China pr\u00e1cticamente no publica informaci\u00f3n sobre sus reservas de petr\u00f3leo, por lo que cualquier cifra que hayas le\u00eddo es una reconstrucci\u00f3n. Este dossier explica los tres m\u00e9todos que utilizan los analistas, muestra la diferencia real entre ellos y te ofrece una forma fiable de citar la cifra sin pretender que sea un hecho.<\/p>\n
Pek\u00edn no publica datos rutinarios sobre inventarios de petr\u00f3leo, por lo que ninguna fuente dispone de la cifra exacta. Los analistas la reconstruyen de dos maneras: mediante mediciones satelitales de tanques de techo flotante (Kpler, Vortexa, Ursa Space Systems) y mediante un c\u00e1lculo del balance de la oferta que toma las importaciones de crudo m\u00e1s la producci\u00f3n nacional menos el procesamiento de las refiner\u00edas y trata el remanente como un aumento de existencias. Los dos m\u00e9todos discrepan porque los sat\u00e9lites no pueden ver el almacenamiento subterr\u00e1neo en cavernas de roca ni los tanques de techo fijo, y porque el balance de la oferta depende de la estimaci\u00f3n de las operaciones de refiner\u00eda en refiner\u00edas independientes de peque\u00f1o tama\u00f1o y con alta volatilidad. El recuento de d\u00edas principal diverge nuevamente en el denominador: la misma reserva de aproximadamente 1200 a 1400 millones de barriles equivale a entre 110 y 130 d\u00edas en comparaci\u00f3n con las importaciones netas, y mucho menos en comparaci\u00f3n con el consumo total. Cualquier cifra citada sin su m\u00e9todo y su denominador no es precisa, sino una selecci\u00f3n.<\/p>\n
China does not release routine crude inventory data. There is no weekly stocks report, no equivalent of the EIA’s Wednesday release, no audited annual filing. Inventory levels are treated as strategically sensitive, which is a rational position for a country whose principal energy vulnerability is a maritime chokepoint.<\/p>\n
La excepci\u00f3n confirma la regla. En 2018, la Oficina Nacional de Estad\u00edstica revel\u00f3 una reserva nacional total de 37,73 millones de toneladas, unos 280,7 millones de barriles, a mediados de 2017 (South China Morning Post<\/a>Fue la primera vez que se publicaba un total oficial, lleg\u00f3 meses despu\u00e9s del per\u00edodo que describ\u00eda, y desde entonces no se ha repetido nada de esa magnitud de forma regular.<\/p>\n Por lo tanto, todas las cifras que circulan, incluidas las nuestras, son reconstrucciones. Esto no es una cr\u00edtica a los analistas que realizan la reconstrucci\u00f3n. Es un hecho sobre los datos, y deber\u00eda influir en la forma en que se citan las cifras.<\/p>\n Para entender por qu\u00e9 las cifras no coinciden, es necesario comprender que no todas intentan medir el mismo objeto.<\/p>\n The divergence is not academic. The EIA put China’s strategic inventories at nearly 1.4 billion barrels as of December 2025, after average additions of 1.1 million barrels a day through 2025 (Evaluaci\u00f3n de impacto ambiental<\/a>). Kpler’s satellite and flow based tracking had onshore inventories at about 1,232 million barrels in late May 2026, down from a peak of 1,251 million in early May (Kpler, 25 de mayo de 2026<\/a>El columnista de Reuters, Clyde Russell, bas\u00e1ndose en el balance de la oferta, estim\u00f3 las existencias comerciales y estrat\u00e9gicas combinadas en al menos 1.200 millones de barriles, citando datos de Vortexa que indican un r\u00e9cord de 1.240 millones en abril de 2026.<\/p>\n La tasa de acumulaci\u00f3n se divide a\u00fan m\u00e1s que el nivel. El Instituto Oxford de Estudios Energ\u00e9ticos encontr\u00f3 estimaciones publicadas de acumulaci\u00f3n impl\u00edcita de existencias para 2025 que van desde 0,43 a 0,9 millones de barriles por d\u00eda, frente a su propio caso central de 0,75, y se\u00f1al\u00f3 que el diferencial entre analistas promedia alrededor de 0,5 millones de barriles por d\u00eda y puede llegar a 1,1 millones (OIES, mayo de 2026<\/a>Un desacuerdo de 1,1 millones de barriles al d\u00eda es mayor que la producci\u00f3n diaria total de varios miembros de la OPEP.<\/p>\n The most instructive case is historical. Analysts at Rice University’s Baker Institute, working with Orbital Insight satellite data, wrote that “at times in mid to late 2017, Orbital Insight’s data suggested total crude oil stockpiles in China were more than three times as large as the figures reported by Xinhua, a potential discrepancy of more than 500 million barrels” (Collins y Hung, Instituto Baker, 2018<\/a>). Quinientos millones de barriles es la diferencia entre una cifra oficial parcial y una medici\u00f3n independiente del mismo pa\u00eds.<\/p>\n Invisible storage. A growing share of China’s strategic capacity is built in mined underground rock caverns rather than above ground steel. Shadow based satellite analysis cannot read it at all. The Baker Institute notes that underground caverns can cost more than 60 percent less per barrel of capacity than above ground tanks, so China has both a security incentive and a cost incentive to keep building storage that satellites cannot see.<\/p>\n Los barriles comerciales y estrat\u00e9gicos son inseparables. El colch\u00f3n de seguridad se compone de dos niveles combinados: una reserva estatal y un fondo comercial mucho mayor en manos de CNPC, Sinopec y CNOOC, al que Pek\u00edn puede recurrir en caso de crisis. Un analista externo no puede atribuir un barril determinado a un solo nivel, por lo que las estimaciones difieren simplemente seg\u00fan d\u00f3nde el autor establezca el l\u00edmite.<\/p>\n La actividad de las refiner\u00edas es el factor m\u00e1s d\u00e9bil. Las refiner\u00edas independientes de Shandong representan aproximadamente una cuarta parte de la capacidad nacional y sus tasas de producci\u00f3n var\u00edan r\u00e1pidamente: el promedio nacional cay\u00f3 al 66,3 % en mayo de 2026, mientras que las plantas de Shandong alcanzaron el 50,5 % en una semana. Dado que el volumen de producci\u00f3n es uno de los dos principales factores que influyen en el equilibrio de la oferta, un error en este aspecto repercute directamente en el aumento impl\u00edcito de las existencias.<\/p>\n Apparent demand is a proxy, not a measurement. China’s apparent demand is refinery processing plus net product imports. There is a persistent gap of roughly 1.1 to 1.4 million barrels a day between crude supply and what refineries actually process. Some of that gap is statistical noise across customs, NBS and shipping data. The rest becomes the stock build. Small measurement errors therefore become large disagreements about storage.<\/p>\n Esta es la parte que la mayor\u00eda de los lectores pasan por alto. Los d\u00edas de suministro son una fracci\u00f3n, y el numerador solo representa la mitad del argumento.<\/p>\n The IEA measures its members’ 90 day obligation against net imports of the prior calendar year, a stable and audited figure. China’s headline day counts are frequently quoted instead against gross imports, or against total consumption, which runs well above net imports. Both are larger denominators, so both mechanically produce a smaller day count for exactly the same barrels.<\/p>\n As\u00ed es como una fuente cre\u00edble dice 90 d\u00edas y otra dice 130 al describir una reserva id\u00e9ntica. Ninguna miente. Est\u00e1n dividiendo por cosas diferentes, y casi nadie dice cu\u00e1l. Establecemos la mec\u00e1nica de referencia en El expediente de existencias de 90 d\u00edas de la AIE<\/a>, y el recuento de d\u00edas laborables en el expediente de d\u00edas de suministro<\/a>.<\/p>\n Considere cada cifra de reservas chinas como un rango y siempre indique el m\u00e9todo y el denominador. A mediados de 2026, las reservas totales de crudo de China, incluyendo las reservas estatales y comerciales, probablemente se sit\u00faen entre 1200 y 1400 millones de barriles, convergiendo hacia el extremo inferior tras las reducciones sufridas durante el conflicto con Ir\u00e1n. En t\u00e9rminos de importaciones netas, esto equivale aproximadamente a entre 110 y 130 d\u00edas de cobertura. En t\u00e9rminos de importaciones brutas o consumo total, la misma cantidad de barriles representa menos d\u00edas.<\/p>\n The practical rule for anyone writing, briefing or selling on this: cite the range with attribution, say plainly that Beijing publishes no confirming figure, and note that the number moves in near real time with China’s buying and refining behaviour, unlike the IEA’s fixed annual benchmark. A single number with no method attached is not more precise. It is just less honest.<\/p>\n Esta es tambi\u00e9n la raz\u00f3n La opacidad en s\u00ed misma es la estrategia.<\/a>, Y por qu\u00e9 las estimaciones son importantes desde el punto de vista comercial: la misma ambig\u00fcedad que frustra a los analistas es lo que le da a Pek\u00edn margen de maniobra en una crisis.<\/p>\n Dado que Pek\u00edn no publica datos rutinarios sobre inventarios de petr\u00f3leo, los analistas reconstruyen el total a partir de lecturas satelitales de tanques visibles y de la diferencia entre las importaciones declaradas por la aduana, la producci\u00f3n nacional y el procesamiento en refiner\u00edas. Este m\u00e9todo es fiable, pero indirecto, por lo que cada cifra publicada conlleva un margen de error y es una estimaci\u00f3n, no una estad\u00edstica oficial.<\/p>\n Debido a que las fuentes utilizan diferentes m\u00e9todos y denominadores para las mismas reservas, un total de entre 1200 y 1400 millones de barriles puede equivaler a entre 110 y 180 d\u00edas de cobertura, dependiendo de si se divide entre las importaciones netas, las importaciones brutas o el consumo total. Adem\u00e1s, las estimaciones de la tasa de acumulaci\u00f3n de reservas difieren hasta en 1,1 millones de barriles diarios entre los analistas, seg\u00fan la OIES.<\/p>\n No. Satellites read the shadow cast by a floating roof on an above ground tank, which captures a large share of visible tank farms, more than 4,000 tanks in Ursa Space Systems’ coverage alone. They cannot see oil in mined underground rock caverns or fixed roof tanks, and China has both a cost incentive and a security incentive to keep building exactly that kind of storage.<\/p>\n Se trata de un c\u00e1lculo residual: producci\u00f3n nacional m\u00e1s importaciones m\u00e1s ingresos por oleoducto, menos procesamiento en refiner\u00edas y exportaciones, utilizando datos de la aduana china y de la Oficina Nacional de Estad\u00edstica. Se supone que el crudo que no se refina ni se exporta se almacena. Dado que depende de la estimaci\u00f3n de la actividad de las refiner\u00edas, especialmente en refiner\u00edas independientes de baja capacidad, peque\u00f1os errores generan grandes fluctuaciones en la producci\u00f3n impl\u00edcita.<\/p>\n Rara vez y parcialmente. El caso m\u00e1s claro es la cifra de la Oficina Nacional de Estad\u00edstica de 37,73 millones de toneladas, unos 280,7 millones de barriles, divulgada en 2018 para mediados de 2017. Xinhua publica ocasionalmente datos de tanques comerciales que cubren solo una parte del sistema, lo que deja las estimaciones satelitales y de balance de suministro como las herramientas principales. Para saber por qu\u00e9 el silencio es deliberado, consulte nuestro dossier sobre \u00bfPor qu\u00e9 China no publica sus reservas de petr\u00f3leo?<\/a>.<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" China pr\u00e1cticamente no publica informaci\u00f3n sobre sus reservas de petr\u00f3leo, por lo que cualquier cifra que hayas le\u00eddo es una reconstrucci\u00f3n. Este dossier explica los tres m\u00e9todos que utilizan los analistas, muestra la diferencia real entre ellos y te ofrece una forma fiable de citar la cifra sin pretender que sea un hecho.<\/p>","protected":false},"author":12,"featured_media":1861,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"p54_article_data":"{\"meta\":{\"kicker\":\"Insight \u00b7 Method\",\"topics\":[\"Energy\",\"Policy\"],\"title\":\"Why Every Estimate of China's Oil Stockpile Disagrees, and Which Numbers to Trust\",\"dek\":\"China publishes almost nothing about its oil reserves, so every figure you have ever read is a reconstruction. This dossier explains the three methods analysts use, shows the real spread between them, and gives you a defensible way to cite the number without pretending it is a fact.\",\"date\":\"12 July 2026\",\"readTime\":\"10 min read\",\"author\":\"Project 54, Research & Strategy\",\"listenTime\":\"22 min listen\"},\"quickAnswer\":{\"q\":\"Why is China's days of supply figure only an estimate, and why does it vary between sources?\",\"a\":\"Beijing does not publish routine oil inventory data, so no source has the actual number. Analysts reconstruct it two ways: satellite gauging of floating roof tanks (Kpler, Vortexa, Ursa Space Systems), and a supply balance calculation that takes crude imports plus domestic output minus refinery throughput and treats the residual as a stock build. The two methods disagree because satellites cannot see underground rock cavern storage or fixed roof tanks, and because the supply balance depends on estimating refinery runs at volatile independent teapot refiners. The headline day count then diverges again on the denominator: the same stockpile of roughly 1.2 to 1.4 billion barrels reads as about 110 to 130 days against net imports, and far fewer against total consumption. Any single number quoted without its method and its denominator is not precision, it is selection.\"},\"takeaways\":[\"No source has the real number. China treats stock levels as strategically sensitive, and the last meaningful official disclosure covered mid 2017: 37.73 million tonnes, roughly 280.7 million barrels, released by the National Bureau of Statistics.\",\"There are two independent methods, and they measure different things. Satellite gauging reads visible above ground tanks. The supply balance method infers a residual from customs and refining data. They are not interchangeable.\",\"Satellites are structurally blind to part of the system. Underground rock caverns cost far less per barrel than steel tanks, which gives China an incentive to keep building storage that cannot be photographed.\",\"The denominator decides the headline. Net imports, gross imports and total consumption give three different day counts for one identical stockpile.\",\"Cite a range with attribution, never a point estimate. As of mid 2026 the defensible position is roughly 1.2 to 1.4 billion barrels, converging on the lower end, at about 110 to 130 days of net import cover.\"],\"sections\":[{\"id\":\"sec1\",\"q\":\"Why is there no official number?\",\"h\":\"Beijing does not publish it, and that is the whole problem\",\"p\":[\"China does not release routine crude inventory data. There is no weekly stocks report, no equivalent of the EIA's Wednesday release, no audited annual filing. Inventory levels are treated as strategically sensitive, which is a rational position for a country whose principal energy vulnerability is a maritime chokepoint.\",\"The exception proves the rule. In 2018 the National Bureau of Statistics disclosed a national reserve total of 37.73 million tonnes, about 280.7 million barrels, as of mid 2017 (South China Morning Post<\/a>). It was the first time an official total had ever been published, it arrived months after the period it described, and nothing on that scale has been repeated on a regular schedule since.\",\"So every figure in circulation, including ours, is a reconstruction. That is not a criticism of the analysts doing the reconstructing. It is a fact about the data, and it should change how you cite the number.\"]},{\"id\":\"sec2\",\"q\":\"How do analysts actually build the estimate?\",\"h\":\"Three methods, measuring three different things\",\"p\":[\"Understanding why the numbers disagree requires understanding that they are not all trying to measure the same object.\"],\"pillars\":[{\"n\":\"01\",\"t\":\"Satellite gauging\",\"d\":\"Providers such as Ursa Space Systems, Kpler and Vortexa photograph tank farms and read the shadow inside a floating roof tank. The roof floats on the liquid and falls as oil is drawn down, so the shadow is a gauge. Ursa tracks more than 4,000 floating roof tanks across roughly 130 Chinese locations. It measures visible above ground tanks only.\"},{\"n\":\"02\",\"t\":\"Supply balance\",\"d\":\"The dominant method for Reuters, the EIA and OIES. Domestic production plus imports plus pipeline receipts, minus refinery throughput and exports. Whatever is unaccounted for is assumed to have gone into storage. It measures a residual, not a tank.\"},{\"n\":\"03\",\"t\":\"Official disclosure\",\"d\":\"Rare, partial and late. The 2018 release covering mid 2017 remains the clearest data point. Xinhua publishes occasional commercial tank figures that cover only part of the system and exclude the strategic layer.\"}]},{\"id\":\"sec3\",\"q\":\"How far apart do the estimates actually get?\",\"h\":\"The spread, in real numbers\",\"p\":[\"The divergence is not academic. The EIA put China's strategic inventories at nearly 1.4 billion barrels as of December 2025, after average additions of 1.1 million barrels a day through 2025 (EIA<\/a>). Kpler's satellite and flow based tracking had onshore inventories at about 1,232 million barrels in late May 2026, down from a peak of 1,251 million in early May (Kpler, 25 May 2026<\/a>). Reuters columnist Clyde Russell, working from the supply balance, put combined commercial and strategic stocks at at least 1.2 billion barrels, with Vortexa data cited alongside at a record 1.24 billion in April 2026.\",\"The rate of accumulation splits even wider than the level. The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies found published implied stock build estimates for 2025 ranging from 0.43 to 0.9 million barrels a day, against its own central case of 0.75, and noted the spread between analysts averages about 0.5 million barrels a day and can reach 1.1 million (OIES, May 2026<\/a>). A disagreement of 1.1 million barrels a day is larger than the entire daily output of several OPEC members.\",\"The most instructive case is historical. Analysts at Rice University's Baker Institute, working with Orbital Insight satellite data, wrote that \\\"at times in mid to late 2017, Orbital Insight's data suggested total crude oil stockpiles in China were more than three times as large as the figures reported by Xinhua, a potential discrepancy of more than 500 million barrels\\\" (Collins and Hung, Baker Institute, 2018<\/a>). Half a billion barrels is the gap between a partial official figure and an independent measurement of the same country.\"],\"table\":{\"cols\":[\"Source\",\"Estimate\",\"What it measures\",\"Date\",\"Why it differs\"],\"rows\":[[\"China NBS (official)\",\"37.73 million tonnes, approx. 280.7 million barrels\",\"Disclosed national reserve total\",\"Released 2018, covering mid 2017\",\"Only official figure; excludes most commercial stock; not repeated\"],[\"EIA\",\"Nearly 1.4 billion barrels\",\"Combined strategic and commercial inventories\",\"December 2025\",\"Broadest definition, includes commercial NOC stocks\"],[\"Kpler\",\"Approx. 1,232 million barrels\",\"Onshore visible crude inventories\",\"25 May 2026\",\"Satellite and flow based; misses underground storage\"],[\"Reuters \/ Clyde Russell\",\"At least 1.2 billion barrels\",\"Implied total from customs and refining data\",\"March to April 2026\",\"Residual method; sensitive to teapot run rates\"],[\"Vortexa (cited by Reuters)\",\"Approx. 1.24 billion barrels, a record\",\"Tracked commercial plus strategic stocks\",\"April 2026\",\"Different tracking universe and definitions\"],[\"OIES\",\"Stock build 0.43 to 0.9 million b\/d (central 0.75)\",\"Rate of accumulation, not level\",\"2025 data, published 2026\",\"Different refinery run and output assumptions\"]]}},{\"id\":\"sec4\",\"q\":\"Why can the methods not just be reconciled?\",\"h\":\"Four technical reasons the gap does not close\",\"p\":[\"Invisible storage. A growing share of China's strategic capacity is built in mined underground rock caverns rather than above ground steel. Shadow based satellite analysis cannot read it at all. The Baker Institute notes that underground caverns can cost more than 60 percent less per barrel of capacity than above ground tanks, so China has both a security incentive and a cost incentive to keep building storage that satellites cannot see.\",\"Commercial and strategic barrels are not separable from outside. The buffer is two blended layers: a state reserve and a much larger pool of commercial stock held by CNPC, Sinopec and CNOOC that Beijing can lean on in a crisis. An outside analyst cannot attribute a given barrel to one layer, so estimates diverge simply on where the author draws the line.\",\"Refinery runs are the weak input. Independent teapot refiners in Shandong are roughly a quarter of national capacity and move run rates fast: the national average fell to 66.3 percent in May 2026, with Shandong plants at 50.5 percent in one week. Because throughput is one of two big inputs to the supply balance, an error there lands directly in the implied stock build.\",\"Apparent demand is a proxy, not a measurement. China's apparent demand is refinery processing plus net product imports. There is a persistent gap of roughly 1.1 to 1.4 million barrels a day between crude supply and what refineries actually process. Some of that gap is statistical noise across customs, NBS and shipping data. The rest becomes the stock build. Small measurement errors therefore become large disagreements about storage.\"]},{\"id\":\"sec5\",\"q\":\"What makes one day count different from another?\",\"h\":\"The denominator is doing more work than the barrels\",\"p\":[\"This is the part most readers miss. Days of supply is a fraction, and the numerator is only half the argument.\",\"The IEA measures its members' 90 day obligation against net imports of the prior calendar year, a stable and audited figure. China's headline day counts are frequently quoted instead against gross imports, or against total consumption, which runs well above net imports. Both are larger denominators, so both mechanically produce a smaller day count for exactly the same barrels.\",\"That is how one credible source says 90 days and another says 130 while describing an identical stockpile. Neither is lying. They are dividing by different things, and almost nobody says which. We set out the benchmark mechanics in the IEA 90 day stockholding dossier<\/a>, and the working day count in the days of supply dossier<\/a>.\"]},{\"id\":\"sec6\",\"q\":\"So how should you cite it?\",\"h\":\"A defensible position, as of mid 2026\",\"p\":[\"Treat every China stockpile figure as a range and always name the method and the denominator. As of mid 2026, total Chinese crude inventories, state reserve plus commercial, most likely sit between about 1.2 and 1.4 billion barrels, converging toward the lower end after the drawdowns through the Iran conflict period. On a net import basis that is roughly 110 to 130 days of cover. On a gross import or total consumption basis the same barrels look like fewer days.\",\"The practical rule for anyone writing, briefing or selling on this: cite the range with attribution, say plainly that Beijing publishes no confirming figure, and note that the number moves in near real time with China's buying and refining behaviour, unlike the IEA's fixed annual benchmark. A single number with no method attached is not more precise. It is just less honest.\",\"This is also why the opacity itself is the strategy<\/a>, and why the estimates matter commercially: the same ambiguity that frustrates analysts is what gives Beijing optionality in a crisis.\"]}],\"media\":{\"image\":{\"src\":\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/earth-night-lights-energy.jpg\",\"label\":\"Measured from orbit, inferred from customs data, confirmed by almost nobody: how China's reserve numbers are actually built.\",\"credit\":\"Project 54\"},\"infographicLabel\":\"The estimate spread: what each source measures, what it misses, and why the day counts diverge.\",\"pdf\":{\"href\":\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/07\/china-oil-reserve-estimates-vary-sources.pdf\",\"title\":\"Why China's Oil Reserve Estimates Disagree, Slide Deck\",\"meta\":\"Briefing deck \u00b7 Project 54\"},\"video\":{\"src\":\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/07\/china-oil-reserve-estimates-vary-sources-video.mp4\",\"label\":\"Explainer briefing: how China reserve estimates are built, and why they clash\",\"duration\":\"8:11\",\"poster\":\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/07\/china-oil-reserve-estimates-vary-sources-poster.jpg\",\"captions\":\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/07\/china-oil-reserve-estimates-vary-sources-captions.vtt\",\"transcript\":\"Beijing does not publish routine oil inventory data, so every figure in circulation is a reconstruction rather than an audited fact. The last meaningful official disclosure came from the National Bureau of Statistics in 2018, covering mid 2017. Analysts use two very different tools. Satellite gauging, from providers such as Kpler and Ursa Space Systems, measures the shadow cast inside a floating roof tank from orbit. The supply balance method looks at no tanks at all: it takes domestic production plus imports, subtracts refinery throughput and exports, and assumes the residual went into storage. The results diverge sharply. The EIA put stocks at nearly 1.4 billion barrels by December 2025, Kpler at roughly 1,232 million barrels in May 2026, with Vortexa data cited around 1.24 billion. The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies found analyst estimates of the 2025 stock build varying by as much as 1.1 million barrels a day, which is larger than the daily output of several OPEC members. Four blind spots keep the gap open: invisible underground rock cavern storage, which costs roughly 60 percent less per barrel than above ground steel and cannot be photographed; the blending of commercial and strategic barrels; highly volatile teapot refinery run rates in Shandong, which fell to 50.5 percent in a single week in May 2026; and apparent demand, which is a proxy rather than a measurement. Then the denominator changes everything. The same stockpile divided by net imports gives roughly 110 to 130 days of cover, and divided by gross imports or total consumption gives a far smaller number. That is how one credible source says 90 days and another says 130 while describing identical barrels. The defensible position in mid 2026 is a range: about 1.2 to 1.4 billion barrels, roughly 110 to 130 days on a net import basis, always naming the method and the denominator. The opacity is not an accident. It is the strategy, and it is what gives Beijing optionality in a crisis.\"},\"podcast\":{\"src\":\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/07\/china-oil-reserve-estimates-vary-sources-podcast.m4a\",\"title\":\"Why Every Estimate of China's Oil Stockpile Disagrees\",\"ep\":\"P54 Energy Growth Brief\",\"duration\":\"22:10\"}},\"poll\":{\"q\":\"When you see a figure for China's oil reserves, what do you check first?\",\"options\":[{\"id\":\"a\",\"label\":\"The method behind it\",\"insight\":\"The right instinct. Satellite gauging and supply balance measure different objects, and one of them is structurally blind to underground caverns. The method tells you what the number can and cannot include.\"},{\"id\":\"b\",\"label\":\"The denominator on the day count\",\"insight\":\"Equally decisive, and more often missed. Net imports, gross imports and total consumption produce three different day counts for one identical stockpile.\"},{\"id\":\"c\",\"label\":\"The date\",\"insight\":\"Necessary but not sufficient. These stocks move fast, so a stale figure is misleading, but a fresh figure with an unnamed method is still unusable.\"},{\"id\":\"d\",\"label\":\"Whether it is official\",\"insight\":\"Reasonable, but it will fail you here. There is essentially no current official figure. The last meaningful disclosure covered mid 2017.\"}]},\"faq\":[{\"q\":\"Why is China's days of supply figure only an estimate?\",\"a\":\"Because Beijing does not publish routine oil inventory data. Analysts reconstruct the total from satellite readings of visible tanks and from the gap between customs reported imports, domestic output and refinery throughput. The method is credible but indirect, so every published figure carries a margin of error and is an estimate, not an official statistic.\"},{\"q\":\"Why does the days of supply number vary between sources?\",\"a\":\"Because sources use different methods and different denominators for the same stockpile. A total of roughly 1.2 to 1.4 billion barrels can be quoted as anywhere from about 110 to 180 days of cover depending on whether it is divided by net imports, gross imports or total consumption, and estimates of the rate of stock build differ by as much as 1.1 million barrels a day between analysts, according to OIES.\"},{\"q\":\"Can satellites see all of China's oil storage?\",\"a\":\"No. Satellites read the shadow cast by a floating roof on an above ground tank, which captures a large share of visible tank farms, more than 4,000 tanks in Ursa Space Systems' coverage alone. They cannot see oil in mined underground rock caverns or fixed roof tanks, and China has both a cost incentive and a security incentive to keep building exactly that kind of storage.\"},{\"q\":\"What is the supply balance or implied stock build method?\",\"a\":\"It is a residual calculation: domestic production plus imports plus pipeline receipts, minus refinery throughput and exports, using China customs and National Bureau of Statistics data. Whatever crude is not refined or exported is assumed to have gone into storage. Because it depends on estimating refinery runs, especially at volatile independent teapot refiners, small errors there produce large swings in the implied build.\"},{\"q\":\"Has China ever published an official reserve figure?\",\"a\":\"Rarely and partially. The clearest case is the National Bureau of Statistics figure of 37.73 million tonnes, about 280.7 million barrels, disclosed in 2018 for mid 2017. Xinhua publishes occasional commercial tank data that covers only part of the system, which leaves satellite and supply balance estimates as the primary tools. For why the silence is deliberate, see our dossier on why China does not publish its oil reserves<\/a>.\"}],\"newsletter\":{\"kicker\":\"The Energy Growth Brief\",\"title\":[\"Intelligence,\",\"to your inbox\"],\"body\":\"Join energy and industrial leaders getting our marketing, AI-growth and revenue-architecture intelligence, direct, no filler.\",\"placeholder\":\"you@company.com\",\"cta\":\"Subscribe\",\"note\":\"No spam. Unsubscribe anytime. We read every reply.\"},\"related\":[{\"title\":\"How Many Days of Oil Supply Does China Hold?\",\"topic\":\"Energy\",\"href\":\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/china-oil-reserve-days-of-supply\/\"},{\"title\":\"China and the IEA 90 Day Oil Stockholding Benchmark\",\"topic\":\"Policy\",\"href\":\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/china-iea-90-day-oil-stockholding-benchmark\/\"},{\"title\":\"Why China Does Not Publish Its Oil Reserves\",\"topic\":\"Policy\",\"href\":\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/why-china-doesnt-publish-oil-reserves\/\"},{\"title\":\"Is China Still Stockpiling Oil in 2026?\",\"topic\":\"Energy\",\"href\":\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/is-china-still-stockpiling-oil-2026\/\"}],\"listenTime\":\"22 min listen\",\"__slug\":\"china-oil-reserve-estimates-vary-sources\"}","p54_faq":"","p54_media":"","p54_comments_enabled":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[92,125],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3628","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analysis","category-strategy"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3628","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/12"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3628"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3628\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3629,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3628\/revisions\/3629"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1861"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3628"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3628"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3628"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}Tres m\u00e9todos para medir tres cosas diferentes<\/h2>\n
\n
La diferencia, en n\u00fameros reales<\/h2>\n
Cuatro razones t\u00e9cnicas por las que la brecha no se cierra.<\/h2>\n
El denominador est\u00e1 haciendo m\u00e1s trabajo que los barriles.<\/h2>\n
Una posici\u00f3n defendible, a mediados de 2026.<\/h2>\n
FAQ<\/h2>\n
Why is China’s days of supply figure only an estimate?<\/h3>\n
\u00bfPor qu\u00e9 var\u00eda el n\u00famero de d\u00edas de suministro entre las distintas fuentes?<\/h3>\n
Can satellites see all of China’s oil storage?<\/h3>\n
\u00bfQu\u00e9 es el m\u00e9todo del balance de oferta o de acumulaci\u00f3n de existencias impl\u00edcitas?<\/h3>\n
\u00bfHa publicado China alguna vez una cifra oficial de reservas?<\/h3>\n