{"id":3696,"date":"2026-07-14T02:29:29","date_gmt":"2026-07-14T02:29:29","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/china-oil-storage-capacity\/"},"modified":"2026-09-17T23:25:46","modified_gmt":"2026-09-17T23:25:46","slug":"capacite-de-stockage-de-petrole-de-la-chine","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/fr\/china-oil-storage-capacity\/","title":{"rendered":"Quelle quantit\u00e9 de p\u00e9trole la Chine peut-elle r\u00e9ellement stocker\u00a0? Capacit\u00e9 en 2026"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Ce dossier ne traite pas de la vitesse \u00e0 laquelle la Chine remplit ses r\u00e9serves, ni des raisons des divergences d&#039;estimations. Il porte sur les infrastructures mat\u00e9rielles : la capacit\u00e9 de stockage physique construite par la Chine, le taux de remplissage de ces r\u00e9servoirs, l&#039;emplacement des cavernes et la dur\u00e9e r\u00e9elle des r\u00e9serves de p\u00e9trole. En 2026, il ne s&#039;agira plus d&#039;une question th\u00e9orique.<\/p>\n<h2>Quelle est la capacit\u00e9 de stockage de p\u00e9trole de la Chine ?<\/h2>\n<p>La Chine disposerait d&#039;une capacit\u00e9 totale de stockage de p\u00e9trole brut d&#039;environ 1,8 \u00e0 2,4 milliards de barils en 2026. Cet \u00e9cart est r\u00e9el et ne peut \u00eatre d\u00e9termin\u00e9 \u00e0 partir de donn\u00e9es publiques. Kayrros estimait la capacit\u00e9 des parcs de stockage \u00e0 plus de 1,8 milliard de barils mi-2024. Energy Aspects \u00e9valuait la capacit\u00e9 totale \u00e0 environ 2 milliards de barils en d\u00e9cembre 2025. S&amp;P Global Commodity Insights indiquait en janvier 2026 que la mise en service d&#039;environ 271 millions de barils de nouvelles capacit\u00e9s commerciales sur huit sites porterait le total \u00e0 plus de 2,39 milliards de barils. Le taux de remplissage actuel se situe entre 1,2 et 1,5 milliard de barils. Le seul chiffre officiel de capacit\u00e9 publi\u00e9 par la Chine \u00e0 ce jour est de 238 millions de barils r\u00e9partis sur neuf bases strat\u00e9giques, selon le Bureau national des statistiques en 2017. Il n&#039;existe aucun chiffre officiel concernant les stocks. Tous les chiffres actuels sont des estimations r\u00e9alis\u00e9es par des analystes externes.<\/p>\n<h2>Points cl\u00e9s \u00e0 retenir<\/h2>\n<ul>\n<li>La capacit\u00e9 totale est une estimation avec une marge de 600 millions de barils, sup\u00e9rieure \u00e0 celle de l&#039;ensemble des r\u00e9serves strat\u00e9giques de p\u00e9trole des \u00c9tats-Unis. Elle s&#039;\u00e9l\u00e8ve \u00e0 1,8 milliard de barils selon Kayrros, 2 milliards selon Energy Aspects, et d\u00e9passe les 2,39 milliards estim\u00e9s par S&amp;P Global apr\u00e8s la construction des capacit\u00e9s en 2026.<\/li>\n<li>Le niveau de remplissage actuel est estim\u00e9 entre 1,2 et 1,5 milliard de barils. L&#039;EIA \u00e9value les r\u00e9serves totales \u00e0 environ 1,4 milliard de barils en d\u00e9cembre 2025, dont environ 360 millions de barils appartiennent aux gouvernements. Cela signifie que les r\u00e9servoirs sont remplis \u00e0 environ 55 \u00e0 65 %, un chiffre que nous avons calcul\u00e9 \u00e0 partir de leurs donn\u00e9es et non une donn\u00e9e publi\u00e9e.<\/li>\n<li>Il n&#039;existe qu&#039;un seul chiffre officiel. Le Bureau national des statistiques a fait \u00e9tat de 238 millions de barils r\u00e9partis sur neuf bases en 2017 et n&#039;a rien publi\u00e9 depuis. La Chine consid\u00e8re ses stocks de p\u00e9trole brut et de produits raffin\u00e9s comme un secret d&#039;\u00c9tat.<\/li>\n<li>Les satellites peuvent voir le haut des r\u00e9servoirs, pas la roche. Quatre sites de cavernes souterraines contiennent au moins 100 millions de barils, et un cinqui\u00e8me est en construction \u00e0 Ningbo. Kayrros estime la capacit\u00e9 souterraine \u00e0 environ 130 millions de barils, avec un taux de remplissage inconnu. Ce facteur constitue une inconnue permanente dans toutes les estimations.<\/li>\n<li>La r\u00e9serve a \u00e9t\u00e9 soumise \u00e0 un test de r\u00e9sistance en 2026 et a tenu bon, mais pas sans efforts. Lorsque la perturbation du d\u00e9troit d&#039;Ormuz a r\u00e9duit les importations de 11,39 millions de barils par jour en f\u00e9vrier \u00e0 environ 6,36 millions en mai, les pr\u00e9l\u00e8vements sur les stocks, d&#039;environ un million de barils par jour, n&#039;ont couvert qu&#039;un tiers du d\u00e9ficit. Les r\u00e9ductions de production, les limitations des exportations, une production nationale record et le recours aux v\u00e9hicules \u00e9lectriques ont permis de combler le reste.<\/li>\n<li>Sur le papier, les r\u00e9serves repr\u00e9sentent une autonomie d&#039;environ 95 \u00e0 121 jours. Il s&#039;agit de jours th\u00e9oriques, et non de jours de survie r\u00e9els, car il est impossible de calculer le fond des r\u00e9servoirs et leur volume utile. Personne ne publie la fraction exploitable.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h2>Trois estimations cr\u00e9dibles, un \u00e9cart de 600 millions de barils<\/h2>\n<p>Commen\u00e7ons par les faits. Il n&#039;existe qu&#039;une seule donn\u00e9e officielle concernant les capacit\u00e9s de stockage chinoises\u00a0: 238 millions de barils r\u00e9partis sur neuf sites, publi\u00e9e par le Bureau national des statistiques en 2017 et jamais mise \u00e0 jour. Tout le reste dans ce dossier est une estimation externe, et nous en prenons acte.<\/p>\n<p>Kayrros estimait la capacit\u00e9 des parcs de stockage de carburant hors sol \u00e0 plus de 1,8 milliard de barils \u00e0 la mi-2024. Energy Aspects \u00e9valuait la capacit\u00e9 totale de stockage \u00e0 environ 2,0 milliards de barils en d\u00e9cembre 2025, avec une possible augmentation de 260 millions de barils en 2026. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.spglobal.com\/energy\/en\/news-research\/latest-news\/crude-oil\/010826-commodities-2026-oil-storage-expands-globally-as-energy-security-trading-drive-demand\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">Perspectives mondiales sur les mati\u00e8res premi\u00e8res de S&amp;P<\/a> En janvier 2026, il a \u00e9t\u00e9 annonc\u00e9 qu&#039;environ 271 millions de barils de nouvelle capacit\u00e9 commerciale de p\u00e9trole brut, r\u00e9partis sur huit sites, arriveraient en 2026, la plupart \u00e9tant souterrains et notamment dans le Fujian, portant le total \u00e0 plus de 2,39 milliards de barils.<\/p>\n<p>Cela repr\u00e9sente un \u00e9cart d&#039;environ 600 millions de barils entre l&#039;estimation basse et l&#039;estimation haute. Pour vous donner une id\u00e9e de l&#039;ampleur de cette somme\u00a0: elle est sup\u00e9rieure \u00e0 la totalit\u00e9 des r\u00e9serves strat\u00e9giques de p\u00e9trole des \u00c9tats-Unis. Quiconque avance un chiffre unique et fiable concernant la capacit\u00e9 de stockage de la Chine ne se base pas sur les donn\u00e9es.<\/p>\n<p>Concernant la construction elle-m\u00eame, une <a href=\"https:\/\/finance.yahoo.com\/news\/analysis-china-accelerates-oil-build-043841340.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">Analyse de Reuters en octobre 2025<\/a> Reuters a recens\u00e9 169 millions de barils r\u00e9partis sur 11 nouveaux sites en construction par Sinopec, CNOOC et d&#039;autres entreprises entre 2025 et 2026, dont 37 millions de barils \u00e9taient d\u00e9j\u00e0 construits. Parmi les projets cit\u00e9s figurent deux sites int\u00e9rieurs dans le Shaanxi, totalisant 11 millions de barils, et une installation de Sinopec de 20 millions de barils sur l&#039;\u00eele de Hainan. Reuters a pr\u00e9cis\u00e9 que sa liste pourrait ne pas \u00eatre exhaustive, en raison du secret qui entoure ces informations en Chine. \u00c0 titre de comparaison, Vortexa et Kpler estiment que 180 \u00e0 190 millions de barils de capacit\u00e9 ont \u00e9t\u00e9 ajout\u00e9s entre 2020 et 2024. La construction pr\u00e9vue pour 2025-2026 \u00e0 elle seule \u00e9quivaut presque \u00e0 celle des cinq ann\u00e9es pr\u00e9c\u00e9dentes.<\/p>\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Mesure<\/th>\n<th>Chiffre<\/th>\n<th>Source et date<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>Capacit\u00e9 de r\u00e9serve strat\u00e9gique officielle<\/td>\n<td>238 millions de barils r\u00e9partis sur 9 bases<\/td>\n<td>Bureau national des statistiques, 2017. Le seul chiffre officiel jamais publi\u00e9<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>capacit\u00e9 des parcs de r\u00e9servoirs hors sol<\/td>\n<td>Plus de 1,8 milliard de barils, selon les estimations<\/td>\n<td>Kayrros, mi-2024<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Capacit\u00e9 de stockage totale<\/td>\n<td>Environ 2 milliards de barils, selon les estimations, auxquels pourraient s&#039;ajouter 260 millions de barils en 2026.<\/td>\n<td>Aspects \u00e9nerg\u00e9tiques, d\u00e9cembre 2025<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Capacit\u00e9 totale apr\u00e8s la construction de 2026<\/td>\n<td>Plus de 2,39 milliards de barils, apr\u00e8s 271 millions de barils r\u00e9partis sur 8 nouveaux sites commerciaux<\/td>\n<td>Perspectives mondiales sur les mati\u00e8res premi\u00e8res de S&amp;P, janvier 2026<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>capacit\u00e9 des cavernes souterraines<\/td>\n<td>Au moins 100 millions de barils r\u00e9partis sur 4 sites. Kayrros l&#039;estime \u00e0 environ 130 millions, le taux de remplissage \u00e9tant inconnu.<\/td>\n<td>T\u00e9moignage du Baker Institute via Ursa Space, 2024, et Kayrros, mars 2025<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>En cours de construction<\/td>\n<td>169 millions de barils r\u00e9partis sur 11 sites, dont 37 millions d\u00e9j\u00e0 construits<\/td>\n<td>Analyse de Reuters, octobre 2025<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>La part de la Chine dans les stocks mondiaux de p\u00e9trole terrestre<\/td>\n<td>31 %, contre 11 % pour les \u00c9tats-Unis et 8 % pour le Japon<\/td>\n<td>Donn\u00e9es d&#039;Ursa Space Systems via S&amp;P Global, janvier 2026<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<h2>Environ 1,2 \u00e0 1,5 milliard de barils, et c&#039;est le p\u00e9rim\u00e8tre qui fait le travail.<\/h2>\n<p>Le <a href=\"https:\/\/www.eia.gov\/todayinenergy\/detail.php?id=67504\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">Administration am\u00e9ricaine de l&#039;information sur l&#039;\u00e9nergie<\/a> Les r\u00e9serves totales de p\u00e9trole de la Chine \u00e9taient estim\u00e9es \u00e0 environ 1,4 milliard de barils en d\u00e9cembre 2025, dont environ 360 millions de barils d\u00e9tenus par l&#039;\u00c9tat et environ 1 milliard de barils de stocks commerciaux, y compris les stocks des raffineries. Kpler estimait ce total \u00e0 plus de 1,5 milliard de barils en d\u00e9cembre 2025. Vortexa a enregistr\u00e9 un niveau record de 1,24 milliard de barils de stocks de p\u00e9trole brut hors sol en avril 2026. Bloomberg a rapport\u00e9 des stocks commerciaux et strat\u00e9giques d&#039;environ 1,2 milliard de barils en juin 2026.<\/p>\n<p>Si l&#039;on compare ces chiffres \u00e0 la capacit\u00e9 r\u00e9elle, on obtient un taux d&#039;utilisation d&#039;environ 55 \u00e0 65 %. Ce pourcentage est le fruit de nos calculs \u00e0 partir des donn\u00e9es recueillies, et non d&#039;un chiffre publi\u00e9\u00a0; nous le pr\u00e9cisons donc. L&#039;analyse ind\u00e9pendante d&#039;OilX, selon laquelle les cavernes de stockage chinoises ne sont remplies qu&#039;\u00e0 moiti\u00e9, va dans le m\u00eame sens.<\/p>\n<p>L&#039;\u00e9cart de plusieurs centaines de millions de barils entre les estimations tient principalement \u00e0 une question de d\u00e9finition, et c&#039;est l\u00e0 l&#039;\u00e9l\u00e9ment essentiel \u00e0 comprendre. L&#039;EIA consid\u00e8re les stocks gouvernementaux et commerciaux comme strat\u00e9giques pour la Chine, car les entreprises d&#039;\u00c9tat ont re\u00e7u l&#039;ordre, \u00e0 partir de 2024, de constituer des r\u00e9serves de p\u00e9trole d&#039;urgence dans des stocks commerciaux. Les estimations plus pr\u00e9cises de Kpler (799 millions de barils) et de Vortexa (735 millions de barils) excluent totalement les r\u00e9serves strat\u00e9giques souterraines. Comparer un p\u00e9rim\u00e8tre large \u00e0 un p\u00e9rim\u00e8tre restreint engendre une erreur de 700 millions de barils sans qu&#039;aucune erreur n&#039;ait \u00e9t\u00e9 commise.<\/p>\n<p>Il existe \u00e9galement une raison structurelle \u00e0 ce brouillage des cat\u00e9gories. Une loi adopt\u00e9e en janvier 2026 a codifi\u00e9 les stocks publics et priv\u00e9s au sein d&#039;une d\u00e9finition unique de r\u00e9serves nationales et impose aux entreprises de constituer des r\u00e9serves de responsabilit\u00e9 sociale supervis\u00e9es par l&#039;\u00c9tat. Toutes les r\u00e9serves sont g\u00e9r\u00e9es par des divisions des compagnies p\u00e9troli\u00e8res d&#039;\u00c9tat, sous l&#039;\u00e9gide de l&#039;Administration nationale des r\u00e9serves alimentaires et strat\u00e9giques, qui en d\u00e9tient la propri\u00e9t\u00e9. En Chine, la fronti\u00e8re entre r\u00e9serves commerciales et strat\u00e9giques rel\u00e8ve d\u00e9sormais autant de la fiction juridique que de la r\u00e9alit\u00e9.<\/p>\n<p>Si vous souhaitez une analyse m\u00e9thodologique compl\u00e8te, nous l&#039;avons r\u00e9dig\u00e9e s\u00e9par\u00e9ment dans <a href=\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/fr\/les-estimations-des-reserves-petrolieres-de-la-chine-varient-selon-les-sources\/\">Pourquoi toutes les estimations des stocks p\u00e9troliers de la Chine divergent-elles ?<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h2>Acier c\u00f4tier et roche suffisamment profonde pour r\u00e9sister \u00e0 une frappe<\/h2>\n<p>La majeure partie des capacit\u00e9s de stockage chinoises se trouve en surface, dans des parcs de stockage c\u00f4tiers situ\u00e9s pr\u00e8s des ports et des raffineries. Ce sont ces r\u00e9servoirs que les satellites peuvent photographier et qui servent de base \u00e0 la quasi-totalit\u00e9 des estimations publi\u00e9es.<\/p>\n<p>La situation souterraine est diff\u00e9rente. Quatre sites de stockage souterrain de p\u00e9trole brut sont actuellement en service, tous situ\u00e9s \u00e0 proximit\u00e9 de ports et de p\u00f4les de consommation\u00a0: Jinzhou (Liaoning), Huangdao (Shandong), Huizhou et Zhanjiang (Guangdong), avec une capacit\u00e9 combin\u00e9e d\u2019au moins 100 millions de barils. Une cinqui\u00e8me caverne est en construction \u00e0 Ningbo (Zhejiang)\u00a0; les travaux ont d\u00e9but\u00e9 en d\u00e9cembre 2023 et devraient s\u2019achever vers la fin de 2026. Elle est con\u00e7ue pour une dur\u00e9e de vie de 50 ans. <a href=\"https:\/\/ursaspace.com\/blog\/underground-oil-storage-china-risk-series\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">Syst\u00e8mes spatiaux Ursa<\/a> elle suit l&#039;\u00e9volution de la construction gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 l&#039;imagerie satellite radar, qui fonctionne m\u00eame \u00e0 travers les nuages et la nuit.<\/p>\n<p>Il s&#039;agit de cavernes rocheuses \u00e9tanches \u00e0 l&#039;eau, creus\u00e9es parfois jusqu&#039;\u00e0 200 m\u00e8tres sous la surface. Gabriel Collins, de l&#039;Institut Baker, a soulign\u00e9 sans d\u00e9tour, lors de son t\u00e9moignage devant la Commission d&#039;examen \u00e9conomique et de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 \u00c9tats-Unis-Chine, l&#039;importance strat\u00e9gique de ces cavernes : certains des gisements de p\u00e9trole souterrains en service en Chine se trouvent sous une couche de terre et de roche pouvant atteindre 100 m\u00e8tres de profondeur, les rendant ainsi inaccessibles \u00e0 la quasi-totalit\u00e9 des munitions de frappe utilis\u00e9es par les forces arm\u00e9es du monde entier, y compris celles des \u00c9tats-Unis.<\/p>\n<p>La justification n&#039;est pas uniquement militaire. Les r\u00e9servoirs souterrains sont moins co\u00fbteux que les r\u00e9servoirs c\u00f4tiers de surface, une fois le co\u00fbt du terrain pris en compte\u00a0; leurs co\u00fbts d&#039;exploitation sont inf\u00e9rieurs, leur dur\u00e9e de vie est plus longue et ils n\u00e9cessitent moins d&#039;entretien. Les capacit\u00e9s suppl\u00e9mentaires pr\u00e9vues pour 2026 sont de plus en plus souterraines, notamment dans le Fujian. Par ailleurs, la Chine a \u00e9tendu ses capacit\u00e9s de stockage \u00e0 l&#039;int\u00e9rieur des terres, loin de ses c\u00f4tes orientales expos\u00e9es, comme en t\u00e9moignent les deux sites du Shaanxi.<\/p>\n<p>Pour quiconque mod\u00e9lise la Chine, la cons\u00e9quence est flagrante\u00a0: la partie la plus vaste et celle qui cro\u00eet le plus rapidement de la r\u00e9serve est celle qui est inaccessible \u00e0 l\u2019observation directe. Les cavernes n\u2019ont pas de plafond flottant \u00e0 photographier. Le remplissage souterrain est estim\u00e9, jamais mesur\u00e9.<\/p>\n<h2>Deux m\u00e9thodes, un angle mort commun<\/h2>\n<p>Le gouvernement chinois consid\u00e8re ses stocks de p\u00e9trole brut et de produits p\u00e9troliers, tant commerciaux que strat\u00e9giques, comme un secret d&#039;\u00c9tat. Le montant total des stocks n&#039;est pas divulgu\u00e9. La derni\u00e8re mise \u00e0 jour officielle des capacit\u00e9s remonte \u00e0 2017. Comme l&#039;explique l&#039;analyste \u00e9nerg\u00e9tique John Kemp, ce secret se comprend compte tenu de l&#039;extr\u00eame vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 du pays \u00e0 toute interruption des importations, et il n&#039;y a aucun int\u00e9r\u00eat \u00e0 partager les niveaux de stocks avec d&#039;\u00e9ventuels adversaires. Il n&#039;en demeure pas moins que cette situation est devenue l&#039;une des principales sources d&#039;incertitude dans les pr\u00e9visions du march\u00e9 p\u00e9trolier mondial.<\/p>\n<p>Les analystes reconstruisent ce nombre de deux mani\u00e8res diff\u00e9rentes, ce qui explique pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment la divergence des estimations.<\/p>\n<p>La premi\u00e8re m\u00e9thode est celle de l&#039;\u00e9quilibre de l&#039;offre. La variation implicite des stocks est \u00e9gale \u00e0 la production int\u00e9rieure plus les importations, moins le d\u00e9bit des raffineries, moins les exportations. <a href=\"https:\/\/jkempenergy.com\/2026\/02\/15\/chinas-oil-stocks-and-readiness-for-war\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">Exemple concret de Kemp en 2025<\/a>La production nationale de 216 millions de tonnes, additionn\u00e9e aux importations de 578 millions de tonnes, donne 794 millions de tonnes disponibles. Or, les raffineries n&#039;ont trait\u00e9 que 738 millions de tonnes, laissant un d\u00e9ficit d&#039;environ 56 millions de tonnes, dont pr\u00e8s de 2 millions ont \u00e9t\u00e9 export\u00e9es. Cela implique une augmentation des stocks de p\u00e9trole brut d&#039;environ 54 millions de tonnes, soit environ 400 millions de barils, ou encore 1,1 million de barils par jour, sur l&#039;ensemble de l&#039;ann\u00e9e 2025.<\/p>\n<p>La seconde m\u00e9thode consiste \u00e0 surveiller le niveau de remplissage des r\u00e9servoirs par satellite. L&#039;analyse g\u00e9ospatiale des ombres port\u00e9es par les toits flottants des r\u00e9servoirs permet de d\u00e9terminer le niveau de remplissage de chaque r\u00e9servoir. Les syst\u00e8mes Kayrros, Kpler, Vortexa et Ursa Space fonctionnent tous de cette mani\u00e8re. Kayrros a observ\u00e9 des stocks hors sol variant de 850 millions \u00e0 un peu plus d&#039;un milliard de barils entre 2016 et 2024.<\/p>\n<p>Les deux m\u00e9thodes pr\u00e9sentent d&#039;importantes marges d&#039;erreur, comme l&#039;indique clairement l&#039;EIA\u00a0: selon la source utilis\u00e9e et les hypoth\u00e8ses retenues, l&#039;\u00e9cart entre les diff\u00e9rentes estimations de la constitution des stocks est en moyenne de 0,5 million de barils par jour et peut atteindre 1,1 million de barils par jour. L&#039;incertitude est \u00e0 peu pr\u00e8s proportionnelle \u00e0 la grandeur mesur\u00e9e.<\/p>\n<p>Ces deux types de cavernes pr\u00e9sentent le m\u00eame d\u00e9faut majeur\u00a0: l\u2019absence de plafond visible \u00e0 photographier. De plus, elles ne figurent pas dans le bilan national. L\u2019ensemble des r\u00e9serves souterraines, estim\u00e9es entre 110 et 130 millions de barils, repose sur des hypoth\u00e8ses.<\/p>\n<h2>Environ trois mois sur le papier, et 2026 l&#039;a mis \u00e0 l&#039;\u00e9preuve.<\/h2>\n<p>Prenons l&#039;exemple des mati\u00e8res premi\u00e8res. En 2025, les importations chinoises de p\u00e9trole brut s&#039;\u00e9levaient en moyenne \u00e0 11,6 millions de barils par jour. Le d\u00e9bit des raffineries atteignait 14,82 millions de barils par jour entre janvier et novembre 2025. La production nationale de p\u00e9trole brut \u00e9tait de 4,35 millions de barils par jour, avec un record d&#039;environ 4,5 millions de barils au premier trimestre 2026. La Chine d\u00e9pend \u00e0 hauteur d&#039;environ 70 % de son approvisionnement en p\u00e9trole brut. Les stocks totaux s&#039;\u00e9l\u00e8vent \u00e0 environ 1,4 milliard de barils, dont environ 360 millions sont d\u00e9tenus par l&#039;\u00c9tat.<\/p>\n<p>Le calcul, qui est de notre propre initiative et non une donn\u00e9e publi\u00e9e, est le suivant\u00a0: 1\u00a0400 millions de barils divis\u00e9s par 11,6 millions de barils d\u2019importations par jour donnent une couverture brute des importations d\u2019environ 121 jours. Compte tenu de la production des raffineries, qui s\u2019\u00e9l\u00e8ve \u00e0 14,82 millions de barils par jour, cela repr\u00e9sente environ 95 jours. La part d\u00e9tenue par le gouvernement, soit 360 millions de barils, couvre \u00e0 elle seule environ 31 jours d\u2019importations.<\/p>\n<p>Cette fourchette est corrobor\u00e9e ind\u00e9pendamment. Kayrros et Kemp ont estim\u00e9 les stocks totaux \u00e0 1,1 \u00e0 1,2 milliard de barils en mars 2025, soit l&#039;\u00e9quivalent d&#039;environ 100 jours ou un peu plus de trois mois d&#039;importations, et la conclusion de Kemp en f\u00e9vrier 2026 \u00e9tait que les stocks de la Chine repr\u00e9sentaient l\u00e9g\u00e8rement plus de trois mois d&#039;importations nettes.<\/p>\n<p>L&#039;avertissement essentiel\u00a0: il s&#039;agit aujourd&#039;hui d&#039;une couverture th\u00e9orique, et non d&#039;une r\u00e9alit\u00e9 tangible. Une grande partie des stocks de r\u00e9servoirs correspond au stock minimum d&#039;exploitation, au fond des r\u00e9servoirs et au volume de travail en transit, autant d&#039;\u00e9l\u00e9ments qui ne peuvent \u00eatre pr\u00e9lev\u00e9s physiquement. Personne ne publie la fraction pr\u00e9lev\u00e9e, et elle est loin d&#039;\u00eatre n\u00e9gligeable.<\/p>\n<p>Puis vint la v\u00e9ritable \u00e9preuve. \u00c0 partir de fin f\u00e9vrier 2026, les perturbations li\u00e9es \u00e0 la guerre en Iran et la fermeture de facto du d\u00e9troit d&#039;Ormuz provoqu\u00e8rent l&#039;effondrement des importations chinoises de p\u00e9trole brut. Celles-ci chut\u00e8rent de 11,39 millions de barils par jour en f\u00e9vrier, dernier mois avant le conflit, \u00e0 environ 6,36 millions en mai, soit une baisse de plus de 44 % selon les donn\u00e9es de Kpler. L&#039;AIE qualifia cet \u00e9v\u00e9nement de plus important choc jamais enregistr\u00e9 sur le march\u00e9 p\u00e9trolier et publia un communiqu\u00e9 coordonn\u00e9 de ses membres en mars 2026.<\/p>\n<p>Voici ce qui s&#039;est r\u00e9ellement pass\u00e9, et ce n&#039;est pas l&#039;histoire que l&#039;on raconte g\u00e9n\u00e9ralement au sujet des r\u00e9serves strat\u00e9giques. La production des raffineries a diminu\u00e9 bien moins que les importations, pour atteindre 13,5 millions de barils par jour en mai, soit une baisse d&#039;environ 1,9 million seulement sur un an. Cet \u00e9cart a \u00e9t\u00e9 combl\u00e9 par des pr\u00e9l\u00e8vements sur les stocks d&#039;environ 1 million de barils par jour, par des r\u00e9ductions de production \u00e0 des niveaux historiquement bas, par des restrictions sur les exportations de carburant mises en place en temps de guerre (ramenant les exportations hors de Hong Kong et Macao \u00e0 120\u00a0000 barils par jour en avril), par une production nationale record d&#039;environ 4,5 millions de barils par jour, par l&#039;acheminement de p\u00e9trole brut par ol\u00e9oduc en provenance de Russie et du Kazakhstan, et par la substitution par les v\u00e9hicules \u00e9lectriques, qui, selon les estimations d&#039;Emma Li de Vortexa, a r\u00e9duit la demande de carburant d&#039;environ 1 million de barils par jour au cours du trimestre.<\/p>\n<p>Bloomberg a pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 les chiffres sans d\u00e9tour\u00a0: les pr\u00e9l\u00e8vements d\u2019environ un million de barils par jour repr\u00e9sentent \u00e0 peu pr\u00e8s un tiers du p\u00e9trole brut que la Chine ne re\u00e7oit plus, et ce volume est d\u00e9risoire compar\u00e9 aux quelque 1,2 milliard de barils d\u00e9tenus par le pays. Les r\u00e9serves n\u2019ont pas eu \u00e0 absorber le choc \u00e0 elles seules. Elles ont permis de gagner du temps pendant que l\u2019offre et la demande s\u2019adaptaient. C\u2019est pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment le r\u00f4le d\u2019une r\u00e9serve, et c\u2019est l\u2019\u00e9v\u00e9nement le plus instructif qui soit survenu en mati\u00e8re de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 \u00e9nerg\u00e9tique chinoise depuis dix ans.<\/p>\n<p>La question de savoir si les r\u00e9serves strat\u00e9giques ont \u00e9t\u00e9 utilis\u00e9es reste en suspens. Sumit Ritolia, de Kpler, a d\u00e9clar\u00e9 que la firme ne pouvait exclure totalement une utilisation partielle de ces r\u00e9serves, et Bloomberg a soulign\u00e9 que le volume exact de p\u00e9trole brut provenant des stocks d&#039;\u00c9tat demeurait incertain, compte tenu du manque de transparence.<\/p>\n<h2>L&#039;assurance, pas la demande<\/h2>\n<p>La construction \u00e0 court terme est document\u00e9e : 169 millions de barils r\u00e9partis sur 11 sites d&#039;ici 2026 selon Reuters, et 271 millions de barils suppl\u00e9mentaires de capacit\u00e9 commerciale r\u00e9partis sur huit sites en 2026 selon S&amp;P Global, portant la capacit\u00e9 totale \u00e0 plus de 2,39 milliards de barils.<\/p>\n<p>L&#039;objectif annonc\u00e9 est plus int\u00e9ressant. En ao\u00fbt 2025, la F\u00e9d\u00e9ration chinoise de l&#039;industrie p\u00e9troli\u00e8re et p\u00e9trochimique (organisme semi-officiel) a d\u00e9clar\u00e9, selon les m\u00e9dias d&#039;\u00c9tat, que la capacit\u00e9 de stockage des r\u00e9serves nationales devrait d\u00e9passer le milliard de barils, soit l&#039;\u00e9quivalent de trois mois d&#039;importations nettes, sans toutefois pr\u00e9ciser d&#039;\u00e9ch\u00e9ancier. Cela correspondrait \u00e0 la norme de 90 jours de l&#039;AIE, \u00e0 laquelle la Chine n&#039;est pas soumise puisqu&#039;elle n&#039;est pas membre de l&#039;AIE. Deux sources commerciales ont par ailleurs indiqu\u00e9 \u00e0 Reuters que P\u00e9kin vise six mois d&#039;importations, soit environ deux milliards de barils. Ce second chiffre, bien que coh\u00e9rent avec l&#039;estimation de capacit\u00e9 d&#039;Energy Aspects et le rythme de construction observ\u00e9, doit \u00eatre consid\u00e9r\u00e9 comme une information non v\u00e9rifi\u00e9e.<\/p>\n<p>Le contexte politique est explicite. La contribution du Comit\u00e9 central du Parti communiste au 15e plan quinquennal, couvrant la p\u00e9riode 2026-2030, appelle \u00e0 la construction d&#039;une nation \u00e9nerg\u00e9tiquement forte, invoquant la comp\u00e9tition entre grandes puissances et affirmant que les \u00c9tats-Unis continuent de contenir et de r\u00e9primer la Chine, ce qui accentue la politisation et l&#039;instrumentalisation des questions \u00e9nerg\u00e9tiques.<\/p>\n<p>Voici un \u00e9l\u00e9ment que la plupart des analyses n\u00e9gligent\u00a0: la demande chinoise d\u2019essence et de diesel est d\u00e9j\u00e0 en baisse, et la consommation globale de p\u00e9trole devrait atteindre son pic vers 2027. La Chine se dote donc des capacit\u00e9s de production n\u00e9cessaires pour couvrir six mois d\u2019importations, pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment au moment o\u00f9 sa demande sous-jacente de p\u00e9trole atteindra son maximum.<\/p>\n<p>Cela vous renseigne sur l&#039;\u00e9tat du chantier. Il ne s&#039;agit pas d&#039;un indicateur de la demande, mais d&#039;un signal g\u00e9opolitique et d&#039;assurance. Kemp et la Commission \u00c9tats-Unis-Chine consid\u00e8rent tous deux le rythme de la construction comme un indicateur d&#039;alerte strat\u00e9gique plausible.<\/p>\n<p>Il existe un corollaire commercial, et c&#039;est celui qui m\u00e9rite d&#039;\u00eatre exploit\u00e9. Une fois le syst\u00e8me d&#039;Ormuz normalis\u00e9, le r\u00e9approvisionnement des stocks pr\u00e9lev\u00e9s et des nouvelles capacit\u00e9s inutilis\u00e9es constituera une source structurelle de demande de p\u00e9trole brut, totalement ind\u00e9pendante de la consommation chinoise. Un pays qui vient de prouver l&#039;efficacit\u00e9 de ses r\u00e9serves et qui dispose de 800 millions \u00e0 1,2 milliard de barils de capacit\u00e9s inutilis\u00e9es a tout int\u00e9r\u00eat \u00e0 acheter.<\/p>\n<p>Pour en savoir plus sur les flux, consultez nos dossiers sur <a href=\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/fr\/la-chine-continue-t-elle-a-constituer-des-stocks-de-petrole-en-2026\/\">la Chine continue-t-elle \u00e0 constituer des stocks de p\u00e9trole ?<\/a> et sur <a href=\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/fr\/reserves-petrolieres-de-la-chine-en-jours\/\">Les jours d&#039;approvisionnement de la Chine<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h2>Foire aux questions<\/h2>\n<h3>Quelle sera la capacit\u00e9 de stockage de p\u00e9trole de la Chine en 2026\u00a0?<\/h3>\n<p>On estime la capacit\u00e9 totale de stockage entre 1,8 et 2,4 milliards de barils, avec des estimations tr\u00e8s variables. Kayrros \u00e9valuait cette capacit\u00e9 \u00e0 plus de 1,8 milliard de barils mi-2024. Energy Aspects l&#039;estimait \u00e0 environ 2 milliards de barils en d\u00e9cembre 2025. S&amp;P Global Commodity Insights indiquait en janvier 2026 que la mise en service d&#039;environ 271 millions de barils de nouvelles capacit\u00e9s commerciales sur huit sites porterait le total \u00e0 plus de 2,39 milliards de barils. Le seul chiffre officiel chinois disponible, publi\u00e9 par le Bureau national des statistiques en 2017 et jamais mis \u00e0 jour, fait \u00e9tat de 238 millions de barils r\u00e9partis sur neuf bases strat\u00e9giques.<\/p>\n<h3>Quelle quantit\u00e9 de p\u00e9trole la Chine d\u00e9tient-elle r\u00e9ellement en r\u00e9serve ?<\/h3>\n<p>Environ 1,2 \u00e0 1,5 milliard de barils. L&#039;Agence am\u00e9ricaine d&#039;information sur l&#039;\u00e9nergie (EIA) estimait les r\u00e9serves totales \u00e0 environ 1,4 milliard de barils en d\u00e9cembre 2025, dont environ 360 millions de barils d\u00e9tenus par le gouvernement et environ 1 milliard de barils d\u00e9tenus par le secteur commercial, y compris les stocks des raffineries. Kpler estimait ces r\u00e9serves \u00e0 plus de 1,5 milliard de barils en d\u00e9cembre 2025, Vortexa enregistrait un record de 1,24 milliard de barils de p\u00e9trole brut de surface en avril 2026, et Bloomberg faisait \u00e9tat d&#039;environ 1,2 milliard de barils en juin 2026. L&#039;\u00e9cart entre ces chiffres s&#039;explique en grande partie par des diff\u00e9rences de d\u00e9finition, notamment selon que la r\u00e9serve strat\u00e9gique souterraine se situe ou non \u00e0 l&#039;int\u00e9rieur du p\u00e9rim\u00e8tre.<\/p>\n<h3>Combien de temps dureront les r\u00e9serves p\u00e9troli\u00e8res de la Chine ?<\/h3>\n<p>Sur le papier, cela repr\u00e9sente environ trois mois. Avec des stocks totaux d&#039;environ 1,4 milliard de barils et des importations pr\u00e9vues de 11,6 millions de barils par jour en 2025, la couverture correspond \u00e0 environ 121 jours d&#039;importations brutes, soit environ 95 jours compte tenu du d\u00e9bit des raffineries, estim\u00e9 \u00e0 14,82 millions de barils par jour. Ce calcul est de notre propre initiative, mais il est corrobor\u00e9 par Kayrros et John Kemp, qui ont ind\u00e9pendamment \u00e9valu\u00e9 les stocks \u00e0 environ 100 jours, soit un peu plus de trois mois d&#039;importations. Il est important de noter qu&#039;il s&#039;agit de jours de couverture th\u00e9oriques, et non de jours de consommation r\u00e9elle, car le niveau des r\u00e9servoirs et le volume utile ne peuvent \u00eatre mesur\u00e9s physiquement, et la fraction exploitable n&#039;est pas publi\u00e9e.<\/p>\n<h3>La Chine stocke-t-elle du p\u00e9trole sous terre ?<\/h3>\n<p>Oui, et de plus en plus. Il existe quatre sites de stockage souterrain de p\u00e9trole brut en service, \u00e0 Jinzhou (Liaoning), Huangdao (Shandong), et Huizhou et Zhanjiang (Guangdong), avec une capacit\u00e9 combin\u00e9e d&#039;au moins 100 millions de barils. Kayrros estime la capacit\u00e9 souterraine \u00e0 environ 130 millions de barils, avec un taux de remplissage inconnu. Une cinqui\u00e8me caverne est en construction \u00e0 Ningbo (Zhejiang), les travaux ayant d\u00e9but\u00e9 en d\u00e9cembre 2023 et devant s&#039;achever vers la fin de 2026. Il s&#039;agit de cavernes creus\u00e9es dans la roche dure et \u00e9tanches \u00e0 l&#039;eau, certaines atteignant 200 m\u00e8tres sous la surface. L&#039;essentiel de l&#039;augmentation de capacit\u00e9 pr\u00e9vue pour 2026 concerne les installations souterraines, notamment dans le Fujian.<\/p>\n<h3>Pourquoi la Chine ne publie-t-elle pas les chiffres de ses r\u00e9serves p\u00e9troli\u00e8res ?<\/h3>\n<p>Because it treats stocks of crude and refined products, both commercial and strategic, as a state secret. The last official capacity disclosure was in 2017 and there have never been official inventory figures. The analyst John Kemp&#8217;s assessment is that the secrecy is understandable given China&#8217;s extreme vulnerability to any interruption of imports, and that there is no benefit in sharing inventory levels with potential adversaries. <a href=\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/fr\/base-de-connaissances\/\">Les analystes reconstituent les chiffres<\/a> Deux m\u00e9thodes permettent d&#039;identifier l&#039;int\u00e9rieur des r\u00e9servoirs : soit par le bilan de l&#039;offre (production plus importations moins op\u00e9rations de raffinage), soit par la surveillance satellitaire des toits flottants. Aucune de ces m\u00e9thodes ne permet d&#039;observer l&#039;int\u00e9rieur d&#039;une caverne rocheuse.<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>La Chine dispose d&#039;une capacit\u00e9 de stockage de p\u00e9trole brut estim\u00e9e entre 1,8 et 2,4 milliards de barils, et en d\u00e9tient actuellement entre 1,2 et 1,5 milliard. Ce dossier d\u00e9taille les parcs de stockage, les cavernes rocheuses, le niveau de remplissage et la dur\u00e9e de stockage r\u00e9elle, chaque donn\u00e9e \u00e9tant \u00e9tay\u00e9e.<\/p>","protected":false},"author":12,"featured_media":3689,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"p54_article_data":"{\"meta\":{\"kicker\":\"Insight \u00b7 Energy Security\",\"topics\":[\"Analysis\",\"Policy\"],\"title\":\"How Much Oil Can China Actually Store? Capacity in 2026\",\"dek\":\"Not how fast China fills, not why the estimates disagree. This dossier is about the steel and the rock: how many barrels of physical storage China has built, how full those tanks are, where the caverns are, and how long the oil would actually last. In 2026 that stopped being an academic question.\",\"date\":\"14 July 2026\",\"readTime\":\"12 min read\",\"author\":\"Project 54, Research & Strategy\",\"dateModified\":\"2026-08-08T20:41:03.212Z\"},\"quickAnswer\":{\"q\":\"How much oil storage capacity does China have?\",\"a\":\"China has roughly 1.8 to 2.4 billion barrels of total crude storage capacity in 2026, and the spread is real, not resolvable from public data. Kayrros estimated more than 1.8 billion barrels of tank farm capacity in mid 2024. Energy Aspects put total capacity at about 2.0 billion barrels in December 2025. S&P Global Commodity Insights reported in January 2026 that around 271 million barrels of new commercial capacity across eight sites would take the total above 2.39 billion barrels. Actual fill is roughly 1.2 to 1.5 billion barrels. The only official capacity figure China has ever published is 238 million barrels across nine strategic bases, from the National Bureau of Statistics in 2017. There are zero official inventory figures. Every current number is an estimate produced by an outside analyst.\"},\"takeaways\":[\"Total capacity is an estimate with a 600 million barrel spread, wider than the entire US Strategic Petroleum Reserve. 1.8bn barrels per Kayrros, 2.0bn per Energy Aspects, above 2.39bn per S&P Global after the 2026 build.\",\"Actual fill is roughly 1.2 to 1.5 billion barrels. The EIA put total holdings at about 1.4 billion barrels in December 2025, of which around 360 million barrels is government held. That implies tanks are somewhere around 55 to 65 percent full, which is our arithmetic on their figures, not a published number.\",\"Only one official number exists. The National Bureau of Statistics disclosed 238 million barrels across nine bases in 2017 and has published nothing since. China treats crude and product stocks as a state secret.\",\"Satellites can see tank tops, not rock. Four underground cavern sites hold at least 100 million barrels, with a fifth under construction at Ningbo. Kayrros puts underground capacity at around 130 million barrels with an unknown fill rate. That is a permanent blind spot in every estimate.\",\"The reserve was stress tested in 2026 and it held, but not on its own. When Hormuz disruption cut imports from 11.39 million barrels a day in February to about 6.36 million in May, stock draws of around 1 million barrels a day covered only about a third of the shortfall. Run cuts, export curbs, record domestic output and EV substitution did the rest.\",\"On paper the stockpile is worth about 95 to 121 days of cover. That is days on paper, not days of survival, because tank bottoms and working volume cannot be drawn. Nobody publishes the drawable fraction.\"],\"sections\":[{\"id\":\"sec1\",\"q\":\"How many barrels of storage has China actually built?\",\"h\":\"Three credible estimates, a 600 million barrel spread\",\"p\":[\"Start with the honest position. There is exactly one official Chinese capacity disclosure in existence: 238 million barrels across nine storage bases, published by the National Bureau of Statistics in 2017 and never updated. Everything else in this dossier is an outside estimate, and we attribute every one of them.\",\"Kayrros estimated more than 1.8 billion barrels of above ground tank farm capacity in mid 2024. Energy Aspects put total storage capacity at about 2.0 billion barrels in December 2025, with a possible 260 million barrels to be added during 2026. <a href=\\\"https:\/\/www.spglobal.com\/energy\/en\/news-research\/latest-news\/crude-oil\/010826-commodities-2026-oil-storage-expands-globally-as-energy-security-trading-drive-demand\\\" target=\\\"_blank\\\" rel=\\\"noopener\\\">S&P Global Commodity Insights<\/a> reported in January 2026 that roughly 271 million barrels of new commercial crude capacity across eight sites would arrive in 2026, much of it underground and notably in Fujian, taking the total above 2.39 billion barrels.\",\"That is a spread of around 600 million barrels between the low and high estimate. To calibrate how large that is: it is bigger than the entire United States Strategic Petroleum Reserve. Anyone quoting a single confident number for China's storage capacity is not telling you something the data supports.\",\"On the build itself, a <a href=\\\"https:\/\/finance.yahoo.com\/news\/analysis-china-accelerates-oil-build-043841340.html\\\" target=\\\"_blank\\\" rel=\\\"noopener\\\">Reuters analysis in October 2025<\/a> counted 169 million barrels across 11 new sites under construction by Sinopec, CNOOC and others through 2025 and 2026, of which 37 million barrels was already built. Named projects included two inland sites in Shaanxi totalling 11 million barrels and a 20 million barrel Sinopec facility on Hainan. Reuters was explicit that its list may not be comprehensive, because of Chinese secrecy. For scale, Vortexa and Kpler estimate that 180 to 190 million barrels of capacity was added across the whole of 2020 to 2024. The 2025 to 2026 build alone nearly matches the previous five years.\"],\"table\":{\"cols\":[\"Measure\",\"Figure\",\"Source and date\"],\"rows\":[[\"Official strategic reserve capacity\",\"238 million barrels across 9 bases\",\"National Bureau of Statistics, 2017. The only official figure ever published\"],[\"Above ground tank farm capacity\",\"More than 1.8 billion barrels, estimate\",\"Kayrros, mid 2024\"],[\"Total storage capacity\",\"About 2.0 billion barrels, estimate, plus a possible 260m added in 2026\",\"Energy Aspects, December 2025\"],[\"Total capacity after the 2026 build\",\"Above 2.39 billion barrels, after 271m barrels across 8 new commercial sites\",\"S&P Global Commodity Insights, January 2026\"],[\"Underground cavern capacity\",\"At least 100 million barrels across 4 sites. Kayrros puts it at about 130m, fill rate unknown\",\"Baker Institute testimony via Ursa Space, 2024, and Kayrros, March 2025\"],[\"Under construction\",\"169 million barrels across 11 sites, 37m of it already built\",\"Reuters analysis, October 2025\"],[\"China's share of global onshore oil inventories\",\"31 percent, against 11 percent for the US and 8 percent for Japan\",\"Ursa Space Systems data via S&P Global, January 2026\"]]}},{\"id\":\"sec2\",\"q\":\"How full are those tanks?\",\"h\":\"Roughly 1.2 to 1.5 billion barrels, and the perimeter is doing the work\",\"p\":[\"The <a href=\\\"https:\/\/www.eia.gov\/todayinenergy\/detail.php?id=67504\\\" target=\\\"_blank\\\" rel=\\\"noopener\\\">US Energy Information Administration<\/a> put China's total holdings at about 1.4 billion barrels as of December 2025, of which roughly 360 million barrels is government held and about 1.0 billion barrels is commercial, including refinery stocks. Kpler put the December 2025 total above 1.5 billion barrels. Vortexa recorded a record 1.24 billion barrels of above ground crude stocks in April 2026. Bloomberg reported commercial and strategic stockpiles at about 1.2 billion barrels in June 2026.\",\"Set those against capacity and you get a utilisation rate somewhere around 55 to 65 percent. That percentage is our arithmetic on the sourced figures, not a published number, and we flag it as such. OilX's independent read, that China's storage caverns are only half full, points the same way.\",\"The reason the estimates diverge by hundreds of millions of barrels is mostly definitional, and this is the single most useful thing to understand about the subject. The EIA counts both government and commercial stocks as strategic for China, because state owned companies were directed from 2024 to hold emergency oil inside commercial stockpiles. Kpler's narrower 799 million barrel figure and Vortexa's 735 million barrel figure exclude the underground strategic reserve entirely. Compare a broad perimeter with a narrow one and you generate a 700 million barrel error without anyone having made a mistake.\",\"There is also a structural reason the categories are blurring. A law passed in January 2026 codified government and commercial stocks within a single definition of national reserves, and requires companies to hold government supervised social responsibility reserves. All reserves are managed by divisions of the state oil firms under the National Food and Strategic Reserves Administration, which holds title. The line between commercial and strategic in China is now a legal fiction as much as a physical one.\",\"If you want the methodology argument in full, we have written it up separately in <a href=\\\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/china-oil-reserve-estimates-vary-sources\/\\\">why every estimate of China's oil stockpile disagrees<\/a>.\"]},{\"id\":\"sec3\",\"q\":\"Where is the oil physically kept?\",\"h\":\"Coastal steel, and rock deep enough to survive a strike\",\"p\":[\"Most of China's storage is above ground, in coastal tank farms near ports and refineries. Those are the tanks a satellite can photograph, and they are the basis of nearly every published estimate.\",\"The underground picture is different. There are four in service underground crude storage sites, all near ports and demand hubs: Jinzhou in Liaoning, Huangdao in Shandong, and Huizhou and Zhanjiang in Guangdong, with combined capacity of at least 100 million barrels. A fifth cavern is under construction at Ningbo in Zhejiang, begun in December 2023, expected to complete around the end of 2026, and designed to last 50 years. <a href=\\\"https:\/\/ursaspace.com\/blog\/underground-oil-storage-china-risk-series\/\\\" target=\\\"_blank\\\" rel=\\\"noopener\\\">Ursa Space Systems<\/a> has been tracking the build with radar satellite imagery, which works through cloud and at night.\",\"These are water sealed hard rock caverns, excavated in some cases up to around 200 metres below the surface. Gabriel Collins of the Baker Institute, in testimony to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, made the strategic point directly: some of China's in service underground oil storages sit under as much as 100 metres of earth and rock, placing them below the reach of nearly every strike munition deployed by any military globally, including the United States.\",\"The rationale is not only military. Caverns are cheaper than coastal above ground tanks once land cost is included, they have lower operating costs, they last longer and they need less maintenance. The 2026 additions are increasingly underground, notably in Fujian. And China has been pushing storage inland, away from its exposed eastern coasts, which is what the two Shaanxi sites are for.\",\"The consequence for anyone modelling China is stark. The single largest and fastest growing part of the reserve is the part that cannot be observed. Caverns have no floating roof to photograph. Underground fill is inferred, never measured.\"]},{\"id\":\"sec4\",\"q\":\"If China publishes nothing, how does anyone know?\",\"h\":\"Two methods, one shared blind spot\",\"p\":[\"China's government treats stocks of crude and products, commercial and strategic alike, as a state secret. Total inventories are not disclosed. The last official capacity update was 2017. As the energy analyst John Kemp puts it, the secrecy is understandable given the country's extreme vulnerability to any interruption of imports, and there is no benefit in sharing inventory levels with potential adversaries. It has nonetheless become one of the most important sources of uncertainty in forecasting the global oil market.\",\"Analysts reconstruct the number two ways, which is exactly why the estimates diverge.\",\"The first is the supply balance method. Implied stock change equals domestic output plus imports, minus refinery throughput, minus exports. <a href=\\\"https:\/\/jkempenergy.com\/2026\/02\/15\/chinas-oil-stocks-and-readiness-for-war\/\\\" target=\\\"_blank\\\" rel=\\\"noopener\\\">Kemp's 2025 worked example<\/a>: domestic output of 216 million tonnes plus imports of 578 million tonnes gives 794 million tonnes available, while refineries processed only 738 million tonnes, leaving around 56 million tonnes unaccounted for, of which about 2 million was exported. That implies crude stocks rose by roughly 54 million tonnes, about 400 million barrels, or 1.1 million barrels a day across 2025.\",\"The second is satellite tank top monitoring. Geospatial analysis of the shadows cast by floating tank roofs gives a fill level per tank. Kayrros, Kpler, Vortexa and Ursa Space all work this way. Kayrros observed above ground stocks ranging from 850 million to a little over 1 billion barrels between 2016 and 2024.\",\"Both methods carry large error bars, and the EIA says so plainly: depending on the source used and the assumptions made, the range between different stock build estimates is 0.5 million barrels a day on average and can be as large as 1.1 million barrels a day. The uncertainty is roughly the size of the thing being measured.\",\"And both share the same blind spot. Rock caverns have no roof to photograph, and they do not show up separately in a national balance. Everything underground, 110 to 130 million barrels of capacity, is an assumption.\"]},{\"id\":\"sec5\",\"q\":\"How long would the oil actually last?\",\"h\":\"About three months on paper, and 2026 tested it\",\"p\":[\"Take the sourced inputs. China's 2025 crude imports averaged 11.6 million barrels a day. Refinery throughput ran at 14.82 million barrels a day across January to November 2025. Domestic crude production was 4.35 million barrels a day, reaching a record of about 4.5 million in the first quarter of 2026. Import dependence is around 70 percent of crude supply. Total stocks stand at about 1.4 billion barrels, of which around 360 million barrels is government held.\",\"The arithmetic, which is ours and not a published figure: 1,400 million barrels divided by 11.6 million barrels a day of imports gives about 121 days of gross import cover. Against refinery runs of 14.82 million barrels a day it gives about 95 days. The government held portion alone, 360 million barrels, covers about 31 days of imports.\",\"That band is corroborated independently. Kayrros and Kemp put total inventories at 1.1 to 1.2 billion barrels in March 2025, equivalent to around 100 days or just over three months of imports, and Kemp's February 2026 conclusion was that China's inventories are worth slightly more than three months of net imports.\",\"The essential caveat: these are days of cover on paper, not days of survival. A large share of tank inventory is minimum operating stock, tank bottoms and in transit working volume that cannot physically be drawn. Nobody publishes the drawable fraction, and it is not small.\",\"Then came the real test. From late February 2026, Iran war disruption and the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz collapsed China's crude imports. They fell from 11.39 million barrels a day in February, the last pre war month, to about 6.36 million in May, a fall of more than 44 percent on Kpler's data. The IEA called it the biggest oil market shock on record and ran a coordinated member release in March 2026.\",\"Here is what actually happened, and it is not the story most people tell about strategic reserves. Refinery runs fell far less than imports, to 13.5 million barrels a day in May, down only about 1.9 million year on year. The gap was closed by stock draws of roughly 1 million barrels a day, by run cuts to record lows, by wartime fuel export curbs that cut exports beyond Hong Kong and Macau to 120,000 barrels a day in April, by record domestic output of about 4.5 million barrels a day, by pipeline crude from Russia and Kazakhstan, and by electric vehicle substitution, which Vortexa's Emma Li estimates cut fuel demand by around 1 million barrels a day in the quarter.\",\"Bloomberg framed the arithmetic bluntly: draws of about 1 million barrels a day are roughly a third of the crude China is no longer receiving, and they pale next to the roughly 1.2 billion barrels the nation holds. The reserve did not have to carry the shock alone. It bought time while the demand side and the supply side did most of the work. That is what a reserve is actually for, and it is the most instructive thing that has happened to Chinese energy security in a decade.\",\"Whether the strategic reserve proper was tapped remains unresolved. Kpler's Sumit Ritolia said the firm cannot completely rule out some strategic reserve utilisation, and Bloomberg noted that exactly how much crude came from state stockpiles remains unclear given the opacity.\"]},{\"id\":\"sec6\",\"q\":\"What is being built to 2030, and what does it signal?\",\"h\":\"Insurance, not demand\",\"p\":[\"The near term build is documented: 169 million barrels across 11 sites through 2026 per Reuters, and a further 271 million barrels of commercial capacity across eight sites in 2026 per S&P Global, taking total capacity above 2.39 billion barrels.\",\"The stated target is more interesting. In August 2025 the semi official China Petroleum and Petrochemical Industry Federation was cited in state media saying state reserve storage capacity should grow to more than 1 billion barrels, equivalent to three months of net imports, with no timeline given. That would match the IEA's 90 day standard, which China is not bound by since it is not an IEA member. Two trade sources separately told Reuters that Beijing aims for six months of imports, roughly 2 billion barrels. Treat that second figure as unverified sourcing, though it is consistent with both the Energy Aspects capacity estimate and the observed pace of construction.\",\"The policy backdrop is explicit. The Communist Party Central Committee's input to the 15th Five Year Plan, covering 2026 to 2030, calls for building a strong energy nation, citing great power competition and stating that the United States continues to contain and suppress China, making the politicisation and weaponisation of energy issues more prominent.\",\"Now the counterweight that most commentary misses. Chinese gasoline and diesel demand are already declining, and overall oil consumption is widely expected to peak around 2027. So China is building the physical capacity to hold six months of import cover at exactly the moment its underlying oil demand tops out.\",\"That tells you what the build is. It is not a demand signal. It is an insurance and geopolitical signal, and both Kemp and the US-China Commission testimony treat the pace of construction as a plausible strategic warning indicator.\",\"There is a commercial corollary, and it is the one worth trading on. Once Hormuz normalises, refilling the drawn stocks and the newly empty capacity is a structural source of crude demand that has nothing whatsoever to do with Chinese consumption. A country that has just proven its reserve works, and has 800 million to 1.2 billion barrels of unfilled capacity, has every reason to buy.\",\"For the flow side of this picture, see our dossiers on <a href=\\\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/is-china-still-stockpiling-oil-2026\/\\\">whether China is still stockpiling oil<\/a> and on <a href=\\\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/china-oil-reserve-days-of-supply\/\\\">China's days of supply<\/a>.\"]}],\"media\":{\"image\":{\"src\":\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/07\/coastal-crude-oil-storage-tank-farm-aerial.jpg\",\"label\":\"Floating roof tanks are the only part of China's reserve a satellite can actually see.\",\"credit\":\"Project 54\"},\"infographicLabel\":\"Capacity against fill: the 600 million barrel spread nobody can close.\",\"pdf\":{\"href\":\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/07\/china-oil-storage-capacity.pdf\",\"title\":\"How Much Oil Can China Actually Store, Slide Deck\",\"meta\":\"Briefing deck \u00b7 Project 54\"},\"video\":{\"src\":\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/07\/china-oil-storage-capacity-video.mp4\",\"label\":\"How Much Oil Can China Actually Store?\",\"duration\":\"8:21\",\"poster\":\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/07\/china-oil-storage-capacity-poster.jpg\"},\"podcast\":{\"src\":\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/china-storage-podcast.m4a\",\"title\":\"China's Secret Underground Oil Reserves\",\"ep\":\"P54 Energy Growth Brief\",\"duration\":\"20:27\"},\"listenTime\":\"20:27\"},\"poll\":{\"q\":\"Satellite analysts say China's tanks are around 55 to 65 percent full. What is the biggest problem with that number?\",\"options\":[{\"id\":\"a\",\"label\":\"It cannot see inside the rock caverns\",\"insight\":\"Correct, and it is a permanent blind spot rather than a temporary data gap. Tank top monitoring reads the shadow cast by a floating roof. Underground water sealed caverns have no roof. That is 110 to 130 million barrels of capacity with, in Kayrros's own words, an unknown fill rate, and the 2026 build is increasingly underground.\"},{\"id\":\"b\",\"label\":\"The capacity denominator is itself an estimate\",\"insight\":\"Also true, and it compounds the first problem. Capacity estimates range from 1.8 billion barrels to above 2.39 billion. If the denominator has a 600 million barrel spread, a utilisation percentage calculated from it inherits that uncertainty, which is why we flag the 55 to 65 percent figure as our arithmetic rather than a published number.\"},{\"id\":\"c\",\"label\":\"Fill and capacity use different perimeters\",\"insight\":\"A sharp answer. The EIA counts government and commercial stocks together, while Kpler and Vortexa's narrower figures exclude the underground strategic reserve entirely. Compare a broad numerator with a narrow denominator and you generate a several hundred million barrel error without anyone making a mistake.\"},{\"id\":\"d\",\"label\":\"Nothing, satellite data is objective measurement\",\"insight\":\"This is the trap. Satellite tank top analysis is measurement of what is visible, and inference about everything else. It is the best method available and it is still an estimate. China has published one capacity figure since 2017 and zero inventory figures. Treat every number, including the satellite ones, as an attributed estimate with a date.\"}],\"note\":\"No tallies. Each option is a real limitation of the data every analyst in this market is working with.\"},\"faq\":[{\"q\":\"How much oil storage capacity does China have in 2026?\",\"a\":\"Roughly 1.8 to 2.4 billion barrels, and the estimates genuinely disagree. Kayrros put above ground tank farm capacity at more than 1.8 billion barrels in mid 2024. Energy Aspects estimated about 2.0 billion barrels of total capacity in December 2025. S&P Global Commodity Insights reported in January 2026 that around 271 million barrels of new commercial capacity across eight sites would take the total above 2.39 billion barrels. The only official Chinese figure is 238 million barrels across nine strategic bases, published by the National Bureau of Statistics in 2017 and never updated.\"},{\"q\":\"How much oil does China actually have in storage?\",\"a\":\"Roughly 1.2 to 1.5 billion barrels. The US EIA put total holdings at about 1.4 billion barrels as of December 2025, of which around 360 million barrels is government held and about 1.0 billion barrels is commercial including refinery stocks. Kpler estimated above 1.5 billion barrels in December 2025, Vortexa recorded a record 1.24 billion barrels of above ground crude in April 2026, and Bloomberg reported about 1.2 billion barrels in June 2026. Much of the gap between these figures is definitional, specifically whether the underground strategic reserve is inside the perimeter or not.\"},{\"q\":\"How long would China's oil reserves last?\",\"a\":\"About three months on paper. At around 1.4 billion barrels of total stocks and 2025 imports of 11.6 million barrels a day, the cover is roughly 121 days of gross imports, or about 95 days measured against refinery throughput of 14.82 million barrels a day. That arithmetic is ours, but it is corroborated by Kayrros and John Kemp, who independently put inventories at around 100 days or just over three months of imports. The critical caveat is that these are days of cover on paper, not days of survival, because tank bottoms and working volume cannot be physically drawn and nobody publishes the drawable fraction.\"},{\"q\":\"Does China store oil underground?\",\"a\":\"Yes, and increasingly so. There are four in service underground crude storage sites, at Jinzhou in Liaoning, Huangdao in Shandong, and Huizhou and Zhanjiang in Guangdong, with combined capacity of at least 100 million barrels. Kayrros puts underground capacity at around 130 million barrels with an unknown fill rate. A fifth cavern is under construction at Ningbo in Zhejiang, started in December 2023 and expected to complete around the end of 2026. These are water sealed hard rock caverns, some as much as 200 metres below the surface. Much of the 2026 capacity build is underground, notably in Fujian.\"},{\"q\":\"Why does China not publish its oil reserve numbers?\",\"a\":\"Because it treats stocks of crude and refined products, both commercial and strategic, as a state secret. The last official capacity disclosure was in 2017 and there have never been official inventory figures. The analyst John Kemp's assessment is that the secrecy is understandable given China's extreme vulnerability to any interruption of imports, and that there is no benefit in sharing inventory levels with potential adversaries. <a href=\\\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/knowledge-database\/\\\">Analysts reconstruct the numbers<\/a> two ways, through a supply balance of output plus imports minus refinery runs, and through satellite monitoring of floating tank roofs. Neither method can see inside a rock cavern.\"}],\"newsletter\":{\"kicker\":\"The Energy Growth Brief\",\"title\":[\"Intelligence,\",\"to your inbox\"],\"body\":\"Join energy and industrial leaders getting our marketing, AI-growth and revenue-architecture intelligence, direct, no filler.\",\"placeholder\":\"you@company.com\",\"cta\":\"Subscribe\",\"note\":\"No spam. Unsubscribe anytime. We read every reply.\"},\"related\":[{\"title\":\"Does China Store Oil Underground? Salt Caverns, Tank Farms and Why It Matters\",\"topic\":\"Energy\",\"href\":\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/does-china-store-oil-underground\/\"},{\"title\":\"China's Oil Reserve: How Many Days of Supply?\",\"topic\":\"Analysis\",\"href\":\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/china-oil-reserve-days-of-supply\/\"},{\"title\":\"Is China Still Stockpiling Oil in 2026?\",\"topic\":\"Analysis\",\"href\":\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/is-china-still-stockpiling-oil-2026\/\"},{\"title\":\"Why Every Estimate of China's Oil Stockpile Disagrees\",\"topic\":\"Analysis\",\"href\":\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/china-oil-reserve-estimates-vary-sources\/\"},{\"title\":\"Does China's Oil Stockpiling Follow IEA Rules?\",\"topic\":\"Policy\",\"href\":\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/does-china-oil-stockpiling-follow-iea-rules\/\"},{\"title\":\"How Much Oil Does China Import Per Day in 2026?\",\"topic\":\"Oil Markets\",\"href\":\"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/how-much-oil-does-china-import-per-day\/\"}]}","p54_faq":"","p54_media":"","p54_comments_enabled":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[92,125],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3696","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analysis","category-strategy"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3696","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/12"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3696"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3696\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4121,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3696\/revisions\/4121"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/3689"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3696"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3696"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/projectfifty4.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3696"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}