La Chine ne publie quasiment rien sur ses r\u00e9serves p\u00e9troli\u00e8res\u00a0; par cons\u00e9quent, tous les chiffres que vous avez pu lire sont des estimations. Ce dossier explique les trois m\u00e9thodes utilis\u00e9es par les analystes, pr\u00e9sente les \u00e9carts r\u00e9els entre elles et vous fournit une mani\u00e8re argument\u00e9e de citer ces chiffres sans pr\u00e9tendre qu'il s'agit d'un fait av\u00e9r\u00e9.<\/p>\n
P\u00e9kin ne publie pas r\u00e9guli\u00e8rement de donn\u00e9es sur ses stocks de p\u00e9trole, de sorte qu'aucune source ne fournit le chiffre exact. Les analystes le reconstituent de deux mani\u00e8res\u00a0: par jaugeage satellitaire des r\u00e9servoirs \u00e0 toit flottant (Kpler, Vortexa, Ursa Space Systems) et par un calcul du bilan de l'offre qui additionne les importations de p\u00e9trole brut et la production nationale, soustrait le d\u00e9bit des raffineries et consid\u00e8re le r\u00e9sultat comme une constitution de stocks. Ces deux m\u00e9thodes divergent car les satellites ne peuvent pas observer les stockages souterrains en cavernes rocheuses ni les r\u00e9servoirs \u00e0 toit fixe, et parce que le bilan de l'offre repose sur l'estimation de l'activit\u00e9 des raffineries artisanales, souvent peu productives. Le nombre de jours de stockage annonc\u00e9 varie ensuite selon le d\u00e9nominateur\u00a0: un m\u00eame stock d'environ 1,2 \u00e0 1,4\u00a0milliard de barils correspond \u00e0 environ 110 \u00e0 130\u00a0jours par rapport aux importations nettes, et bien moins par rapport \u00e0 la consommation totale. Un chiffre donn\u00e9 sans indication de m\u00e9thode ni de d\u00e9nominateur n'est pas un indicateur de pr\u00e9cision, mais un indicateur s\u00e9lectif.<\/p>\n
China does not release routine crude inventory data. There is no weekly stocks report, no equivalent of the EIA’s Wednesday release, no audited annual filing. Inventory levels are treated as strategically sensitive, which is a rational position for a country whose principal energy vulnerability is a maritime chokepoint.<\/p>\n
L'exception confirme la r\u00e8gle. En 2018, le Bureau national des statistiques a r\u00e9v\u00e9l\u00e9 un total de r\u00e9serves nationales de 37,73 millions de tonnes, soit environ 280,7 millions de barils, \u00e0 la mi-2017 (South China Morning Post<\/a>C'\u00e9tait la premi\u00e8re fois qu'un total officiel \u00e9tait publi\u00e9 ; il est paru des mois apr\u00e8s la p\u00e9riode qu'il d\u00e9crivait, et rien de cette ampleur n'a \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9p\u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9guli\u00e8rement depuis.<\/p>\n Ainsi, chaque chiffre en circulation, y compris le n\u00f4tre, est une reconstruction. Il ne s'agit pas d'une critique des analystes qui effectuent ces reconstructions, mais d'un constat relatif aux donn\u00e9es elles-m\u00eames, qui devrait influencer la mani\u00e8re dont vous citez ce chiffre.<\/p>\n Pour comprendre pourquoi ces chiffres divergent, il faut comprendre qu'ils ne tentent pas tous de mesurer le m\u00eame objet.<\/p>\n The divergence is not academic. The EIA put China’s strategic inventories at nearly 1.4 billion barrels as of December 2025, after average additions of 1.1 million barrels a day through 2025 (EIA<\/a>). Kpler’s satellite and flow based tracking had onshore inventories at about 1,232 million barrels in late May 2026, down from a peak of 1,251 million in early May (Kpler, 25 mai 2026<\/a>Le chroniqueur de Reuters, Clyde Russell, se basant sur l'\u00e9quilibre de l'offre, estime les stocks commerciaux et strat\u00e9giques combin\u00e9s \u00e0 au moins 1,2 milliard de barils, tandis que les donn\u00e9es de Vortexa font \u00e9tat d'un record de 1,24 milliard en avril 2026.<\/p>\n Le taux d'accumulation pr\u00e9sente des \u00e9carts encore plus importants que le niveau. L'Oxford Institute for Energy Studies a constat\u00e9 que les estimations publi\u00e9es de la constitution implicite des stocks pour 2025 variaient de 0,43 \u00e0 0,9 million de barils par jour, contre son propre sc\u00e9nario central de 0,75 million, et a not\u00e9 que l'\u00e9cart entre les analystes est en moyenne d'environ 0,5 million de barils par jour et peut atteindre 1,1 million (OIES, mai 2026<\/a>Un d\u00e9saccord portant sur 1,1 million de barils par jour est sup\u00e9rieur \u00e0 la production journali\u00e8re totale de plusieurs membres de l'OPEP.<\/p>\n The most instructive case is historical. Analysts at Rice University’s Baker Institute, working with Orbital Insight satellite data, wrote that “at times in mid to late 2017, Orbital Insight’s data suggested total crude oil stockpiles in China were more than three times as large as the figures reported by Xinhua, a potential discrepancy of more than 500 million barrels” (Collins et Hung, Baker Institute, 2018<\/a>Un demi-milliard de barils repr\u00e9sente l'\u00e9cart entre un chiffre officiel partiel et une mesure ind\u00e9pendante effectu\u00e9e dans le m\u00eame pays.<\/p>\n Invisible storage. A growing share of China’s strategic capacity is built in mined underground rock caverns rather than above ground steel. Shadow based satellite analysis cannot read it at all. The Baker Institute notes that underground caverns can cost more than 60 percent less per barrel of capacity than above ground tanks, so China has both a security incentive and a cost incentive to keep building storage that satellites cannot see.<\/p>\n Les r\u00e9serves commerciales et strat\u00e9giques sont indissociables de l'ext\u00e9rieur. La r\u00e9serve de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 se compose de deux niveaux interd\u00e9pendants\u00a0: une r\u00e9serve d'\u00c9tat et un stock commercial beaucoup plus important d\u00e9tenu par CNPC, Sinopec et CNOOC, sur lequel P\u00e9kin peut s'appuyer en cas de crise. Un analyste externe ne peut attribuer une quantit\u00e9 donn\u00e9e de p\u00e9trole \u00e0 l'un ou l'autre de ces niveaux\u00a0; les estimations divergent donc simplement selon la d\u00e9finition que l'auteur donne \u00e0 cette distinction.<\/p>\n Le taux d'utilisation des raffineries est le facteur le plus faible. Les raffineries ind\u00e9pendantes du Shandong, sp\u00e9cialis\u00e9es dans les petites raffineries artisanales, repr\u00e9sentent environ un quart de la capacit\u00e9 nationale et leur taux d'utilisation varie rapidement\u00a0: la moyenne nationale est tomb\u00e9e \u00e0 66,3\u00a0% en mai\u00a02026, tandis que les usines du Shandong atteignaient 50,5\u00a0% en une semaine. Le d\u00e9bit \u00e9tant l'un des deux principaux facteurs influen\u00e7ant l'\u00e9quilibre de l'offre, toute erreur \u00e0 ce niveau a un impact direct sur la constitution des stocks.<\/p>\n Apparent demand is a proxy, not a measurement. China’s apparent demand is refinery processing plus net product imports. There is a persistent gap of roughly 1.1 to 1.4 million barrels a day between crude supply and what refineries actually process. Some of that gap is statistical noise across customs, NBS and shipping data. The rest becomes the stock build. Small measurement errors therefore become large disagreements about storage.<\/p>\n C\u2019est ce point que la plupart des lecteurs n\u00e9gligent. Le nombre de jours de stock est une fraction, et le num\u00e9rateur ne repr\u00e9sente que la moiti\u00e9 du raisonnement.<\/p>\n The IEA measures its members’ 90 day obligation against net imports of the prior calendar year, a stable and audited figure. China’s headline day counts are frequently quoted instead against gross imports, or against total consumption, which runs well above net imports. Both are larger denominators, so both mechanically produce a smaller day count for exactly the same barrels.<\/p>\n C\u2019est ainsi qu\u2019une source cr\u00e9dible annonce 90 jours et une autre 130, pour un stock identique. Aucune ne ment. Leurs crit\u00e8res de division diff\u00e8rent, et presque personne ne pr\u00e9cise lesquels. Nous avons d\u00e9fini les m\u00e9canismes de r\u00e9f\u00e9rence dans le dossier de l'AIE sur les stocks \u00e0 90 jours<\/a>, et le nombre de jours ouvrables dans les jours du dossier d'approvisionnement<\/a>.<\/p>\n Consid\u00e9rez chaque chiffre relatif aux stocks chinois comme une fourchette et indiquez toujours la m\u00e9thode de calcul et le d\u00e9nominateur. \u00c0 la mi-2026, les stocks totaux de p\u00e9trole brut de la Chine, r\u00e9serves d'\u00c9tat et stocks commerciaux confondus, se situeront vraisemblablement entre 1,2 et 1,4 milliard de barils, tendant vers la limite inf\u00e9rieure apr\u00e8s les r\u00e9ductions observ\u00e9es durant le conflit iranien. En termes d'importations nettes, cela repr\u00e9sente environ 110 \u00e0 130 jours de consommation. En termes d'importations brutes ou de consommation totale, ce m\u00eame volume de barils correspond \u00e0 une couverture plus courte.<\/p>\n The practical rule for anyone writing, briefing or selling on this: cite the range with attribution, say plainly that Beijing publishes no confirming figure, and note that the number moves in near real time with China’s buying and refining behaviour, unlike the IEA’s fixed annual benchmark. A single number with no method attached is not more precise. It is just less honest.<\/p>\n C'est aussi pourquoi L'opacit\u00e9 elle-m\u00eame est la strat\u00e9gie<\/a>, et pourquoi ces estimations sont importantes sur le plan commercial\u00a0: cette m\u00eame ambigu\u00eft\u00e9 qui frustre les analystes est ce qui donne \u00e0 P\u00e9kin des options en cas de crise.<\/p>\n P\u00e9kin ne publie pas de donn\u00e9es r\u00e9guli\u00e8res sur ses stocks de p\u00e9trole. Les analystes reconstituent donc le total \u00e0 partir d'observations satellitaires des r\u00e9servoirs visibles et de l'\u00e9cart entre les importations d\u00e9clar\u00e9es par les douanes, la production nationale et le d\u00e9bit des raffineries. Cette m\u00e9thode, bien que cr\u00e9dible, est indirecte\u00a0; par cons\u00e9quent, chaque chiffre publi\u00e9 comporte une marge d'erreur et constitue une estimation, et non une statistique officielle.<\/p>\n Les sources utilisent des m\u00e9thodes et des d\u00e9nominateurs diff\u00e9rents pour un m\u00eame stock. Un total d'environ 1,2 \u00e0 1,4 milliard de barils peut repr\u00e9senter entre 110 et 180 jours de couverture, selon qu'il soit calcul\u00e9 \u00e0 partir des importations nettes, des importations brutes ou de la consommation totale. De plus, les estimations du rythme de constitution des stocks varient jusqu'\u00e0 1,1 million de barils par jour entre les analystes, selon l'OIES.<\/p>\n No. Satellites read the shadow cast by a floating roof on an above ground tank, which captures a large share of visible tank farms, more than 4,000 tanks in Ursa Space Systems’ coverage alone. They cannot see oil in mined underground rock caverns or fixed roof tanks, and China has both a cost incentive and a security incentive to keep building exactly that kind of storage.<\/p>\n Il s'agit d'un calcul r\u00e9siduel\u00a0: production nationale plus importations plus acheminement par pipeline, moins le d\u00e9bit des raffineries et les exportations, \u00e0 partir des donn\u00e9es des douanes chinoises et du Bureau national des statistiques. On suppose que le p\u00e9trole brut non raffin\u00e9 ou non export\u00e9 a \u00e9t\u00e9 stock\u00e9. Ce calcul d\u00e9pendant de l'estimation des taux de production des raffineries, notamment celles des petites raffineries ind\u00e9pendantes, dont la production est volatile, de petites erreurs dans ce domaine peuvent entra\u00eener d'importantes variations du volume de production estim\u00e9.<\/p>\n Rarement et partiellement. L'exemple le plus frappant est le chiffre de 37,73 millions de tonnes, soit environ 280,7 millions de barils, publi\u00e9 par le Bureau national des statistiques en 2018 pour la mi-2017. Xinhua publie occasionnellement des donn\u00e9es commerciales sur les r\u00e9servoirs, mais celles-ci ne couvrent qu'une partie du syst\u00e8me, ce qui fait des estimations par satellite et de l'\u00e9quilibre de l'offre les principaux outils. Pour comprendre pourquoi ce silence est d\u00e9lib\u00e9r\u00e9, consultez notre dossier sur Pourquoi la Chine ne publie-t-elle pas ses r\u00e9serves de p\u00e9trole ?<\/a>.<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" La Chine ne publie quasiment rien sur ses r\u00e9serves p\u00e9troli\u00e8res\u00a0; par cons\u00e9quent, tous les chiffres que vous avez pu lire sont des estimations. Ce dossier explique les trois m\u00e9thodes utilis\u00e9es par les analystes, pr\u00e9sente les \u00e9carts r\u00e9els entre elles et vous fournit une mani\u00e8re argument\u00e9e de citer ces chiffres sans pr\u00e9tendre qu'il s'agit d'un fait av\u00e9r\u00e9.<\/p>","protected":false},"author":12,"featured_media":1861,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"p54_article_data":"{\"meta\":{\"kicker\":\"Insight \u00b7 Method\",\"topics\":[\"Energy\",\"Policy\"],\"title\":\"Why Every Estimate of China's Oil Stockpile Disagrees, and Which Numbers to Trust\",\"dek\":\"China publishes almost nothing about its oil reserves, so every figure you have ever read is a reconstruction. This dossier explains the three methods analysts use, shows the real spread between them, and gives you a defensible way to cite the number without pretending it is a fact.\",\"date\":\"12 July 2026\",\"readTime\":\"10 min read\",\"author\":\"Project 54, Research & Strategy\",\"listenTime\":\"22 min listen\"},\"quickAnswer\":{\"q\":\"Why is China's days of supply figure only an estimate, and why does it vary between sources?\",\"a\":\"Beijing does not publish routine oil inventory data, so no source has the actual number. Analysts reconstruct it two ways: satellite gauging of floating roof tanks (Kpler, Vortexa, Ursa Space Systems), and a supply balance calculation that takes crude imports plus domestic output minus refinery throughput and treats the residual as a stock build. The two methods disagree because satellites cannot see underground rock cavern storage or fixed roof tanks, and because the supply balance depends on estimating refinery runs at volatile independent teapot refiners. The headline day count then diverges again on the denominator: the same stockpile of roughly 1.2 to 1.4 billion barrels reads as about 110 to 130 days against net imports, and far fewer against total consumption. Any single number quoted without its method and its denominator is not precision, it is selection.\"},\"takeaways\":[\"No source has the real number. China treats stock levels as strategically sensitive, and the last meaningful official disclosure covered mid 2017: 37.73 million tonnes, roughly 280.7 million barrels, released by the National Bureau of Statistics.\",\"There are two independent methods, and they measure different things. Satellite gauging reads visible above ground tanks. The supply balance method infers a residual from customs and refining data. They are not interchangeable.\",\"Satellites are structurally blind to part of the system. Underground rock caverns cost far less per barrel than steel tanks, which gives China an incentive to keep building storage that cannot be photographed.\",\"The denominator decides the headline. Net imports, gross imports and total consumption give three different day counts for one identical stockpile.\",\"Cite a range with attribution, never a point estimate. As of mid 2026 the defensible position is roughly 1.2 to 1.4 billion barrels, converging on the lower end, at about 110 to 130 days of net import cover.\"],\"sections\":[{\"id\":\"sec1\",\"q\":\"Why is there no official number?\",\"h\":\"Beijing does not publish it, and that is the whole problem\",\"p\":[\"China does not release routine crude inventory data. There is no weekly stocks report, no equivalent of the EIA's Wednesday release, no audited annual filing. Inventory levels are treated as strategically sensitive, which is a rational position for a country whose principal energy vulnerability is a maritime chokepoint.\",\"The exception proves the rule. In 2018 the National Bureau of Statistics disclosed a national reserve total of 37.73 million tonnes, about 280.7 million barrels, as of mid 2017 (South China Morning Post<\/a>). It was the first time an official total had ever been published, it arrived months after the period it described, and nothing on that scale has been repeated on a regular schedule since.\",\"So every figure in circulation, including ours, is a reconstruction. That is not a criticism of the analysts doing the reconstructing. It is a fact about the data, and it should change how you cite the number.\"]},{\"id\":\"sec2\",\"q\":\"How do analysts actually build the estimate?\",\"h\":\"Three methods, measuring three different things\",\"p\":[\"Understanding why the numbers disagree requires understanding that they are not all trying to measure the same object.\"],\"pillars\":[{\"n\":\"01\",\"t\":\"Satellite gauging\",\"d\":\"Providers such as Ursa Space Systems, Kpler and Vortexa photograph tank farms and read the shadow inside a floating roof tank. The roof floats on the liquid and falls as oil is drawn down, so the shadow is a gauge. Ursa tracks more than 4,000 floating roof tanks across roughly 130 Chinese locations. It measures visible above ground tanks only.\"},{\"n\":\"02\",\"t\":\"Supply balance\",\"d\":\"The dominant method for Reuters, the EIA and OIES. Domestic production plus imports plus pipeline receipts, minus refinery throughput and exports. Whatever is unaccounted for is assumed to have gone into storage. It measures a residual, not a tank.\"},{\"n\":\"03\",\"t\":\"Official disclosure\",\"d\":\"Rare, partial and late. The 2018 release covering mid 2017 remains the clearest data point. Xinhua publishes occasional commercial tank figures that cover only part of the system and exclude the strategic layer.\"}]},{\"id\":\"sec3\",\"q\":\"How far apart do the estimates actually get?\",\"h\":\"The spread, in real numbers\",\"p\":[\"The divergence is not academic. The EIA put China's strategic inventories at nearly 1.4 billion barrels as of December 2025, after average additions of 1.1 million barrels a day through 2025 (EIA<\/a>). Kpler's satellite and flow based tracking had onshore inventories at about 1,232 million barrels in late May 2026, down from a peak of 1,251 million in early May (Kpler, 25 May 2026<\/a>). Reuters columnist Clyde Russell, working from the supply balance, put combined commercial and strategic stocks at at least 1.2 billion barrels, with Vortexa data cited alongside at a record 1.24 billion in April 2026.\",\"The rate of accumulation splits even wider than the level. The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies found published implied stock build estimates for 2025 ranging from 0.43 to 0.9 million barrels a day, against its own central case of 0.75, and noted the spread between analysts averages about 0.5 million barrels a day and can reach 1.1 million (OIES, May 2026<\/a>). A disagreement of 1.1 million barrels a day is larger than the entire daily output of several OPEC members.\",\"The most instructive case is historical. Analysts at Rice University's Baker Institute, working with Orbital Insight satellite data, wrote that \\\"at times in mid to late 2017, Orbital Insight's data suggested total crude oil stockpiles in China were more than three times as large as the figures reported by Xinhua, a potential discrepancy of more than 500 million barrels\\\" (Collins and Hung, Baker Institute, 2018<\/a>). Half a billion barrels is the gap between a partial official figure and an independent measurement of the same country.\"],\"table\":{\"cols\":[\"Source\",\"Estimate\",\"What it measures\",\"Date\",\"Why it differs\"],\"rows\":[[\"China NBS (official)\",\"37.73 million tonnes, approx. 280.7 million barrels\",\"Disclosed national reserve total\",\"Released 2018, covering mid 2017\",\"Only official figure; excludes most commercial stock; not repeated\"],[\"EIA\",\"Nearly 1.4 billion barrels\",\"Combined strategic and commercial inventories\",\"December 2025\",\"Broadest definition, includes commercial NOC stocks\"],[\"Kpler\",\"Approx. 1,232 million barrels\",\"Onshore visible crude inventories\",\"25 May 2026\",\"Satellite and flow based; misses underground storage\"],[\"Reuters \/ Clyde Russell\",\"At least 1.2 billion barrels\",\"Implied total from customs and refining data\",\"March to April 2026\",\"Residual method; sensitive to teapot run rates\"],[\"Vortexa (cited by Reuters)\",\"Approx. 1.24 billion barrels, a record\",\"Tracked commercial plus strategic stocks\",\"April 2026\",\"Different tracking universe and definitions\"],[\"OIES\",\"Stock build 0.43 to 0.9 million b\/d (central 0.75)\",\"Rate of accumulation, not level\",\"2025 data, published 2026\",\"Different refinery run and output assumptions\"]]}},{\"id\":\"sec4\",\"q\":\"Why can the methods not just be reconciled?\",\"h\":\"Four technical reasons the gap does not close\",\"p\":[\"Invisible storage. A growing share of China's strategic capacity is built in mined underground rock caverns rather than above ground steel. Shadow based satellite analysis cannot read it at all. The Baker Institute notes that underground caverns can cost more than 60 percent less per barrel of capacity than above ground tanks, so China has both a security incentive and a cost incentive to keep building storage that satellites cannot see.\",\"Commercial and strategic barrels are not separable from outside. The buffer is two blended layers: a state reserve and a much larger pool of commercial stock held by CNPC, Sinopec and CNOOC that Beijing can lean on in a crisis. An outside analyst cannot attribute a given barrel to one layer, so estimates diverge simply on where the author draws the line.\",\"Refinery runs are the weak input. Independent teapot refiners in Shandong are roughly a quarter of national capacity and move run rates fast: the national average fell to 66.3 percent in May 2026, with Shandong plants at 50.5 percent in one week. Because throughput is one of two big inputs to the supply balance, an error there lands directly in the implied stock build.\",\"Apparent demand is a proxy, not a measurement. China's apparent demand is refinery processing plus net product imports. There is a persistent gap of roughly 1.1 to 1.4 million barrels a day between crude supply and what refineries actually process. Some of that gap is statistical noise across customs, NBS and shipping data. The rest becomes the stock build. Small measurement errors therefore become large disagreements about storage.\"]},{\"id\":\"sec5\",\"q\":\"What makes one day count different from another?\",\"h\":\"The denominator is doing more work than the barrels\",\"p\":[\"This is the part most readers miss. Days of supply is a fraction, and the numerator is only half the argument.\",\"The IEA measures its members' 90 day obligation against net imports of the prior calendar year, a stable and audited figure. China's headline day counts are frequently quoted instead against gross imports, or against total consumption, which runs well above net imports. Both are larger denominators, so both mechanically produce a smaller day count for exactly the same barrels.\",\"That is how one credible source says 90 days and another says 130 while describing an identical stockpile. Neither is lying. They are dividing by different things, and almost nobody says which. We set out the benchmark mechanics in the IEA 90 day stockholding dossier<\/a>, and the working day count in the days of supply dossier<\/a>.\"]},{\"id\":\"sec6\",\"q\":\"So how should you cite it?\",\"h\":\"A defensible position, as of mid 2026\",\"p\":[\"Treat every China stockpile figure as a range and always name the method and the denominator. As of mid 2026, total Chinese crude inventories, state reserve plus commercial, most likely sit between about 1.2 and 1.4 billion barrels, converging toward the lower end after the drawdowns through the Iran conflict period. On a net import basis that is roughly 110 to 130 days of cover. On a gross import or total consumption basis the same barrels look like fewer days.\",\"The practical rule for anyone writing, briefing or selling on this: cite the range with attribution, say plainly that Beijing publishes no confirming figure, and note that the number moves in near real time with China's buying and refining behaviour, unlike the IEA's fixed annual benchmark. A single number with no method attached is not more precise. It is just less honest.\",\"This is also why the opacity itself is the strategy<\/a>, and why the estimates matter commercially: the same ambiguity that frustrates analysts is what gives Beijing optionality in a crisis.\"]}],\"media\":{\"image\":{\"src\":\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/earth-night-lights-energy.jpg\",\"label\":\"Measured from orbit, inferred from customs data, confirmed by almost nobody: how China's reserve numbers are actually built.\",\"credit\":\"Project 54\"},\"infographicLabel\":\"The estimate spread: what each source measures, what it misses, and why the day counts diverge.\",\"pdf\":{\"href\":\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/07\/china-oil-reserve-estimates-vary-sources.pdf\",\"title\":\"Why China's Oil Reserve Estimates Disagree, Slide Deck\",\"meta\":\"Briefing deck \u00b7 Project 54\"},\"video\":{\"src\":\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/07\/china-oil-reserve-estimates-vary-sources-video.mp4\",\"label\":\"Explainer briefing: how China reserve estimates are built, and why they clash\",\"duration\":\"8:11\",\"poster\":\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/07\/china-oil-reserve-estimates-vary-sources-poster.jpg\",\"captions\":\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/07\/china-oil-reserve-estimates-vary-sources-captions.vtt\",\"transcript\":\"Beijing does not publish routine oil inventory data, so every figure in circulation is a reconstruction rather than an audited fact. The last meaningful official disclosure came from the National Bureau of Statistics in 2018, covering mid 2017. Analysts use two very different tools. Satellite gauging, from providers such as Kpler and Ursa Space Systems, measures the shadow cast inside a floating roof tank from orbit. The supply balance method looks at no tanks at all: it takes domestic production plus imports, subtracts refinery throughput and exports, and assumes the residual went into storage. The results diverge sharply. The EIA put stocks at nearly 1.4 billion barrels by December 2025, Kpler at roughly 1,232 million barrels in May 2026, with Vortexa data cited around 1.24 billion. The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies found analyst estimates of the 2025 stock build varying by as much as 1.1 million barrels a day, which is larger than the daily output of several OPEC members. Four blind spots keep the gap open: invisible underground rock cavern storage, which costs roughly 60 percent less per barrel than above ground steel and cannot be photographed; the blending of commercial and strategic barrels; highly volatile teapot refinery run rates in Shandong, which fell to 50.5 percent in a single week in May 2026; and apparent demand, which is a proxy rather than a measurement. Then the denominator changes everything. The same stockpile divided by net imports gives roughly 110 to 130 days of cover, and divided by gross imports or total consumption gives a far smaller number. That is how one credible source says 90 days and another says 130 while describing identical barrels. The defensible position in mid 2026 is a range: about 1.2 to 1.4 billion barrels, roughly 110 to 130 days on a net import basis, always naming the method and the denominator. The opacity is not an accident. It is the strategy, and it is what gives Beijing optionality in a crisis.\"},\"podcast\":{\"src\":\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/07\/china-oil-reserve-estimates-vary-sources-podcast.m4a\",\"title\":\"Why Every Estimate of China's Oil Stockpile Disagrees\",\"ep\":\"P54 Energy Growth Brief\",\"duration\":\"22:10\"}},\"poll\":{\"q\":\"When you see a figure for China's oil reserves, what do you check first?\",\"options\":[{\"id\":\"a\",\"label\":\"The method behind it\",\"insight\":\"The right instinct. Satellite gauging and supply balance measure different objects, and one of them is structurally blind to underground caverns. The method tells you what the number can and cannot include.\"},{\"id\":\"b\",\"label\":\"The denominator on the day count\",\"insight\":\"Equally decisive, and more often missed. Net imports, gross imports and total consumption produce three different day counts for one identical stockpile.\"},{\"id\":\"c\",\"label\":\"The date\",\"insight\":\"Necessary but not sufficient. These stocks move fast, so a stale figure is misleading, but a fresh figure with an unnamed method is still unusable.\"},{\"id\":\"d\",\"label\":\"Whether it is official\",\"insight\":\"Reasonable, but it will fail you here. There is essentially no current official figure. The last meaningful disclosure covered mid 2017.\"}]},\"faq\":[{\"q\":\"Why is China's days of supply figure only an estimate?\",\"a\":\"Because Beijing does not publish routine oil inventory data. Analysts reconstruct the total from satellite readings of visible tanks and from the gap between customs reported imports, domestic output and refinery throughput. The method is credible but indirect, so every published figure carries a margin of error and is an estimate, not an official statistic.\"},{\"q\":\"Why does the days of supply number vary between sources?\",\"a\":\"Because sources use different methods and different denominators for the same stockpile. A total of roughly 1.2 to 1.4 billion barrels can be quoted as anywhere from about 110 to 180 days of cover depending on whether it is divided by net imports, gross imports or total consumption, and estimates of the rate of stock build differ by as much as 1.1 million barrels a day between analysts, according to OIES.\"},{\"q\":\"Can satellites see all of China's oil storage?\",\"a\":\"No. Satellites read the shadow cast by a floating roof on an above ground tank, which captures a large share of visible tank farms, more than 4,000 tanks in Ursa Space Systems' coverage alone. They cannot see oil in mined underground rock caverns or fixed roof tanks, and China has both a cost incentive and a security incentive to keep building exactly that kind of storage.\"},{\"q\":\"What is the supply balance or implied stock build method?\",\"a\":\"It is a residual calculation: domestic production plus imports plus pipeline receipts, minus refinery throughput and exports, using China customs and National Bureau of Statistics data. Whatever crude is not refined or exported is assumed to have gone into storage. Because it depends on estimating refinery runs, especially at volatile independent teapot refiners, small errors there produce large swings in the implied build.\"},{\"q\":\"Has China ever published an official reserve figure?\",\"a\":\"Rarely and partially. The clearest case is the National Bureau of Statistics figure of 37.73 million tonnes, about 280.7 million barrels, disclosed in 2018 for mid 2017. Xinhua publishes occasional commercial tank data that covers only part of the system, which leaves satellite and supply balance estimates as the primary tools. For why the silence is deliberate, see our dossier on why China does not publish its oil reserves<\/a>.\"}],\"newsletter\":{\"kicker\":\"The Energy Growth Brief\",\"title\":[\"Intelligence,\",\"to your inbox\"],\"body\":\"Join energy and industrial leaders getting our marketing, AI-growth and revenue-architecture intelligence, direct, no filler.\",\"placeholder\":\"you@company.com\",\"cta\":\"Subscribe\",\"note\":\"No spam. Unsubscribe anytime. We read every reply.\"},\"related\":[{\"title\":\"How Many Days of Oil Supply Does China Hold?\",\"topic\":\"Energy\",\"href\":\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/china-oil-reserve-days-of-supply\/\"},{\"title\":\"China and the IEA 90 Day Oil Stockholding Benchmark\",\"topic\":\"Policy\",\"href\":\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/china-iea-90-day-oil-stockholding-benchmark\/\"},{\"title\":\"Why China Does Not Publish Its Oil Reserves\",\"topic\":\"Policy\",\"href\":\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/why-china-doesnt-publish-oil-reserves\/\"},{\"title\":\"Is China Still Stockpiling Oil in 2026?\",\"topic\":\"Energy\",\"href\":\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/is-china-still-stockpiling-oil-2026\/\"}],\"listenTime\":\"22 min listen\",\"__slug\":\"china-oil-reserve-estimates-vary-sources\"}","p54_faq":"","p54_media":"","p54_comments_enabled":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[92,125],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3628","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analysis","category-strategy"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3628","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/12"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3628"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3628\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3629,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3628\/revisions\/3629"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1861"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3628"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3628"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3628"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}Trois m\u00e9thodes, trois mesures diff\u00e9rentes<\/h2>\n
\n
L'\u00e9cart, en chiffres r\u00e9els<\/h2>\n
Quatre raisons techniques expliquent pourquoi l'\u00e9cart ne se r\u00e9duit pas.<\/h2>\n
Le d\u00e9nominateur effectue plus de travail que les barils.<\/h2>\n
Une position d\u00e9fendable, \u00e0 la mi-2026<\/h2>\n
FAQ<\/h2>\n
Why is China’s days of supply figure only an estimate?<\/h3>\n
Pourquoi le nombre de jours de stock varie-t-il selon les sources\u00a0?<\/h3>\n
Can satellites see all of China’s oil storage?<\/h3>\n
Qu\u2019est-ce que la m\u00e9thode d\u2019\u00e9quilibre de l\u2019offre ou de constitution implicite des stocks\u00a0?<\/h3>\n
La Chine a-t-elle d\u00e9j\u00e0 publi\u00e9 un chiffre officiel concernant ses r\u00e9serves ?<\/h3>\n