_data":"{\"meta\":{\"kicker\":\"Insight \u00b7 Government & Policy\",\"topics\":[\"Energy\",\"Strategy\"],\"title\":\"The IEA's Record Oil Release of March 2026: Why Strategic Reserves Became the Front Line of Energy Security\",\"dek\":\"In March 2026 the International Energy Agency authorised the largest emergency oil release in its history, 400 million barrels, to steady a market reeling from a disruption to the Strait of Hormuz. This dossier traces the root cause of the shock, explains how coordinated reserve action actually works, weighs whether it was enough, and asks what a quarter that turned strategic stocks from background insurance into front-line policy means for the future of energy security and for anyone who buys, sells or plans around oil.\",\"date\":\"28 June 2026\",\"readTime\":\"12 min read\",\"author\":\"Project 54, Research & Strategy\"},\"quickAnswer\":{\"q\":\"What was the IEA's March 2026 oil release and why did it happen?\",\"a\":\"On 11 March 2026 the 32 member countries of the International Energy Agency agreed to release 400 million barrels of oil from their emergency reserves, the largest such action in the agency's history, to counter a severe supply disruption stemming from conflict in the Middle East that restricted flows through the Strait of Hormuz. The strait normally carries around 20 percent of the world's oil, and its disruption helped push Brent crude above 100 dollars a barrel for the first time in roughly four years, peaking far higher. The release matters because it converted strategic petroleum reserves from quiet, background insurance into an active, front-line policy tool, and it exposed the central question of energy security in 2026: reserves can buy time against a chokepoint, but they cannot replace the artery itself.\"},\"takeaways\":[\"On 11 March 2026 the 32 IEA member countries unanimously agreed to release 400 million barrels of emergency oil, the largest coordinated stock release in the agency's history.\",\"The trigger was a disruption to the Strait of Hormuz, the chokepoint that normally carries around 20 percent of global oil and significant LNG, a physical transit shock rather than a demand collapse.\",\"Brent crude passed 100 dollars a barrel in early March for the first time in about four years and rose far higher at its peak, with the monthly increase among the largest on record, figures best treated as reported estimates.\",\"IEA members hold more than 1.2 billion barrels of public emergency stocks, and the 90-day stockholding obligation, now mirrored by emergency rules in around 60 countries covering most global imports, is the architecture that made the response possible.\",\"The episode reframed strategic reserves as front-line policy, and the commercial lesson for energy B2B is that physical supply security and logistics resilience are now procurement criteria, not afterthoughts.\"],\"sections\":[{\"id\":\"rootcause\",\"q\":\"What actually caused the shock?\",\"h\":\"A chokepoint, not a glut, the root cause of the 2026 disruption\",\"p\":[\"The defining feature of the 2026 oil shock is that it was a transit crisis, not a demand or production collapse. Conflict in the Middle East escalated sharply in early 2026, and in the aftermath, according to widespread reporting, shipping through the Strait of Hormuz was severely restricted as Iran threatened vessels transiting the waterway. The strait is the single most important oil artery on earth: roughly 20 percent of the world's oil and a large volume of liquefied natural gas normally pass through it. When a chokepoint of that scale is constrained, the problem is not that the oil has stopped being produced, it is that it cannot reach the market by its usual route.\",\"That distinction is the root cause of everything that followed. A demand shock can be met by cutting consumption, and a production shock can sometimes be offset by other producers pumping more, but a chokepoint blockage strands barrels behind the obstruction regardless of how much is produced upstream. Reporting indicated that flows through the strait fell by more than 90 percent at the peak, removing on the order of millions of barrels a day from normal seaborne movement. The IEA characterised the situation as the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market. Understanding the shock as a physical transit failure, rather than a market imbalance, is what makes sense of why the policy response leaned so heavily on releasing physical barrels already sitting on the right side of the blockage.\"],\"pillars\":[{\"n\":\"01\",\"t\":\"A transit shock\",\"d\":\"The disruption hit the route, not production, barrels were stranded behind a chokepoint rather than ceasing to exist.\"},{\"n\":\"02\",\"t\":\"20 percent of world oil\",\"d\":\"The Strait of Hormuz normally carries around a fifth of global oil plus major LNG volumes, which is why its constraint was systemic.\"},{\"n\":\"03\",\"t\":\"Largest on record\",\"d\":\"The IEA described it as the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market, framing the scale of the response.\"}]},{\"id\":\"response\",\"q\":\"How did the IEA respond, and how does coordinated reserve action work?\",\"h\":\"400 million barrels, and the machinery behind a collective release\",\"p\":[\"On 11 March 2026 the IEA's 32 member countries agreed unanimously to make 400 million barrels of oil from their emergency reserves available to the market, the largest emergency stock release the agency has ever coordinated. Fatih Birol, the IEA's executive director, said, \\\"The oil market challenges we are facing are unprecedented in scale, therefore I am very glad that IEA Member countries have responded with an emergency collective action of unprecedented size.\\\" He also stressed that the deeper fix lay in restoring transit: tanker traffic, he noted, had to resume through the Strait of Hormuz to bring stable oil and gas flows back to the global market. The release was a circuit-breaker for prices and confidence, not a substitute for reopening the route.\",\"The mechanics are worth understanding because they explain both the power and the limits of the tool. Every IEA member is obliged to hold emergency oil stocks equal to at least 90 days of its net oil imports, and to stand ready to act collectively in a severe disruption. Those stocks can be government-held, agency-held or held by industry under government obligation, and collectively IEA members hold more than 1.2 billion barrels of public emergency stocks plus several hundred million more in obligated industry stocks. When the agency acts, releases are phased to each member's national circumstances rather than dumped simultaneously: in March, Asia-Oceania members made stocks available immediately while members in the Americas and Europe began from the end of the month. This is coordinated supply management, calibrated to calm a market in the weeks it takes for the underlying disruption to resolve.\"]},{\"id\":\"enough\",\"q\":\"Was the release enough, and what did it reveal?\",\"h\":\"Buying weeks, not months, against a multi-barrel gap\",\"p\":[\"The honest answer is that a 400 million barrel release is large enough to steady a market and small enough to expose the system's limits at the same time. Against a chokepoint that can remove millions of barrels a day, a release of that size buys weeks of cushion, not months of replacement. The price action told the story: Brent crude moved above 100 dollars a barrel in early March for the first time in around four years and rose considerably higher at its peak, with the monthly increase ranking among the largest ever recorded, before the release and other factors took some heat out of the market. Those price figures are best treated as reported estimates from a volatile period rather than precise marks, but the direction was unmistakable, and analysts warned that output for the quarter could fall by the most since the pandemic.\",\"What the episode revealed is more durable than any single price print. First, that strategic reserves are a mitigation, not a cure: they bridge a gap while the real problem, in this case a blocked strait, is resolved by other means. Second, that the adequacy of reserves, measured in days of import cover, is now a live policy question rather than a technical footnote, and the same logic is driving large stock builds elsewhere, which Project 54 examined in its analysis of China's strategic petroleum reserve. Third, that energy security has a geography: the value of a barrel depends on which side of a chokepoint it sits. A market that had treated the Strait of Hormuz as a tail risk spent the first half of 2026 learning to price it as a present one, which is precisely why questions of spare capacity and producer baselines, examined in the analysis of the UAE's OPEC and OPEC-plus position, became so consequential.\"]},{\"id\":\"future\",\"q\":\"What does it mean for the future, and for energy B2B?\",\"h\":\"Reserves as front-line policy, and resilience as a buying criterion\",\"p\":[\"The most important consequence is that strategic reserves moved, in a single quarter, from background insurance to front-line policy. Expect the aftermath to include faster reserve top-ups once the disruption eases, renewed debate over how many days of cover is enough, and more countries building or expanding strategic stocks, a trend already visible in Asia and the Gulf. The 90-day obligation that underpins the IEA system, now mirrored by emergency stockholding rules in around 60 countries covering roughly 95 percent of global oil imports, is likely to be reinforced rather than relaxed. Energy security policy, in other words, is being rewritten in real time around the lesson that physical resilience matters more than markets assumed.\",\"For energy-sector B2B, the read is direct and commercial. When supply security becomes a front-page risk, it stops being someone else's problem and becomes a procurement criterion: buyers start scoring suppliers on supply-chain resilience, logistics redundancy and the ability to keep delivering through disruption, and price-risk management and inventory strategy climb the agenda. Suppliers who can demonstrate that resilience, and who bring credible data rather than assurances, gain an edge precisely when buyers are most anxious. Project 54's view is that this is the structural takeaway from 2026, not the price spike itself: in an era where a single chokepoint can become the largest supply disruption in market history, the advantage goes to the organisations that have engineered resilience in advance rather than the ones improvising once the strait is already closed.\"],\"pillars\":[{\"n\":\"01\",\"t\":\"Reserves move to the front line\",\"d\":\"Strategic stocks are now an active policy tool, expect faster top-ups, adequacy debates and more countries expanding cover.\"},{\"n\":\"02\",\"t\":\"Security has a geography\",\"d\":\"A barrel's value depends on which side of a chokepoint it sits, transit risk is now priced as present, not tail.\"},{\"n\":\"03\",\"t\":\"Resilience becomes a criterion\",\"d\":\"Buyers score supply-chain resilience and continuity, suppliers who can prove it win when anxiety peaks.\"}]}],\"media\":{\"image\":{\"src\":\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/stock-market-trading.jpg\",\"label\":\"A transit shock became a price shock, Brent passed 100 dollars for the first time in about four years.\",\"credit\":\"Project 54\"},\"infographicLabel\":\"400 million barrels released on 11 March 2026, the IEA's largest ever, against a Strait of Hormuz that normally carries around 20 percent of global oil.\",\"pdf\":{\"href\":\"\/wp-content\/themes\/p54-blueprint\/assets\/pdf\/iea-emergency-oil-reserves-2026.pdf\",\"title\":\"The IEA's Record Oil Release of March 2026, Slide Deck\",\"meta\":\"PDF \u00b7 briefing deck\"},\"podcast\":{\"src\":\"\/wp-content\/themes\/p54-blueprint\/assets\/media\/iea-emergency-oil-reserves-2026-podcast.m4a\",\"title\":\"The 2026 Oil Crisis and Strategic Reserves\",\"ep\":\"P54 Energy Growth Brief\",\"duration\":\"17:04\"},\"video\":{\"src\":\"\/wp-content\/themes\/p54-blueprint\/assets\/media\/iea-emergency-oil-reserves-2026-video.mp4\",\"label\":\"The 2026 Oil Crisis: Strategic Reserves as Front-Line Policy\",\"duration\":\"2:40\"}},\"poll\":{\"q\":\"After 2026, how should organisations treat oil supply security?\",\"options\":[{\"id\":\"a\",\"label\":\"As a procurement criterion we now score suppliers on\",\"insight\":\"The structural read. When a chokepoint becomes the largest disruption in market history, supply-chain resilience and continuity move from nice-to-have to scored requirement.\"},{\"id\":\"b\",\"label\":\"As a price-risk problem to hedge\",\"insight\":\"The financial read. The March spike showed how fast a transit shock becomes a price shock, hedging and inventory strategy climb the agenda when reserves can only buy weeks.\"},{\"id\":\"c\",\"label\":\"As a reason to build our own reserves and buffers\",\"insight\":\"The policy-mirroring read. Governments are expanding strategic stocks, and businesses exposed to oil are increasingly applying the same logic to their own buffers.\"},{\"id\":\"d\",\"label\":\"As a tail risk that has now passed\",\"insight\":\"The risky read. Treating 2026 as a one-off ignores the lesson the market just learned, the Strait of Hormuz is a present risk to price in, not a tail risk to forget.\"}],\"note\":\"No tallies, just where you stand. The 2026 takeaway is that resilience is engineered in advance, not improvised once the strait is closed.\"},\"faq\":[{\"q\":\"How much oil did the IEA release in March 2026?\",\"a\":\"On 11 March 2026 the 32 member countries of the International Energy Agency agreed to release 400 million barrels of oil from their emergency reserves, the largest coordinated emergency stock release in the agency's history. Releases were phased to national circumstances, with Asia-Oceania members making stocks available immediately and members in the Americas and Europe beginning from the end of March.\"},{\"q\":\"Why did the IEA release emergency oil reserves?\",\"a\":\"The release responded to a severe supply disruption caused by conflict in the Middle East that restricted flows through the Strait of Hormuz, the chokepoint that normally carries around 20 percent of the world's oil. The disruption helped push Brent crude above 100 dollars a barrel for the first time in roughly four years. The IEA described it as the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market.\"},{\"q\":\"What is the IEA 90-day stockholding obligation?\",\"a\":\"Each IEA member country is obliged to hold emergency oil stocks equal to at least 90 days of its net oil imports and to be ready to act collectively in a severe supply disruption. Those stocks can be held by government, by a dedicated agency, or by industry under government obligation. Collectively, IEA members hold more than 1.2 billion barrels of public emergency stocks, which is the architecture that made the March 2026 release possible.\"},{\"q\":\"Was the IEA's oil release enough to fix the crisis?\",\"a\":\"It was enough to steady prices and confidence but not to replace the lost flows. Against a chokepoint that can remove millions of barrels a day, a 400 million barrel release buys weeks of cushion rather than months of replacement, which is why IEA Executive Director Fatih Birol stressed that tanker traffic had to resume through the Strait of Hormuz to restore stable flows. Reserves mitigate a chokepoint disruption, they do not cure it.\"},{\"q\":\"What does the 2026 oil shock mean for businesses?\",\"a\":\"It reframed strategic reserves as front-line policy and made physical supply security a present risk rather than a tail risk. For energy-sector B2B, the practical effect is that supply-chain resilience, logistics redundancy and continuity become procurement criteria, while price-risk management and inventory strategy rise up the agenda. Suppliers who can demonstrate resilience with credible data, rather than assurances, gain an advantage when buyers are most concerned about security of supply.\"}],\"newsletter\":{\"kicker\":\"The Energy Growth Brief\",\"title\":[\"Get the next\",\"intelligence drop\"],\"body\":\"Join energy and industrial leaders getting our marketing, AI-growth and revenue-architecture intelligence, direct, no filler.\",\"cta\":\"Subscribe\",\"note\":\"No spam. Unsubscribe anytime. We read every reply.\",\"success\":\"You're on the list\",\"successBody\":\"Welcome to The Energy Growth Brief, watch your inbox for the next dispatch.\",\"cadence\":\"Twice monthly\",\"reach\":\"Gulf \u00b7 MENA \u00b7 Asia \u00b7 Europe\"},\"related\":[{\"title\":\"China's Strategic Petroleum Reserve in 2026: Levels, Capacity, Days of Supply, and the Commercial Signal\",\"topic\":\"Energy\",\"href\":\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/china-strategic-petroleum-reserve-2026\/\"},{\"title\":\"The UAE's OPEC+ Exit and the New Baseline Mechanism: Root Causes and What Comes Next for Oil Markets\",\"topic\":\"Energy\",\"href\":\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/uae-opec-exit-baseline-mechanism\/\"},{\"title\":\"The GCC Oilfield Services Market in 2026: Where the Spend Is, and How Suppliers Win Procurement\",\"topic\":\"Energy\",\"href\":\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/gcc-oilfield-services-market-2026\/\"},{\"title\":\"ADNOC and XRG: How Abu Dhabi Built a 150 Billion Dollar Bet on Gas, Chemicals and the AI Power Boom\",\"topic\":\"Strategy\",\"href\":\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/adnoc-xrg-gas-chemicals-ai-bet\/\"}],\"listenTime\":\"17 min listen\"}","p54_faq":"","p54_media":"","p54_comments_enabled":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[92,125],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3496","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-analysis","category-strategy"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3496","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/12"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3496"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3496\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3517,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3496\/revisions\/3517"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3496"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3496"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3496"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}