{"id":3569,"date":"2026-07-06T09:00:00","date_gmt":"2026-07-06T09:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/?p=3569"},"modified":"2026-09-22T22:34:44","modified_gmt":"2026-09-22T22:34:44","slug":"reinitialisation-strategique-de-bp-a-lhorizon-2026","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/fr\/bp-strategic-reset-2026\/","title":{"rendered":"R\u00e9orientation strat\u00e9gique de BP\u00a0: pourquoi la compagnie p\u00e9troli\u00e8re la plus verte s\u2019est tourn\u00e9e \u00e0 nouveau vers le p\u00e9trole et le gaz, et qu\u2019est-ce que cela signifie pour les fournisseurs\u00a0?"},"content":{"rendered":"

En f\u00e9vrier 2025, BP a reni\u00e9 son virage vers la neutralit\u00e9 carbone op\u00e9r\u00e9 en 2020 et a r\u00e9investi ses capitaux dans le p\u00e9trole et le gaz. Dix-huit mois plus tard, l'entreprise a un nouveau directeur g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, un pr\u00e9sident limog\u00e9, un programme de rachat d'actions suspendu et une vente d'actifs de 20 milliards de dollars en cours. Voil\u00e0 la logique derri\u00e8re le revirement le plus spectaculaire de toutes les grandes compagnies p\u00e9troli\u00e8res de cette d\u00e9cennie, les chiffres qui l'ont motiv\u00e9 et la le\u00e7on commerciale \u00e0 en tirer. toute personne vendant \u00e0 une supermajor<\/a> qui a chang\u00e9 d'avis. Les chiffres relatifs aux ressources sont indiqu\u00e9s comme \u00e9tant des estimations.<\/p>\n

Le revirement le plus spectaculaire de toute la d\u00e9cennie.<\/h2>\n

Le 26 f\u00e9vrier 2025, BP a annonc\u00e9 ce que son propre directeur g\u00e9n\u00e9ral a qualifi\u00e9 de r\u00e9initialisation fondamentale. Selon les termes de Murray Auchincloss dans le communiqu\u00e9 de l'entreprise\u00a0: communiqu\u00e9 strat\u00e9gique<\/a>, \u201c Aujourd'hui, nous avons fondamentalement red\u00e9fini la strat\u00e9gie de BP. Nous r\u00e9duisons et r\u00e9affectons nos investissements \u00e0 nos activit\u00e9s les plus rentables afin de stimuler la croissance, et nous nous effor\u00e7ons sans rel\u00e2che d'am\u00e9liorer nos performances et notre efficacit\u00e9 en mati\u00e8re de co\u00fbts. Tout cela vise \u00e0 assurer une croissance durable de notre flux de tr\u00e9sorerie et de nos rendements. \u201d En clair, il s'agissait d'un retour aux activit\u00e9s p\u00e9troli\u00e8res et gazi\u00e8res et d'un abandon des activit\u00e9s de transition que BP avait mises cinq ans \u00e0 d\u00e9velopper.<\/p>\n

Dix-huit mois plus tard, la restructuration n'est pas un simple glissement, mais une refonte compl\u00e8te de l'entreprise. BP a depuis remplac\u00e9 son directeur g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, nommant Meg O'Neill, ancienne directrice de Woodside Energy, \u00e0 compter du 1er avril 2026, apr\u00e8s la d\u00e9mission d'Auchincloss en d\u00e9cembre 2025. Le pr\u00e9sident du conseil d'administration, Albert Manifold, a \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9mis de ses fonctions huit mois apr\u00e8s sa prise de fonction, en mai 2026, en raison de probl\u00e8mes de gouvernance et de conduite, selon le conseil. En juin 2026, Meg O'Neill est all\u00e9e plus loin que son pr\u00e9d\u00e9cesseur, en ramenant BP \u00e0 deux segments seulement, l'amont et l'aval, et en supprimant l'unit\u00e9 ind\u00e9pendante d\u00e9di\u00e9e aux \u00e9nergies bas carbone, int\u00e9grant ainsi les activit\u00e9s d'\u00e9nergies renouvelables, d\u00e9sormais r\u00e9duites, au sein de la direction g\u00e9n\u00e9rale.<\/p>\n

Il s'agit d'une supermajor op\u00e9rant un revirement spectaculaire gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 des capitaux importants, tout en faisant tourner sa direction \u00e0 un rythme qui alimente les sp\u00e9culations sur un rachat ou un d\u00e9mant\u00e8lement. Pour comprendre pourquoi la plus verte des majors a chang\u00e9 de cap, il faut revenir au pari qu'elle a fait en 2020 et aux r\u00e9sultats obtenus.<\/p>\n

La logique : un pari qui n'a pas port\u00e9 ses fruits sur le march\u00e9<\/h2>\n

En 2020, sous la direction de Bernard Looney, alors PDG de BP, l'entreprise s'est engag\u00e9e \u00e0 atteindre la neutralit\u00e9 carbone d'ici 2050 et \u00e0 se transformer d'une compagnie p\u00e9troli\u00e8re internationale en une entreprise \u00e9nerg\u00e9tique int\u00e9gr\u00e9e, en r\u00e9duisant sa production de p\u00e9trole et de gaz tout en d\u00e9veloppant les \u00e9nergies renouvelables, la bio\u00e9nergie et l'hydrog\u00e8ne. Cette strat\u00e9gie reposait sur le pari que la transition \u00e9nerg\u00e9tique s'acc\u00e9l\u00e9rerait, que les investisseurs et la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 l'exigeraient, et que BP pourrait d\u00e9velopper des activit\u00e9s \u00e0 forte croissance et \u00e0 faible \u00e9mission de carbone, tandis que les hydrocarbures traditionnels financeraient les dividendes.<\/p>\n

Sur le plan boursier, le pari s'est av\u00e9r\u00e9 perdant. BP a largement distanc\u00e9 Shell, ExxonMobil et ConocoPhillips pendant cinq ans, et en 2024, son b\u00e9n\u00e9fice net attribuable aux actionnaires s'est effondr\u00e9 \u00e0 381 millions de dollars, contre 15,2 milliards en 2023. Le diagnostic, selon les propres termes sans d\u00e9tour d'Auchincloss\u00a0: Fortune<\/a>, c'\u00e9tait une diversification excessive : \u201c Nous avons voulu trop en faire. Nous aurions d\u00fb recentrer nos efforts. C'est \u00e9videmment ce que j'ai fait maintenant. \u201d<\/p>\n

Trois pressions se sont alors renforc\u00e9es mutuellement. Le rendement et le cours de l'action \u00e9taient \u00e0 l'origine du grief principal. La pression activiste provenait d'Elliott Management, qui a r\u00e9v\u00e9l\u00e9 une participation d'environ 5 %<\/a> et a insist\u00e9 sur des r\u00e9ductions de co\u00fbts drastiques, des cessions d'actifs et un retour au p\u00e9trole et au gaz. Le contexte macro\u00e9conomique a \u00e9volu\u00e9\u00a0: Auchincloss a soutenu que le gaz, et non l'\u00e9olien ou le solaire marginaux, permettrait de couvrir la demande \u00e9nerg\u00e9tique des centres de donn\u00e9es d'IA. Le conseil d'administration a pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 ce revirement comme une d\u00e9cision strat\u00e9gique. Comme l'a d\u00e9clar\u00e9 Helge Lund, alors pr\u00e9sident du conseil, dans le communiqu\u00e9 annon\u00e7ant la restructuration\u00a0: \u201c\u00a0Le conseil d'administration estime qu'il s'agit d'une importante restructuration strat\u00e9gique pour bp et est convaincu que, conjugu\u00e9e \u00e0 une gestion rigoureuse de la performance, elle permettra d'am\u00e9liorer les r\u00e9sultats et de cr\u00e9er une valeur durable.\u00a0\u201d En r\u00e9sum\u00e9\u00a0: BP a conclu qu'elle ne pouvait pas surpasser ses concurrents en \u00e9tant la compagnie p\u00e9troli\u00e8re majeure la plus verte, et a donc r\u00e9orient\u00e9 ses investissements vers ses activit\u00e9s les plus rentables. C'est cette m\u00eame rigueur en mati\u00e8re de gestion du capital que nous avons observ\u00e9e chez un concurrent dans notre analyse. Journ\u00e9e des march\u00e9s financiers 2026 d'Equinor<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Des rachats d'actions \u00e0 la r\u00e9paration du bilan<\/h2>\n

Les principaux chiffres de cette r\u00e9initialisation proviennent du communiqu\u00e9 de BP de f\u00e9vrier 2025\u00a0: les investissements dans le p\u00e9trole et le gaz sont port\u00e9s \u00e0 environ 10 milliards de dollars par an jusqu\u2019en 2027, les investissements de transition sont r\u00e9duits entre 1,5 et 2 milliards de dollars par an (plus de 5 milliards de dollars par an en dessous des pr\u00e9visions pr\u00e9c\u00e9dentes), le capital du groupe est r\u00e9initialis\u00e9 entre 13 et 15 milliards de dollars par an, un objectif de d\u00e9sinvestissement de 20 milliards de dollars est fix\u00e9 d\u2019ici fin 2027 et la production devrait cro\u00eetre de 2,3 \u00e0 2,5 millions de barils \u00e9quivalent p\u00e9trole par jour d\u2019ici 2030.<\/p>\n

Lors de la publication des r\u00e9sultats de l'exercice 2025, le 10 f\u00e9vrier 2026, le plan s'\u00e9tait concr\u00e9tis\u00e9 par un redressement du bilan. BP a annonc\u00e9 un b\u00e9n\u00e9fice sous-jacent \u00e0 co\u00fbt de remplacement de 7,5 milliards de dollars, mais une perte nette de 3,4 milliards de dollars au quatri\u00e8me trimestre, due \u00e0 des d\u00e9pr\u00e9ciations d'actifs d'environ 4 milliards de dollars, principalement li\u00e9es, selon la soci\u00e9t\u00e9, \u00e0 ses activit\u00e9s de transition, et une dette nette de 22,2 milliards de dollars. En r\u00e9ponse, BP a suspendu son programme de rachat d'actions<\/a> Afin d\u2019int\u00e9grer les exc\u00e9dents de tr\u00e9sorerie \u00e0 son bilan, la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 a relev\u00e9 son objectif de r\u00e9duction des co\u00fbts structurels \u00e0 un montant compris entre 5,5 et 6,5 milliards de dollars d\u2019ici fin 2027 et a fix\u00e9 son objectif de capital pour 2026 \u00e0 une valeur minimale, soit entre 13 et 13,5 milliards de dollars.<\/p>\n

La machine \u00e0 cessions est lanc\u00e9e. Le 24 d\u00e9cembre 2025, BP a conclu un accord pour vendre une participation majoritaire de 65 % dans Castrol, sa filiale de lubrifiants, \u00e0 l'investisseur en infrastructures Stonepeak, pour une valeur d'entreprise d'environ 10,1 milliards de dollars, g\u00e9n\u00e9rant un produit net d'environ 6 milliards de dollars. Ce montant porte le total des cessions r\u00e9alis\u00e9es et annonc\u00e9es \u00e0 plus de 11 milliards de dollars, contre un objectif de 20 milliards. Parall\u00e8lement, les \u00e9nergies renouvelables font l'objet d'une d\u00e9capitalisation : BP a vendu ses activit\u00e9s \u00e9oliennes terrestres aux \u00c9tats-Unis en 2025, c\u00e8de la moiti\u00e9 de sa filiale solaire Lightsource bp et a transf\u00e9r\u00e9 la majeure partie de ses activit\u00e9s \u00e9oliennes offshore dans une coentreprise avec le japonais JERA. Le tableau r\u00e9capitule les changements intervenus.<\/p>\n

Lisez le rapport sur la chute du capital, pas le rapport sur le d\u00e9veloppement durable<\/h2>\n

C\u2019est l\u00e0 que le revirement d\u2019une supermajor devient concret. Les budgets se r\u00e9orientent vers l\u2019exploration et la production p\u00e9troli\u00e8re et gazi\u00e8re, au d\u00e9triment des \u00e9nergies renouvelables. Par cons\u00e9quent, les fournisseurs de services d\u2019exploration et de production, de forage, de sous-marin, de GNL, de raffinage, de fiabilit\u00e9, de n\u00e9goce et de solutions num\u00e9riques sont en pleine croissance, tandis que les fournisseurs sp\u00e9cialis\u00e9s dans les \u00e9nergies renouvelables doivent faire face \u00e0 un client BP en d\u00e9clin et sous-capitalis\u00e9. La premi\u00e8re \u00e9tape pratique consiste \u00e0 r\u00e9affecter le compte BP aux deux nouveaux segments, Amont et Aval, car l\u2019unit\u00e9 d\u00e9di\u00e9e aux \u00e9nergies bas carbone est supprim\u00e9e.<\/p>\n

Les priorit\u00e9s en mati\u00e8re d'approvisionnement ont \u00e9galement \u00e9volu\u00e9. BP visant des r\u00e9ductions de co\u00fbts structurels de 5,5 \u00e0 6,5 milliards de dollars et ayant suspendu son programme de rachat d'actions, toute proposition commerciale \u00e0 BP doit d\u00e9sormais privil\u00e9gier la rentabilit\u00e9 imm\u00e9diate, l'efficacit\u00e9 du capital et la contribution au flux de tr\u00e9sorerie disponible \u2013 soit le libell\u00e9 exact de cette nouvelle orientation \u2013 plut\u00f4t que le positionnement en mati\u00e8re de d\u00e9veloppement durable. Il faut s'attendre \u00e0 des conditions de paiement plus strictes, des cycles d'approbation plus longs et une justification plus rigoureuse des d\u00e9penses discr\u00e9tionnaires, et tester la r\u00e9sistance des conditions de BP en cons\u00e9quence. L\u00e0 o\u00f9 les activit\u00e9s li\u00e9es aux \u00e9nergies renouvelables subsistent, elles sont peu gourmandes en capital et pilot\u00e9es par des partenaires. Les fournisseurs d'\u00e9nergies renouvelables devraient donc privil\u00e9gier les coentreprises, le v\u00e9hicule JERA et le partenaire Lightsource, car c'est l\u00e0 que se trouvent d\u00e9sormais le capital de d\u00e9ploiement et le pouvoir de d\u00e9cision.<\/p>\n

Les cessions d'actifs entra\u00eenent \u00e9galement une instabilit\u00e9 des contreparties. Si votre client est impliqu\u00e9 dans une op\u00e9ration de vente (Castrol rachet\u00e9e par Stonepeak, l'\u00e9olien terrestre am\u00e9ricain ou une participation dans Lightsource), votre contrat peut \u00eatre transf\u00e9r\u00e9 \u00e0 un fonds de capital-investissement dont les objectifs sont plus rapides et ax\u00e9s sur les r\u00e9sultats financiers. Il est donc essentiel de suivre les op\u00e9rations de BP en cours et de se positionner en amont aupr\u00e8s des acqu\u00e9reurs potentiels. La le\u00e7on \u00e0 retenir, applicable \u00e0 toutes les grandes entreprises, est la suivante\u00a0: lorsqu'une entreprise change de strat\u00e9gie, il faut se concentrer sur la pr\u00e9sentation de l'allocation des capitaux et le discours du PDG, et non sur le rapport de d\u00e9veloppement durable. Ce changement de cap a permis aux fournisseurs d'anticiper les flux financiers des mois avant que les pratiques d'achat ne soient visiblement modifi\u00e9es. C'est cette m\u00eame analyse du point de vue des fournisseurs que nous avons appliqu\u00e9e \u00e0\u2026 \u00c9tape 3 de l'approvisionnement de Shell<\/a> et au moteur du capital derri\u00e8re Le mod\u00e8le d'exploration double d'Eni<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Un BP pilot\u00e9 par l'amont, avec des risques d'ex\u00e9cution et de gouvernance<\/h2>\n

La direction est fix\u00e9e et il est peu probable qu'elle soit modifi\u00e9e sous la direction d'O'Neill, qui l'acc\u00e9l\u00e8re d'ailleurs. Son discours, cit\u00e9 par Fortune en juin 2026, est explicite\u00a0: \u201c\u00a0Recentrer BP sur deux segments distincts est une \u00e9tape importante pour acc\u00e9l\u00e9rer la mise en \u0153uvre. Cela r\u00e9duira la complexit\u00e9 et renforcera l'ex\u00e9cution. Nous nous dirigeons r\u00e9solument vers un BP plus simple, plus fort et plus performant.\u00a0\u201d Les objectifs de BP tablent sur une croissance de plus de 20\u00a0% de son flux de tr\u00e9sorerie disponible ajust\u00e9 d'ici 2027 et une production de 2,3 \u00e0 2,5 millions de barils \u00e9quivalent p\u00e9trole par jour d'ici 2030, gr\u00e2ce aux schistes bitumineux am\u00e9ricains et du golfe du Mexique, du Moyen-Orient et de nouvelles d\u00e9couvertes comme le gisement de Bumerangue au Br\u00e9sil, dont BP estime les r\u00e9serves en place \u00e0 environ 8 milliards de barils de liquides. Il s'agit d'une estimation des ressources en place, et non des r\u00e9serves r\u00e9cup\u00e9rables, et il convient de l'interpr\u00e9ter comme telle.<\/p>\n

La principale menace r\u00e9side dans le risque d'ex\u00e9cution, d\u00e9sormais aggrav\u00e9 par le risque de gouvernance. BP doit mener \u00e0 bien plus d'une douzaine de projets majeurs, r\u00e9aliser d'importantes r\u00e9ductions de co\u00fbts et finaliser des cessions d'actifs d'une valeur de 20 milliards de dollars sur des march\u00e9s incertains, tout en int\u00e9grant trois directeurs g\u00e9n\u00e9raux et trois pr\u00e9sidents du conseil d'administration en trois ans. Le limogeage du pr\u00e9sident du conseil d'administration, Albert Manifold, en mai 2026, a illustr\u00e9 cette instabilit\u00e9. Amanda Blanc, administratrice ind\u00e9pendante principale, a d\u00e9clar\u00e9 que le conseil d'administration \u00e9tait \u201c surpris et d\u00e9\u00e7u d'apprendre l'existence de probl\u00e8mes de gouvernance et de conduite qu'il juge inacceptables et a pris des mesures d\u00e9cisives \u201d, selon une d\u00e9claration rapport\u00e9e par Reuters et Al Jazeera<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Les sp\u00e9culations concernant un rachat ou un d\u00e9mant\u00e8lement restent d'actualit\u00e9, mais non confirm\u00e9es. Les performances d\u00e9cevantes persistantes de Shell ont aliment\u00e9 les rumeurs d'un rachat par BP tout au long de 2025, bien que les deux entreprises aient d\u00e9menti toute n\u00e9gociation en juin 2025 et que Shell ait ensuite \u00e9t\u00e9 interdite de soumettre une offre pendant six mois en vertu du Code britannique des offres publiques d'achat. \u00c0 la mi-2026, aucune offre n'est confirm\u00e9e et tout nouveau bouleversement au niveau de la direction tend \u00e0 relancer les discussions. Pour un fournisseur, l'hypoth\u00e8se de d\u00e9part est celle d'un BP qui continue d'acqu\u00e9rir agressivement des capacit\u00e9s p\u00e9troli\u00e8res et gazi\u00e8res et de se d\u00e9lester d'actifs de transition, une incertitude \u00e9lev\u00e9e planant sur la maison m\u00e8re elle-m\u00eame. C'est l'inverse de la logique de consolidation que nous avons examin\u00e9e en mer du Nord. La coentreprise Adura de Shell et Equinor<\/a>.<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

En f\u00e9vrier 2025, BP a reni\u00e9 sa strat\u00e9gie de neutralit\u00e9 carbone initi\u00e9e en 2020 et a r\u00e9investi ses capitaux dans le p\u00e9trole et le gaz. Dix-huit mois plus tard, l'entreprise a un nouveau directeur g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, un pr\u00e9sident limog\u00e9, un programme de rachat d'actions suspendu et une vente d'actifs de 20 milliards de dollars en cours. C'est ce qui explique le revirement le plus spectaculaire jamais op\u00e9r\u00e9 par une grande compagnie p\u00e9troli\u00e8re. <\/p>","protected":false},"author":12,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"p54_article_data":"{\"meta\": {\"kicker\": \"Insight \u00b7 Industry Leader\", \"topics\": [\"Strategy\", \"Capital\", \"Energy\"], \"title\": \"BP's Strategic Reset: Why the Greenest Major Turned Back to Oil and Gas, and What It Signals for Suppliers\", \"dek\": \"In February 2025 BP tore up the net-zero pivot it made in 2020 and put its capital back into oil and gas. Eighteen months on it has a new chief executive, a fired chairman, a suspended buy-back and a 20 billion dollar sell-off underway. This is the logic behind the deepest reversal by any oil major this decade, the numbers that drove it, and the commercial lesson for anyone selling into a supermajor<\/a> that has changed its mind. Resource figures are marked as estimates.\", \"date\": \"6 July 2026\", \"readTime\": \"12 min read\", \"author\": \"Project 54\", \"listenTime\": \"22 min listen\", \"dateModified\": \"2026-07-21\"}, \"quickAnswer\": {\"q\": \"What is BP's strategic reset and why did it reverse its net-zero strategy?\", \"a\": \"BP's strategic reset, announced on 26 February 2025, reallocates capital from renewables back to oil and gas to lift returns and close a valuation gap with rivals. BP is raising oil and gas investment to around 10 billion dollars a year through 2027 while cutting transition-business spending by more than 5 billion dollars a year, and targeting production of 2.3 to 2.5 million barrels of oil equivalent per day by 2030. The reversal was driven by weak returns, its 2024 profit collapsed to 381 million dollars, by pressure from activist investor Elliott Management, which built a stake of about 5 percent, and by a bet that oil and gas demand, led by US gas and AI-driven power, will stay stronger for longer. By early 2026 the reset had hardened: BP suspended its share buy-back, replaced its chief executive with Meg O'Neill, and removed its chairman over governance concerns.\"}, \"takeaways\": [\"BP's 26 February 2025 reset raises oil and gas investment to around 10 billion dollars a year and cuts transition spending by more than 5 billion dollars a year, reversing the net-zero pivot it made in 2020.\", \"The trigger was returns and pressure: 2024 profit collapsed to 381 million dollars from 15.2 billion in 2023, and activist Elliott Management built a stake of about 5 percent pushing for capital discipline and a tilt back to hydrocarbons.\", \"By early 2026 the reset hardened. BP suspended its share buy-back at full-year results, set 2026 capital at the low end of guidance, and agreed to sell a controlling stake in Castrol to Stonepeak for about 6 billion dollars in net proceeds.\", \"Governance turmoil is now part of the story: BP replaced CEO Murray Auchincloss with former Woodside chief Meg O'Neill from April 2026, then removed chairman Albert Manifold in May 2026 over conduct concerns.\", \"For suppliers the signal is precise: budget is moving up into oil and gas and out of renewables, procurement now leads with cash, cost and returns, and any pitch built on net-zero positioning is pitching into a closing door.\"], \"sections\": [{\"id\": \"now\", \"q\": \"What is BP actually doing now?\", \"h\": \"The Deepest U-Turn of Any Major This Decade\", \"p\": [\"On 26 February 2025 BP announced what its own chief executive called a fundamental reset. In the words of Murray Auchincloss in the company's strategy release<\/a>, \\\"Today we have fundamentally reset bp's strategy. We are reducing and reallocating capital expenditure to our highest-returning businesses to drive growth, and relentlessly pursuing performance improvements and cost efficiency. This is all in service of sustainably growing cash flow and returns.\\\" The plain meaning was a return to oil and gas and a retreat from the transition franchises BP had spent five years building.\", \"Eighteen months on, the reset is not a slide, it is the whole company. BP has since replaced its chief executive, appointing former Woodside Energy chief Meg O'Neill from 1 April 2026 after Auchincloss stepped down in December 2025. It has removed its chairman, Albert Manifold, eight months into the job, in May 2026 over what the board called governance and conduct issues. And in June 2026 O'Neill went further than her predecessor, collapsing BP into just two segments, Upstream and Downstream, and abolishing the standalone low-carbon unit, folding the shrunken renewables business into corporate.\", \"This is a supermajor executing a capital-backed U-turn while cycling through leadership at a rate that keeps takeover and break-up speculation alive. To understand why the greenest of the majors reversed course, you have to go back to the bet it made in 2020, and to the numbers that bet produced.\"]}, {\"id\": \"logic\", \"q\": \"Why did BP go green in 2020, and why did it reverse?\", \"h\": \"The Logic: A Bet That Did Not Pay Off in the Market\", \"p\": [\"In 2020, under then-chief executive Bernard Looney, BP committed to net zero by 2050 and to transform from an international oil company into an integrated energy company, cutting oil and gas output while scaling renewables, bioenergy and hydrogen. The reasoning was a bet that the energy transition would accelerate, that investor and societal sentiment demanded it, and that BP could build higher-growth low-carbon franchises while legacy hydrocarbons funded the dividend.\", \"In market terms the bet did not pay off. BP trailed Shell, ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips badly over five years, and in 2024 its profit attributable to shareholders collapsed to 381 million dollars, down from 15.2 billion in 2023. The diagnosis, in Auchincloss's own candid words to Fortune<\/a>, was over-diversification: \\\"We just chased too much. We should have narrowed that. That's obviously what I've done now.\\\"\", \"Three pressures then reinforced each other. Returns and the share price were the root grievance. Activist pressure came from Elliott Management, which disclosed a stake of about 5 percent<\/a> and pushed for deep cost cuts, asset sales and a return to oil and gas. And the macro case shifted: Auchincloss argued that gas, not marginal wind or solar, would backfill the power demand of AI data centres. The board framed the reversal as a value decision. As then-chairman Helge Lund put it in the reset release, \\\"The board believes that this is an important strategic reset for bp and is confident that it, together with rigorous performance management, will deliver improved performance and sustainable value.\\\" The one-line logic: BP concluded it could not out-earn peers by being the greenest major, so it moved the money to its highest-returning barrels. That is the same capital-discipline instinct we traced at a rival in our analysis of Equinor's 2026 Capital Markets Day<\/a>.\"]}, {\"id\": \"numbers\", \"q\": \"What do the numbers say, and how hard has the reset become?\", \"h\": \"From Buy-Backs to Balance-Sheet Repair\", \"p\": [\"The reset's headline figures come from BP's own February 2025 release: oil and gas investment raised to around 10 billion dollars a year through 2027, transition investment cut to between 1.5 and 2 billion dollars a year (more than 5 billion dollars a year below prior guidance), group capital reset to 13 to 15 billion dollars a year, a 20 billion dollar divestment target by end 2027, and production growth to 2.3 to 2.5 million barrels of oil equivalent per day by 2030.\", \"By full-year 2025 results, released on 10 February 2026, the plan had hardened into balance-sheet repair. BP reported underlying replacement-cost profit of 7.5 billion dollars, but a fourth-quarter statutory loss of 3.4 billion dollars driven by around 4 billion dollars of impairments the company said were primarily related to its transition businesses, and net debt of 22.2 billion dollars. In response BP suspended its share buy-back<\/a> to direct excess cash to the balance sheet, raised its structural cost-cut target to between 5.5 and 6.5 billion dollars by end 2027, and set 2026 capital at the low end, 13 to 13.5 billion dollars.\", \"The divestment machine is running. On 24 December 2025 BP agreed to sell a 65 percent controlling stake in Castrol, its lubricants business, to infrastructure investor Stonepeak at an enterprise value of about 10.1 billion dollars, for roughly 6 billion dollars in net proceeds, taking completed and announced disposals above 11 billion dollars against the 20 billion dollar target. Renewables are being de-capitalised in parallel: BP sold its US onshore wind business in 2025, is selling half of its Lightsource bp solar arm, and moved most offshore wind into a joint venture with Japan's JERA. The table sets out what changed.\"], \"table\": {\"cols\": [\"Measure\", \"The 2020 to 2024 posture\", \"The reset posture (2025 to 2026)\"], \"rows\": [[\"Oil and gas investment\", \"Falling, output to shrink toward 2030\", \"Raised to around 10 billion dollars a year to 2027\"], [\"Transition investment\", \"Scaling up renewables and hydrogen\", \"Cut by more than 5 billion dollars a year\"], [\"Production target 2030\", \"Deliberately lower\", \"2.3 to 2.5 million barrels of oil equivalent per day\"], [\"Shareholder returns\", \"Resilient dividend plus buy-backs\", \"Buy-back suspended, cash to the balance sheet\"], [\"Portfolio\", \"Building low-carbon franchises\", \"20 billion dollar sell-off, Castrol to Stonepeak\"]]}}, {\"id\": \"suppliers\", \"q\": \"What does BP's reversal mean for suppliers and B2B sellers?\", \"h\": \"Read the Capital Slide, Not the Sustainability Report\", \"p\": [\"This is where a supermajor's reversal becomes actionable. Budget is flowing to upstream oil and gas and away from renewables, so vendors serving exploration and production, drilling, subsea, LNG, refining reliability and trading and digital are in the growth lane, while renewables-only suppliers face a shrinking, de-capitalised BP counterparty. The first practical step is to re-map the BP account to the two new segments, Upstream and Downstream, because the standalone low-carbon unit is being abolished.\", \"Procurement priority has changed too. With BP targeting 5.5 to 6.5 billion dollars of structural cost cuts and having suspended its buy-back, every pitch into BP should now lead with hard payback, capital efficiency and free-cash-flow contribution, the exact language of the reset, rather than sustainability positioning. Expect harder payment terms, longer approval cycles and heavier justification for discretionary spend, and stress-test BP counterparty terms accordingly. Where renewables business still exists it is capital-light and partner-led, so renewables suppliers should follow the joint-venture entities, the JERA vehicle and the Lightsource partner, because that is where the deployment capital and decision rights now sit.\", \"Divestments also create counterparty churn. If your customer sits inside a unit being sold, Castrol to Stonepeak, US onshore wind, a stake in Lightsource, your contract may transfer to a private-equity owner with a faster, more financially driven mandate, so track which BP units are in play and pre-position with the likely acquirers. The transferable lesson is one we apply across the majors: when a company reverses strategy, read the capital-allocation slide and the language of the chief executive, not the sustainability report. The reset told suppliers exactly where money would move months before procurement behaviour visibly changed. This is the same supplier-side reading we brought to Shell's Scope 3 procurement gate<\/a> and to the capital engine behind Eni's dual exploration model<\/a>.\"]}, {\"id\": \"future\", \"q\": \"Where does BP go from here?\", \"h\": \"An Upstream-Led BP, With Execution and Governance Risk\", \"p\": [\"The direction is set and unlikely to reverse under O'Neill, who is accelerating it. Her framing, quoted by Fortune in June 2026, is explicit: \\\"Focusing BP around two distinct segments is an important step in accelerating delivery. It will reduce complexity and strengthen execution. We are moving firmly towards a simpler, stronger and more valuable BP.\\\" BP's own targets run to more than 20 percent growth in adjusted free cash flow to 2027 and production of 2.3 to 2.5 million barrels of oil equivalent per day by 2030, pinned on US shale and the Gulf of Mexico, the Middle East, and new finds such as Brazil's Bumerangue, which BP has described as holding an estimated 8 billion barrels of liquids in place. That is a resource-in-place estimate, not recoverable reserves, and should be read as such.\", \"The dominant threat is execution risk, now compounded by governance risk. BP must deliver more than a dozen major projects, hit steep cost cuts, and complete 20 billion dollars of asset sales into uncertain markets, all while absorbing three chief executives and three chairs in three years. The removal of chairman Albert Manifold in May 2026 captured the instability. Senior independent director Amanda Blanc said the board was \\\"surprised and disappointed to learn of governance oversight and conduct issues it deems unacceptable and has taken decisive action,\\\" a statement reported by Reuters and Al Jazeera<\/a>.\", \"Takeover and break-up speculation remains live but unconfirmed. Persistent underperformance kept Shell-BP speculation circulating through 2025, though both companies denied deal talks in June 2025 and Shell was then barred under the UK Takeover Code from bidding for six months. As of mid-2026 there is no confirmed live bid, and any renewed leadership shock tends to revive the talk. For a supplier, the planning assumption is a BP that keeps buying oil and gas capability aggressively and keeps shedding transition assets, with elevated uncertainty hanging over the corporate parent itself. It is the mirror image of the consolidation logic we examined in the North Sea through Shell and Equinor's Adura venture<\/a>.\", \"BP had to change the whole company because it runs one balance sheet. The alternatives are visible elsewhere: Chevron selling contracted power rather than barrels<\/a>, and Eni funding growth through satellites<\/a>.\"]}], \"media\": {\"image\": {\"src\": \"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/oil-refinery-industrial-energy.jpg\", \"label\": \"Capital moving back to the barrel: BP's reset put oil and gas ahead of the transition\", \"credit\": \"Project 54\"}, \"infographicLabel\": \"BP's reset: capital reallocation from transition back to oil and gas, 2025 to 2030\", \"pdf\": {\"href\": \"\/wp-content\/themes\/p54-blueprint\/assets\/pdf\/bp-strategic-reset-2026.pdf\", \"title\": \"BP's Strategic Reset: Briefing Deck\", \"meta\": \"9-slide briefing \u00b7 Project 54\"}, \"podcast\": {\"src\": \"\/wp-content\/themes\/p54-blueprint\/assets\/media\/bp-strategic-reset-2026-podcast.m4a\", \"title\": \"BP Abandons Net Zero for Oil\", \"ep\": \"P54 Energy Growth Brief\", \"duration\": \"21:56\"}, \"video\": {\"src\": \"\/wp-content\/themes\/p54-blueprint\/assets\/media\/bp-strategic-reset-2026-video.mp4\", \"label\": \"BP's Strategic Reversal: The Return to Oil and Gas\", \"duration\": \"8:19\"}}, \"poll\": {\"q\": \"What do you read as the real driver of BP's reset back to oil and gas?\", \"note\": \"Your selection maps how you interpret the reversal. No vote tallies, this is a reflection tool.\", \"options\": [{\"id\": \"a\", \"label\": \"Returns and the valuation gap\", \"insight\": \"The performance reading. BP trailed peers for five years and 2024 profit collapsed to 381 million dollars, so capital moved to the highest-returning barrels to close the gap.\"}, {\"id\": \"b\", \"label\": \"Activist pressure from Elliott\", \"insight\": \"The governance reading. Elliott's roughly 5 percent stake and its push for cost cuts, disposals and a hydrocarbon tilt shaped the timing and severity of the reset.\"}, {\"id\": \"c\", \"label\": \"A changed demand outlook\", \"insight\": \"The macro reading. BP is betting oil and gas demand, led by US gas and AI-driven power, stays stronger for longer than the 2020 transition thesis assumed.\"}, {\"id\": \"d\", \"label\": \"The 2020 strategy was simply too early\", \"insight\": \"The timing reading. In the chief executive's own words BP chased too much too soon, so the reset is less a rejection of transition than a retreat to what pays now.\"}]}, \"faq\": [{\"q\": \"What is BP's strategic reset?\", \"a\": \"It is the strategy BP announced on 26 February 2025 that reallocates capital from renewables back to oil and gas. BP is raising oil and gas investment to around 10 billion dollars a year through 2027, cutting transition spending by more than 5 billion dollars a year, targeting production of 2.3 to 2.5 million barrels of oil equivalent per day by 2030, and running a 20 billion dollar divestment programme. By early 2026 it had also suspended its share buy-back to repair the balance sheet.\"}, {\"q\": \"Why did BP abandon its net-zero strategy?\", \"a\": \"Because the 2020 transition bet did not deliver market returns. BP trailed Shell, ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips over five years and its 2024 profit fell to 381 million dollars from 15.2 billion in 2023. Activist investor Elliott Management built a stake of about 5 percent and pushed for capital discipline and a return to oil and gas, and BP concluded, in its chief executive's words, that it had chased too much. The reset reallocates capital to its highest-returning hydrocarbon assets. For the full sourced explanation, see our dedicated answer on why BP abandoned its net zero strategy<\/a>.\"}, {\"q\": \"Who is BP's chief executive in 2026?\", \"a\": \"Meg O'Neill, the former chief executive of Woodside Energy and a 23-year ExxonMobil veteran, who became BP's chief executive on 1 April 2026 after Murray Auchincloss stepped down in December 2025. In June 2026 she restructured BP into two segments, Upstream and Downstream, and abolished the standalone low-carbon unit, accelerating rather than softening the reset.\"}, {\"q\": \"What does BP's reset mean for suppliers and vendors?\", \"a\": \"Budget is moving up into oil and gas and out of renewables, so upstream, LNG, refining and trading suppliers are favoured while renewables-only suppliers face a shrinking BP counterparty. Procurement now leads with cost, cash and returns rather than sustainability, so pitches should stress payback and capital efficiency. Divestments such as Castrol to Stonepeak also mean some contracts will transfer to new, more financially driven owners.\"}, {\"q\": \"Could BP be taken over or broken up?\", \"a\": \"It remains possible but unconfirmed. Persistent underperformance kept speculation about a Shell approach circulating in 2025, but both companies denied deal talks in June 2025 and Shell was then barred under the UK Takeover Code from bidding for six months. As of mid-2026 there is no confirmed live bid, though the governance turmoil and the removal of the chairman in May 2026 have kept the speculation alive.\"}], \"newsletter\": {\"kicker\": \"The Energy Growth Brief\", \"title\": [\"Get the next\", \"intelligence drop\"], \"body\": \"Join energy and industrial leaders getting our marketing, AI-growth and revenue-architecture intelligence, direct, no filler.\", \"cadence\": \"Twice monthly\", \"reach\": \"Gulf \u00b7 MENA \u00b7 Asia \u00b7 Europe\", \"cta\": \"Subscribe\", \"note\": \"No spam. Unsubscribe anytime. We read every reply.\", \"success\": \"You're on the list\", \"successBody\": \"Welcome to The Energy Growth Brief, watch your inbox for the next dispatch.\"}, \"related\": [{\"title\": \"Growing Shareholder Value: BP's Reset Document\", \"topic\": \"Corporate Strategy\", \"href\": \"\/bp-growing-shareholder-value-reset-explained\/\"}, {\"title\": \"What Does BP's Strategic Reset Mean for Suppliers and Vendors?\", \"topic\": \"Supplier Playbook\", \"href\": \"\/bp-strategic-reset-suppliers-vendors\/\"}, {\"title\": \"Why Did BP Abandon Its Net Zero Strategy?\", \"topic\": \"Analysis\", \"href\": \"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/why-bp-abandoned-net-zero-strategy\/\"}, {\"title\": \"Equinor's 2026 Capital Markets Day: Inside the Disciplined Bet on Oil, Gas and Selective Power\", \"topic\": \"Capital\", \"href\": \"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/equinor-capital-markets-day-2026-strategy\/\"}, {\"title\": \"Adura: Inside the Shell and Equinor North Sea Venture, and the Consolidation Playbook for Mature Basins\", \"topic\": \"Strategy\", \"href\": \"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/adura-shell-equinor-north-sea-consolidation\/\"}, {\"title\": \"Shell's Scope 3 and Sustainable Procurement: How the Supplier Carbon Data Gate Decides Who Sells to Big Oil\", \"topic\": \"Strategy\", \"href\": \"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/shell-scope-3-sustainable-procurement-suppliers\/\"}]}","p54_faq":"","p54_media":"","p54_comments_enabled":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[92,125],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3569","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-analysis","category-strategy"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3569","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/12"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3569"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3569\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4118,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3569\/revisions\/4118"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3569"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3569"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3569"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}