S\u00ed, a principios de a\u00f1o, a un ritmo r\u00e9cord, luego deliberadamente no. Los datos comerciales preliminares muestran que China agreg\u00f3 alrededor de 1,24 millones de barriles por d\u00eda a los inventarios de crudo a principios de 2026, por encima de los aproximadamente 1,1 millones de barriles por d\u00eda promediados a lo largo de 2025, lo que dej\u00f3 las existencias totales cerca de 1.400 millones de barriles. La interrupci\u00f3n del Estrecho de Ormuz desde finales de febrero cambi\u00f3 el flujo: con el Brent dispar\u00e1ndose por encima de los 100 d\u00f3lares por barril, China redujo las importaciones a alrededor de 7,8 millones de barriles por d\u00eda en mayo, su nivel m\u00e1s bajo en casi una d\u00e9cada, y recurri\u00f3 a las reservas en lugar de comprar el aumento. Los pron\u00f3sticos previos a la crisis de la EIA, alrededor de 1,0 mill\u00f3n de barriles por d\u00eda de acumulaci\u00f3n, y FGE, alrededor de 730.000 barriles por d\u00eda, todav\u00eda definen el panorama para todo el a\u00f1o: la acumulaci\u00f3n de almacenamiento contin\u00faa, y se espera que la acumulaci\u00f3n se reanude a medida que los precios se normalicen.<\/p>\n
Hasta 2025, China a\u00f1adi\u00f3 petr\u00f3leo crudo a sus reservas estrat\u00e9gicas y comerciales combinadas a un ritmo promedio de aproximadamente 1,1 millones de barriles diarios, la acumulaci\u00f3n sostenida m\u00e1s r\u00e1pida jam\u00e1s registrada en ning\u00fan pa\u00eds. En diciembre de 2025, las reservas totales se situaban cerca de 1.400 millones de barriles: aproximadamente 360 millones de barriles en la reserva estrat\u00e9gica controlada directamente por el gobierno y alrededor de 1.000 millones de barriles en tanques comerciales que Pek\u00edn considera cada vez m\u00e1s estrat\u00e9gicos, tras haber ordenado a sus compa\u00f1\u00edas petroleras nacionales que mantuvieran reservas de emergencia.<\/p>\n
El nuevo a\u00f1o comenz\u00f3 a\u00fan m\u00e1s r\u00e1pido. Los datos preliminares del comercio y del gobierno para principios de 2026 indican un aumento de aproximadamente 1,24 millones de barriles diarios, por debajo del ritmo mensual r\u00e9cord alcanzado en diciembre, pero por encima del promedio de todo el a\u00f1o 2025. La l\u00f3gica era sencilla: los precios a principios de 2026 se mantuvieron en un rango que Pek\u00edn consideraba atractivo, se estaba poniendo en funcionamiento nueva capacidad de almacenamiento en el marco del programa estatal, y la instrucci\u00f3n pol\u00edtica de acumular reservas no hab\u00eda cambiado.<\/p>\n
None of this is officially published. Beijing releases no reserve statistics, so every figure here is an estimate assembled from customs data, satellite tank-gauging and refinery runs, the same triangulation that produces the range of numbers explored across our companion dossiers on the stockpile’s size and days of cover.<\/p>\n
From late February 2026 the conflict in the Middle East largely closed the Strait of Hormuz, the chokepoint that normally carries around 20 percent of the world’s oil and roughly 45 percent of China’s crude imports. Brent moved above 100 dollars a barrel for the first time in roughly four years, and on 11 March the International Energy Agency authorised its largest ever coordinated release, 400 million barrels from member reserves.<\/p>\n
China, que no forma parte del sistema de la AIE, gestion\u00f3 su propia respuesta. En lugar de pujar por los escasos cargamentos a precios de crisis, dej\u00f3 de llenar sus tanques y comenz\u00f3 a vaciarlos. Los datos aduaneros muestran que las importaciones cayeron a unos 7,8 millones de barriles diarios en mayo, frente a un promedio de cinco a\u00f1os de alrededor de 11 millones, el nivel m\u00e1s bajo en casi una d\u00e9cada. Este \u00fanico recorte represent\u00f3 aproximadamente el 74 % de la disminuci\u00f3n del comercio mundial de crudo durante la crisis.<\/p>\n
The effect surprised forecasters who had priced a far worse spike. By absorbing its own demand shock from storage, China removed the world’s largest buyer from a panicked market at exactly the moment supply was shortest. The stockpile did precisely what it was built to do, and its scale, near 1.4 billion barrels against the government’s own three-month import-cover target, is why Beijing could afford to do it for months rather than weeks.<\/p>\n
Las previsiones realizadas antes de la crisis siguen describiendo la trayectoria que ambas agencias esperan que se retome. La Administraci\u00f3n de Informaci\u00f3n Energ\u00e9tica de EE. UU. supuso que China continuar\u00eda acumulando reservas estrat\u00e9gicas a un ritmo cercano a 1 mill\u00f3n de barriles diarios hasta 2026, antes de que el ritmo se ralentizara en 2027. La consultora FGE proyect\u00f3 que las reservas aumentar\u00edan en unos 266 millones de barriles a lo largo del a\u00f1o, lo que equivale a un promedio de unos 730\u00a0000 barriles diarios. Ambas proyecciones implican que la reducci\u00f3n de reservas durante la crisis es una pausa dentro de un proceso de acumulaci\u00f3n m\u00e1s prolongado, no su fin.<\/p>\n
El programa f\u00edsico apunta en la misma direcci\u00f3n. Empresas estatales como Sinopec y CNOOC est\u00e1n a\u00f1adiendo al menos 169 millones de barriles de capacidad de almacenamiento en 11 emplazamientos hasta 2025 y 2026, y la Federaci\u00f3n de la Industria Petroqu\u00edmica y Petroqu\u00edmica de China se ha propuesto elevar la capacidad de reserva estatal por encima de los mil millones de barriles, lo que se define expl\u00edcitamente como tres meses de cobertura neta de importaciones. Los tanques vac\u00edos constituyen una instrucci\u00f3n permanente para comprar.<\/p>\n
Timing is the only real question, and China’s own behaviour supplies the rule: it accelerates purchases when prices are soft and steps back when they spike. A durable reopening of Hormuz and a Brent price returning toward pre-crisis levels would recreate exactly the conditions under which China stockpiled hardest, this time with more tankage to fill and a fresh demonstration of why the buffer is worth holding.<\/p>\n
Dado que Pek\u00edn no publica informaci\u00f3n, la historia de 2026 debe interpretarse a partir de los flujos de datos, en lugar de las declaraciones. Analizando el patr\u00f3n periodo a periodo, se observa coherencia: un crecimiento r\u00e9cord mientras los precios lo permitieron, una reducci\u00f3n deliberada cuando no fue posible y previsiones que anticipan que el crecimiento se reanudar\u00e1 una vez que las condiciones se normalicen.<\/p>\n
Cada cifra conlleva la advertencia que subyace a todo este conjunto: se trata de estimaciones basadas en datos aduaneros, seguimiento de buques cisterna y mediciones satelitales, y las diferentes metodolog\u00edas producen cifras distintas. Sin embargo, la direcci\u00f3n de cada fase no est\u00e1 en discusi\u00f3n.<\/p>\n
| Per\u00edodo<\/th>\n | Flujo estimado<\/th>\n | Lo que indica<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n |
|---|---|---|
| A\u00f1o completo 2025<\/td>\n | Construcciones con un promedio de aproximadamente 1,1 millones de barriles por d\u00eda.<\/td>\n | El r\u00e9cord hist\u00f3rico: las reservas totales alcanzan casi 1.400 millones de barriles.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n |
| De enero a febrero de 2026<\/td>\n | Genera alrededor de 1,24 millones de barriles por d\u00eda.<\/td>\n | Aceleraci\u00f3n por encima del promedio de 2025 mientras los precios se mantuvieron atractivos.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n |
| De marzo a mayo de 2026<\/td>\n | Las importaciones se reducen a unos 7,8 millones de barriles diarios; extracci\u00f3n neta<\/td>\n | Respuesta a la crisis: consumir desde las reservas en lugar de comprar en un mercado en alza.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n |
| Segundo semestre de 2026 (previsi\u00f3n)<\/td>\n | Se esperan producciones de aproximadamente 0,7 a 1,0 millones de barriles por d\u00eda.<\/td>\n | Tanto la EIA como la FGE esperan que la acumulaci\u00f3n se reanude a medida que los precios se normalicen.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n |
| Programa de capacitaci\u00f3n<\/td>\n | 169 millones de barriles de nueva capacidad de almacenamiento en 11 emplazamientos.<\/td>\n | El objetivo estatal de superar los mil millones de barriles de capacidad de reserva mantiene en marcha el programa de expansi\u00f3n.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\nLa se\u00f1al comercial dentro de la pausa<\/h2>\nLa distinci\u00f3n comercial m\u00e1s importante en este caso radica en la diferencia entre la tasa de ocupaci\u00f3n y el programa de capacidad. La tasa de ocupaci\u00f3n fluct\u00faa con el precio del petr\u00f3leo y dej\u00f3 de hacerlo en marzo. El programa de capacidad, que incluye las obras civiles, los tanques de acero, las conexiones de oleoductos, la medici\u00f3n, la instrumentaci\u00f3n, los sistemas contra incendios, la inspecci\u00f3n y la certificaci\u00f3n en 11 emplazamientos, se rige por los ciclos de planificaci\u00f3n estatales y no se detuvo. Los proveedores que venden para el desarrollo venden en funci\u00f3n del programa, no del precio.<\/p>\n The cycle also moves adjacent markets in both directions. China’s stockpiling swings are now large enough to reshape seaborne crude flows, tanker demand and port throughput on their own: the 2025 build pulled shipping demand forward, and the 2026 drawdown removed it just as sharply. Any supplier whose revenue tracks Chinese import volumes, from marine logistics to inspection services, is exposed to a reserve policy that is decided without publication and read only through flows.<\/p>\n Para los equipos de marketing y estrategia del sector energ\u00e9tico, este episodio tambi\u00e9n constituye una lecci\u00f3n sobre inteligencia de la demanda. Las preguntas que se hacen compradores y analistas \u2014cu\u00e1nto est\u00e1 a\u00f1adiendo China, si se ha detenido el suministro, cu\u00e1ndo se reanudar\u00e1\u2014 se disparan precisamente cuando el mercado est\u00e1 m\u00e1s incierto, y las organizaciones que las responden con credibilidad captan esa atenci\u00f3n. Por eso existe esta p\u00e1gina, y la misma l\u00f3gica de b\u00fasqueda de respuestas se aplica a cualquier marca B2B del sector energ\u00e9tico cuya experiencia se alinee con las preguntas que el mercado se plantea activamente.<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" China entered 2026 adding an estimated 1.24 million barrels a day to its oil reserves, then the Hormuz crisis flipped it from builder to buffer: imports fell to 7.8 million barrels a day and China drew on its 1.4 billion barrel stockpile instead of buying the spike. What the flows show, and when building resumes.<\/p>","protected":false},"author":12,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"iawp_total_views":2,"p54_article_data":"{\"meta\":{\"kicker\":\"Insight \u00b7 Energy\",\"topics\":[\"Energy\",\"Strategy\",\"Capital\"],\"title\":\"Is China Still Adding to Its Oil Reserves in 2026? The Record Build, the Hormuz Shock, and What Comes Next\",\"dek\":\"China entered 2026 stockpiling crude faster than ever, adding an estimated 1.24 million barrels a day to inventories in the opening weeks of the year, above even 2025's record average of 1.1 million barrels a day. Then the Strait of Hormuz disruption turned the world's biggest oil buyer into its biggest shock absorber: imports fell to roughly 7.8 million barrels a day by May, the lowest in nearly a decade, and China drew on its estimated 1.4 billion barrel stockpile rather than chase a spiking market. Here is what the trade data show, why the pause is not the end of the buildout, and what the stockpiling cycle signals for suppliers watching the world's largest storage programme.\",\"date\":\"3 July 2026\",\"readTime\":\"9 min read\",\"author\":\"Project 54\",\"listenTime\":\"21 min listen\"},\"quickAnswer\":{\"q\":\"Is China still adding to its oil reserves in 2026?\",\"a\":\"Yes at the start of the year, at record pace, then deliberately not. Preliminary trade data show China adding about 1.24 million barrels a day to crude inventories in early 2026, above the roughly 1.1 million barrels a day averaged across 2025, which left total stocks near 1.4 billion barrels. The Strait of Hormuz disruption from late February changed the flow: with Brent spiking above 100 dollars a barrel, China cut imports to about 7.8 million barrels a day by May, its lowest in nearly a decade, and drew on stockpiles instead of buying the spike. Pre-crisis forecasts from the EIA, about 1.0 million barrels a day of builds, and FGE, about 730,000 barrels a day, still frame the full-year picture: the storage buildout continues, and accumulation is expected to resume as prices normalise.\"},\"takeaways\":[\"China opened 2026 stockpiling faster than ever: preliminary data show additions of about 1.24 million barrels a day in the opening weeks, above 2025's record average of about 1.1 million barrels a day, which had already lifted total crude inventories to nearly 1.4 billion barrels.\",\"The Strait of Hormuz disruption flipped China from builder to buffer. Imports fell to about 7.8 million barrels a day by May 2026, the lowest in nearly a decade, and China's cut accounted for roughly 74 percent of the decrease in global crude trade.\",\"The drawdown is the reserve working as designed. By consuming from storage instead of bidding for scarce cargoes at over 100 dollars a barrel, China absorbed the shock and helped keep the global price spike contained.\",\"The buildout logic survives the pause. Pre-crisis forecasts saw 2026 builds of 0.7 to 1.0 million barrels a day, and the capacity programme, at least 169 million barrels of new tankage across 11 sites and a state target above 1 billion barrels, remains in place.\",\"For suppliers, the fill rate and the capacity programme are different markets. Tankage, instrumentation, inspection and marine logistics contracts run on the storage buildout, not the oil price, and the buildout has not stopped.\"],\"sections\":[{\"id\":\"record-build\",\"q\":\"How fast was China adding oil to its reserves before the crisis?\",\"h\":\"Record accumulation into early 2026\",\"p\":[\"Through 2025 China added crude oil to its combined strategic and commercial inventories at an average of about 1.1 million barrels a day, the fastest sustained accumulation any country has ever run. By December 2025 total stocks stood near 1.4 billion barrels: roughly 360 million barrels in the directly government-controlled strategic reserve and around 1 billion barrels in commercial tanks that Beijing increasingly treats as strategic, having directed its national oil companies to hold emergency barrels.\",\"The new year began faster still. Preliminary trade and government data for early 2026 indicate additions of about 1.24 million barrels a day, below the record monthly pace set in December but above the full-year 2025 average. The logic was straightforward: prices entering 2026 remained in a range Beijing considered attractive, new tankage was coming online across the state programme, and the political instruction to stockpile had not changed.\",\"None of this is officially published. Beijing releases no reserve statistics, so every figure here is an estimate assembled from customs data, satellite tank-gauging and refinery runs, the same triangulation that produces the range of numbers explored across our companion dossiers on the stockpile's size and days of cover.\"]},{\"id\":\"hormuz-flip\",\"q\":\"What did the Strait of Hormuz disruption change?\",\"h\":\"From builder to buffer: the flip in the second quarter\",\"p\":[\"From late February 2026 the conflict in the Middle East largely closed the Strait of Hormuz, the chokepoint that normally carries around 20 percent of the world's oil and roughly 45 percent of China's crude imports. Brent moved above 100 dollars a barrel for the first time in roughly four years, and on 11 March the International Energy Agency authorised its largest ever coordinated release, 400 million barrels from member reserves.\",\"China, which sits outside the IEA system, ran its own response. Rather than bid for scarce cargoes at crisis prices, it stopped filling tanks and started emptying them. Customs data show imports falling to about 7.8 million barrels a day by May, against a five-year average around 11 million, the lowest level in nearly a decade. That single cut accounted for roughly 74 percent of the decrease in global crude trade during the crisis.\",\"The effect surprised forecasters who had priced a far worse spike. By absorbing its own demand shock from storage, China removed the world's largest buyer from a panicked market at exactly the moment supply was shortest. The stockpile did precisely what it was built to do, and its scale, near 1.4 billion barrels against the government's own three-month import-cover target, is why Beijing could afford to do it for months rather than weeks.\"]},{\"id\":\"resumption\",\"q\":\"Will China resume stockpiling in the second half of 2026?\",\"h\":\"The forecasts, and the logic that survives the shock\",\"p\":[\"The forecasts made before the crisis still describe the trajectory both agencies expect to reassert itself. The US Energy Information Administration assumed China would keep building strategic stockpiles at close to 1.0 million barrels a day through 2026 before slowing in 2027. Consultancy FGE projected inventories rising by about 266 million barrels across the year, roughly 730,000 barrels a day on average. Both imply that the crisis drawdown is a pause inside a longer accumulation, not the end of it.\",\"The physical programme points the same way. State companies including Sinopec and CNOOC are adding at least 169 million barrels of storage capacity across 11 sites through 2025 and 2026, and the China Petroleum and Petrochemical Industry Federation has set an intention to lift state reserve capacity above 1 billion barrels, explicitly framed as three months of net import cover. Empty tanks are a standing instruction to buy.\",\"Timing is the only real question, and China's own behaviour supplies the rule: it accelerates purchases when prices are soft and steps back when they spike. A durable reopening of Hormuz and a Brent price returning toward pre-crisis levels would recreate exactly the conditions under which China stockpiled hardest, this time with more tankage to fill and a fresh demonstration of why the buffer is worth holding.\"]},{\"id\":\"ledger\",\"q\":\"How do the 2026 numbers fit together?\",\"h\":\"The stockpiling ledger, period by period\",\"p\":[\"Because Beijing publishes nothing, the 2026 story has to be read from flows rather than statements. Laid out period by period, the pattern is coherent: a record build while prices allowed it, a deliberate drawdown when they did not, and forecasts that expect the build to resume once conditions normalise.\",\"Every figure carries the caveat that runs through this whole cluster: these are estimates built from customs data, tanker tracking and satellite gauging, and different methodologies produce different numbers. The direction of each phase, however, is not in dispute.\"],\"table\":{\"cols\":[\"Period\",\"Estimated flow\",\"What it signals\"],\"rows\":[[\"2025 full year\",\"Builds averaging about 1.1 million b\/d\",\"The record baseline; total stocks reach nearly 1.4 billion barrels\"],[\"January to February 2026\",\"Builds around 1.24 million b\/d\",\"Acceleration above the 2025 average while prices stayed attractive\"],[\"March to May 2026\",\"Imports cut to about 7.8 million b\/d; net drawdown\",\"Crisis response: consume from storage rather than buy a spiking market\"],[\"Second half 2026 (forecast)\",\"Builds of roughly 0.7 to 1.0 million b\/d expected\",\"EIA and FGE both expect accumulation to resume as prices normalise\"],[\"Capacity programme\",\"169 million barrels of new tankage across 11 sites\",\"State target above 1 billion barrels of reserve capacity keeps the buildout running\"]]}},{\"id\":\"commercial-signal\",\"q\":\"What does the stockpiling cycle mean for suppliers and marketers?\",\"h\":\"The commercial signal inside the pause\",\"p\":[\"The most important commercial distinction in this story is between the fill rate and the capacity programme. The fill rate moves with the oil price and stopped moving in March. The capacity programme, the civil works, steel tankage, pipeline tie-ins, metering, instrumentation, fire suppression, inspection and certification across 11 sites, runs on state planning cycles and did not stop. Suppliers selling into the buildout are selling into the programme, not the price.\",\"The cycle also moves adjacent markets in both directions. China's stockpiling swings are now large enough to reshape seaborne crude flows, tanker demand and port throughput on their own: the 2025 build pulled shipping demand forward, and the 2026 drawdown removed it just as sharply. Any supplier whose revenue tracks Chinese import volumes, from marine logistics to inspection services, is exposed to a reserve policy that is decided without publication and read only through flows.\",\"For marketing and strategy teams in the energy sector, the episode is also a demand-intelligence lesson. The questions buyers and analysts ask, how much is China adding, has it stopped, when will it resume, spike exactly when the market is most uncertain, and the organisations that answer them credibly capture that attention. That is the reason this page exists, and the same answer-engine logic applies to any energy B2B brand whose expertise maps to questions the market is actively asking.\"]}],\"media\":{\"image\":{\"src\":\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/lighthouse-coastal-energy.jpg\",\"label\":\"China's storage buildout kept running through the 2026 price shock: the fill rate paused, the capacity programme did not.\",\"credit\":\"Project 54\"},\"infographicLabel\":\"China's 2026 stockpiling cycle: record builds in January and February, crisis drawdown from March, forecast resumption in the second half\",\"pdf\":{\"href\":\"\/wp-content\/themes\/p54-blueprint\/assets\/pdf\/is-china-still-stockpiling-oil-2026.pdf\",\"title\":\"China's 2026 Oil Stockpiling Cycle: Briefing Deck\",\"meta\":\"9-slide briefing \u00b7 Project 54\"},\"podcast\":{\"src\":\"\/wp-content\/themes\/p54-blueprint\/assets\/media\/is-china-still-stockpiling-oil-2026-podcast.m4a\",\"title\":\"China's Invisible Oil Buffer Dictates Global Flows\",\"ep\":\"P54 Energy Growth Brief\",\"duration\":\"20:54\"}},\"poll\":{\"q\":\"China stockpiled at record pace, then drew down through the Hormuz crisis. What does the cycle tell you?\",\"note\":\"Your selection maps how you interpret China's reserve behaviour. No vote tallies, this is a reflection tool.\",\"options\":[{\"id\":\"a\",\"label\":\"A buffer working exactly as designed\",\"insight\":\"This reading treats the 2026 cycle as vindication: the point of holding 1.4 billion barrels is to consume them in a crisis instead of bidding against the world for scarce cargoes. Build cheap, draw dear, repeat.\"},{\"id\":\"b\",\"label\":\"A price actor now too big to ignore\",\"insight\":\"On this view the lesson is market power. When one buyer's stockpiling decisions account for three quarters of the swing in global crude trade, China's reserve policy has become a supply-side force comparable to an OPEC decision, set without publication or warning.\"},{\"id\":\"c\",\"label\":\"A cycle you can position for\",\"insight\":\"This reading is commercial. The drawdown is temporary, the tankage keeps growing, and the resumption of buying is forecastable within a range. Suppliers and traders who track the flows rather than the headlines get to the demand first.\"}]},\"faq\":[{\"q\":\"How much oil was China adding per day in early 2026?\",\"a\":\"Preliminary data indicate about 1.24 million barrels a day of additions in January and February 2026, above the roughly 1.1 million barrels a day averaged across 2025. The full context of the reserve programme is set out in our dossier on China's strategic petroleum reserve in 2026<\/a>.\"},{\"q\":\"Did China stop stockpiling during the Hormuz crisis?\",\"a\":\"Effectively yes. Customs data show imports falling to about 7.8 million barrels a day by May 2026, the lowest in nearly a decade, implying China was consuming from storage rather than adding to it. Beijing publishes no reserve data, so the switch is read from trade flows rather than official statements.\"},{\"q\":\"How big is China's total oil stockpile?\",\"a\":\"Best estimates put total crude inventories near 1.4 billion barrels entering 2026, roughly 360 million barrels in the government strategic reserve and around 1 billion barrels in commercial tanks. How that count is built is covered in our dossier on the barrel count<\/a>.\"},{\"q\":\"How many days of supply does the stockpile cover?\",\"a\":\"Around 120 to 130 days of import cover on most estimates, though the figure moves with the import denominator used. The methodology and the ranges are unpacked in our days-of-supply dossier<\/a>.\"},{\"q\":\"Does China's stockpiling follow IEA rules?\",\"a\":\"No. China is not an IEA member and carries no 90-day stockholding obligation, and it did not release stocks through the IEA's coordinated March 2026 action. How China compares to the benchmark anyway is examined in our dossier on the 90-day comparison<\/a>.\"}],\"newsletter\":{\"kicker\":\"The Energy Growth Brief\",\"title\":[\"Get the next\",\"intelligence drop\"],\"body\":\"Join energy and industrial leaders getting our marketing, AI-growth and revenue-architecture intelligence, direct, no filler.\",\"cadence\":\"Twice monthly\",\"reach\":\"Gulf \u00b7 MENA \u00b7 Asia \u00b7 Europe\",\"cta\":\"Subscribe\",\"note\":\"No spam. Unsubscribe anytime. We read every reply.\",\"success\":\"You're on the list\",\"successBody\":\"Welcome to The Energy Growth Brief, watch your inbox for the next dispatch.\"},\"related\":[{\"title\":\"China's Strategic Petroleum Reserve in 2026: Levels, Capacity, Days of Supply, and the Commercial Signal\",\"topic\":\"Energy\",\"href\":\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/china-strategic-petroleum-reserve-2026\/\"},{\"title\":\"How Many Barrels Are in China's Strategic Petroleum Reserve? Sizing the World's Largest Oil Stockpile\",\"topic\":\"Energy\",\"href\":\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/china-strategic-petroleum-reserve-barrels\/\"},{\"title\":\"How Does China Compare to the IEA 90-Day Benchmark? Why the Comparison Is Harder Than It Looks\",\"topic\":\"Energy\",\"href\":\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/china-iea-90-day-oil-stockholding-benchmark\/\"}]}","p54_faq":"","p54_media":"","p54_comments_enabled":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[92,125],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3560","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-analysis","category-strategy"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3560","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/12"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3560"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3560\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3562,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3560\/revisions\/3562"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3560"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3560"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3560"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}} |